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Abstract
A formidable barrier for small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to be integrated
into civil airspace is that small UAS currently lack the ability to Detect and Avoid
(DAA) other aircraft during flight operations; however, this ability is an essential part
of regulations governing the general operation of aircraft in civil airspace. In this way,
the research described is focused on achieving an equivalent level of safety for small
UAS as manned aircraft in civil airspace.
A small UAS DAA system was proposed to guide small UAS to detect nearby
traffic, identify hazards, assess collision risks, perform mitigation analyses, and choose
appropriate maneuvers to avoid potential collisions in mid-air encounters. To facilitate
system development and performance evaluation, the proposed DAA system was
designed and implemented on a fast-time simulation-based analysis platform, on which
a set of quantifiable analysis metrics were designed for small UAS to improve situation
awareness in hazard identification and collision risk assessment; and a learning-based
Smart Decision Tree Method (SDTM) was developed to provide real-time supervisory
DAA guidance for small UAS to avoid potential collisions in mitigation analysis.
The theoretical research achieved was also integrated into an effort to implement
an Automatic Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) to verify the short range DAA
performance for small UAS in the visual-line-of-sight flight tests performed at the
RAVEN test site in Argentia, NL.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The history of UAS can be traced back to World War II as a target-practice drone [15].
With evolution and development in the last seventy years, UAS have been largely
applied for military purposes from aerial reconnaissance to active target spotting [16],
and have become an indispensable part of modern warfare. At the same time,
UAS have also become more and more popular for both civilian and commercial
applications. For example, UAS have recently been used for environmental monitoring
and measurements, emergency response, homeland security, precision agriculture, land
management, infrastructure monitoring, and commercial applications such as aerial
photography and transportation of goods and post [3, 17].
As new entrants to the aviation industry, UAS are more than just aircraft; they are
a comprehensive control system, which consists of several distinct parts described in
Fig. 1.1: the flying air vehicle with the systems onboard (i.e., the Unmanned Aircraft
(UA)), the Ground Control Station (GCS) that the pilot uses to operate the UA, and
the Command and Control (C2) link between the air and the ground [18].
1
Figure 1.1: A typical system diagram for UAS [3].
On manned aircraft, human pilots are trained to communicate with and follow
instructions from Air Traffic Control (ATC) on the ground, check equipment on the
aircraft, and look through the windows of the aircraft to detect collision threats and
maneuver to avoid other aircraft [19]. However, UAS are lacking this critical ability
to Detect and Avoid (DAA) other aircraft during flight operations.
The other significant issue for operating UAS is the fact that the UA pilots
control the UA in a remote manner, typically relying on radio frequency (RF) and/or
satellite communications to establish a C2 link between the GCS and the UA. For
safe operations of UAS, the C2 link has to be robustly, reliably, and redundantly
established. When the C2 link does fail, the UA should perform predictable and
acceptable “lost link” procedures similar to manned aircraft autopilot systems [18].
For these safety concerns, civil aviation authorities like the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) in the United States (US) and Transport Canada (TC) in
Canada have not allowed UAS to be integrated into civil airspace with manned aircraft.
Currently, they allow UAS only in limited operational areas in civil airspace under
Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA) in the US and Special Flight Operations
Certificates (SFOC) in Canada.
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As industry pushes for the increased use of more UAS, both the FAA and TC
have committed to modifying the current regulations. As to the airworthiness and
flight performance, they have decided to require UAS to be certified as compliant
aircraft systems according to the existing standards and regulations for manned aircraft
systems. As to the C2 link, they have published the UAS “Lost Link” procedures
during UAS operations [20,21] and have issued a number of standards and certification
processes for the link reliability requirements, as suggested by the Radio Technical
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Special Committee SC-228 (advisory committee
of the FAA) [2]. As to the DAA systems, they have not set forth or issued any
standards to guide the certification process of DAA systems for UAS because DAA
systems are still under development. To help the industry gain operational experience
and encourage researchers and system developers to solve the problems along the
road to certify DAA systems, aviation authorities have proposed two near-term DAA
solutions for integrating UAS into civil airspace:
1. Large UAS are required to have installed the same sensors as manned aircraft
like airborne radar, Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), and Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) to provide an equivalent level of
safety as manned General Aviation (GA) aircraft [18]. Once equipped, processed
sensor information is transmitted from the UA to the GCS, where the Pilot-In-
Command (PIC) analyzes the guidance from the DAA systems and the data
from different sensors, and makes final decisions on whether maneuvers are
needed to avoid other surrounding traffic.
2. Small UAS are required to have installed newly-developed small, light, and
low-power versions of airborne sensors or portable ground-based sensors for
safe operations due to their limitations on Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP).
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Once equipped, processed sensor information is transmitted from the UA to
the GCS, where the PIC analyzes the guidance from the newly-developed DAA
systems and the data from different sensors, and makes final decisions on whether
maneuvers are needed to avoid other surrounding traffic.
1.2 Problem Discussion
The first solution for large UAS, discussed in Section 1.1, is a straightforward starting
point for integrating UAS into civil airspace with other manned GA aircraft in the
near future, as those DAA systems have already been proven and certified on manned
aircraft. The remaining challenges are therefore to modify the current regulations and
operational procedures in civil airspace, and to have additional training courses for
air traffic controllers and pilots of large UAS and manned aircraft.
However, implementing the second near-term DAA solution for small UAS will be
much harder for researchers and engineers in the UAS industry than implementing the
first solution for large UAS, since there are no certified DAA systems that would allow
small UAS to achieve the equivalent level of safety as manned GA aircraft. In addition,
small UAS aerodynamic characteristics are very different from manned aircraft. The
collision avoidance solutions for manned aircraft will not be suitable for small UAS.
Generally, small UAS operate at a slow cruise airspeed; thus, the turning trajectories
of small UAS and the time needed to complete turns are greatly affected by the wind
conditions (i.e., wind speed and wind direction) during a level maneuver, whereas
manned aircraft operate faster and are less affected by the wind during a turn. To
reflect this reality, new specific collision avoidance solutions should be designed and
implemented in the new DAA systems for small UAS to avoid potential collisions with
other nearby mid-air traffic. Moreover, any such DAA systems should be evaluated
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and qualified before they can be certified and deployed, either on the UA or on the
ground, for small UAS to achieve an equivalent level of safety as manned GA aircraft.
Both the FAA and TC have established a number of restricted areas in civil airspace
as test sites for carrying out system developments, performing UAS tests, and gathering
operational data for the future integration of UAS into civil airspace with manned GA
aircraft. It is true that field flight tests are absolutely necessary for the evaluation and
certification of UAS and DAA systems; however, field tests are not cost-effective, and
only limited cases (encouter geometries) can be carried out during system testing and
verification. Another method, which is less expensive but still time-consuming, is to
have these tests run on the Hardware-In-Loop (HIL) simulator. This method indeed
is a very good solution for the training of pilots and air traffic controllers as well as for
research on human factors in UAS operations. In addition to these two methods for
the development of DAA systems, the Monte Carlo (MC) simulation method is also
often used for risk-quantitative analysis and decision-making to handle uncertainty
and variability of mid-air encounters in civil airspace. This method checks all possible
initial conditions of encounters and researched environments, evaluates outputs of
DAA systems from all the possible collision avoidance decisions, and assesses the risk
levels and the performance of the collision decisions. For more accurate and reliable
results from the analysis, the MC simulation generally requires the larger simulation
sizes, which would be computationally expensive and inefficient [22].
As for system development and testing, it is crucial to have a fast performance
evaluation method. The system should be tested and evaluated as quickly and
comprehensively as possible after the initial design, and the problems found in the
evaluation should be fed back to the design again for further modifications and updates,
so that the design and implementation could be fine-tuned after a couple of iterations
in a short time period. However, these three methods discussed in this section require a
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long time (process turnaround time) to evaluate the newly-developed system, and only
limited cases can be tested during flight tests in the field or on the HIL simulator, which
will not be sufficient to obtain approvals or certifications from aviation authorities.
1.3 Perspectives and Scope
This thesis extends the recently published RTCA SC-228 Minimum Operational
Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA Systems [2] by filling the technology gaps
identified in the current Phase I MOPS, and helps formalize the future Phase II MOPS
for small UAS. Later, both FAA and Transport Canada will incorporate the RTCA
recommendations for the future rule-making to approve the integration of small UAS
into civil airspace.
1.3.1 DAA History
To assure the safe, efficient, and compatible operation of UAS with other manned
GA aircraft in civil airspace, RTCA Special Committee SC-203 was established in
2004, to provide recommendations and technical standards for FAA to make policy,
program, and regulatory decisions [23]. The SC-203 has developed and documented
guiding principles for UAS integration and operations; however, due to disagreement
on different aircraft dynamics among the great variety of UAS used in civil airspace [8],
the SC-203 could not formalize a UAS MOPS for FAA to quantitatively determine
the safety boundaries (e.g., collision avoidance alerting boundary and self-separation
alerting boundary). In 2013, as learned from overly ambitious objectives in the
SC-203, RTCA decided to assign UAS research tasks specifically into two separate
special committees: a new SC-228 (to develop the MOPS for DAA equipment and C2
Fang 2018 6
Data Link solutions) [24], and a previous SC-147 (to develop the MOPS for Collision
Avoidance (CA) equipment, e.g., ACAS Xu) [25].
In the SC-228, the research focuses on long-range DAA in two phases (Phase I for
large UAS for mostly transiting operations in Class A airspace, and Phase II extends
to include small UAS and covers extended operations in Class G airspace) [26]. The
RAVEN project1 joined the SC-203 in 2009 and then moved to the new SC-228 in
2013. As shown in Fig. 1.2, after a four-year concentrated effort, the Phase I MOPS
has been formalized and published in May, 2017 [2], in which a DAA Well Clear
(WC) boundary is quantitatively determined for the UAS DAA systems regardless
of aircraft dynamics, to replace previous subjective WC boundaries determined by
human pilots [27]. Based on this WC boundary, a series of DAA research for small
UAS has been carried out in this thesis, such as Remaining Well Clear (RWC) and
avoiding Loss of Well Clear (LoWC). In addition, the SC-147 (established for TCAS
in 1980) works on a new Aircraft Collision Avoidance System for NextGen (ACAS
Xa) to replace TCAS II on the current manned aircraft (expected ACAS Xa MOPS
completion date in December 2018), and the ACAS Xu MOPS for UAS is scheduled
to be completed in 2020 [25].
DAAoWelloClear
201720132004 2020
DAAo
MOPSo
ACASoXu
MOPS
SC-228
Established
SC-203
Established
CAoforoUAS
2018
Figure 1.2: RTCA special committee research timeline.
1The RAVEN project is based at Memorial University, St. John’s, NL, Canada, and their main
research objective is to develop intelligent DAA systems to allow small UAS to share the same
airspace with manned aviation.
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1.3.2 DAA Scope
As described in Section 1.1, to enable near-term UAS access to civil airspace, RTCA
recommends to implement DAA systems for UAS to reduce the rate of Loss of Well
Clear with other manned aircraft in civil airspace, and further to ensure the rate of
unmitigated Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) lower to an accepted risk level for the
UAS integration approval from aviation authorities.
In response, the research is focused on the long-range DAA for small UAS 2 as
shown in Fig. 1.3, to provide DAA guidance for the PIC to make final decisions on
whether maneuvers are needed to avoid LoWCs with other surrounding traffic. With
currently available sensor technologies, such as small size, light weight, and low power
airborne ADS-B and ground portable radar, a DAA system can provide warning alerts
more than 60 seconds before potential LoWCs, which allows the PIC in the DAA loop
to identify risks and make maneuvering decisions.
Intruder
UADAA CA
Figure 1.3: Diagram for DAA and CA regions in a mid-air encounter.
On the other hand, CA maneuvers are typically initiated 10 to 20 seconds before
potential NMACs, which precludes the PIC in the CA loop when taking into account
2It should be clarified that small UAS operations in this thesis mainly refer to those unmanned
aircraft operations in Class G uncontrolled airspace at the level of 2000 ft to 3000 ft with oncoming
GA aircraft as intruders during mid-air encounters.
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the non-removable system delays in 5 to 15 seconds [28]. Furthermore, CA systems
on UA require to measure the distance to approaching traffic accurately for NMAC
prediction,3 and to support resolution advisory (RA) coordination with existing CA
systems on manned aircraft [2]. The former requirement inevitably prevents the
integration of small UAS into civil airspace in the near future. For this reason, this
thesis focuses on DAA research to help integrate small UAS into civil airspace in the
near future (except using CA in Chapter 6 as a reference).
In general, CA is a last resort to avoid a potential NMAC when an aircraft WC
boundary is violated. To accomplish this task, ACAS Xu will combine TCAS, airborne
radar, ADS-B, and electro-optics (EO) and infrared (IR) sensors to carry out sensor
fusion and collision avoidance [29]. Up to date, this will rely on a to-be-defined
module named Nucleus in the future [30, 31]. In addition, specifically for small UAS,
miniaturization of sensors suite and aircraft dynamics for different UA and traffic have
to be accounted in the development of future ACAS Xu. As a result, CA research is
currently beyond the scope of this thesis.
1.4 Contributions
As required for the near-term integration of small UAS into civil airspace, it is
necessary to have a comprehensive and efficient solution for the development of
DAA systems of small UAS. As shown in Fig. 1.4, a fast-time software simulation
platform is therefore proposed and developed to facilitate the development of DAA
systems, to test and evaluate these newly-developed systems, and to qualify their
DAA mitigation performance over millions of simulated mid-air encounters in civil
3Due to delays from sensor measurements and data communications, ADS-B provides traffic
positions at an accuracy of 0.2 nmi [2], thus only airborne radar currently is a mature sensor for CA
systems on UA.
Fang 2018 9
airspace. Moreover, along with the development of this platform, a number of new
metrics are also introduced to evaluate and analyze DAA systems performance, which
will produce analytical statistics to help aviation authorities prepare future standards
and regulations governing routine operations of small UAS in civil airspace.
Encounterz
Generation
Detect Avoid
Sensor
Measurement
Sensor
Selection
Target
Trackingz
CivilzAirspace
Traffic
Mitigation
Strategy
Performance
Evaluation
Riskz
Assessment
Hazardz
Identification
Figure 1.4: Block diagram for the fast-time simulation based analysis platform.
The contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows:
Modelling The effort on the modelling framework establishes a series of mathematical
definitions and formulas to represent all the involved elements in mid-air en-
counters in civil airspace. These elements have been described and designed into
software models such as the encounter generation model, the sensor measurement
model, the target tracking model, the hazard identification model, the risk as-
sessment model, the mitigation strategy model, as well as the performance
evaluation model.
Analysis Platform A fast-time simulation-based analysis platform is developed to
exercise encounter geometries, verify the performance and reliability of mitigation
methods, and perform statistical analysis over millions of simulated encounters
from a set of repeatable high fidelity aircraft encounters in civil airspace in a
short period of time. The success of this simulation platform greatly reduces
the turnaround time of the performance evaluation for DAA systems, and helps
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them achieve the ultimate goal of an equivalent level of safety as human pilots
on manned GA aircraft.
Situation Awareness For quantifying situation awareness during mid-air encoun-
ters, a set of time-based and range-based metrics are designed to evaluate
encounter collision risks in real-time and provide normalized risk levels for on-
coming air traffic [32]. More importantly, wind effects are also introduced in
the mathematical analysis to determine ever-changing outer and inner safety
boundaries in various wind conditions for small UAS in self-separation and
collision avoidance during mid-air encounters [33]. With a decision synthesis on
both collision risks and safety boundaries, an appropriate mitigation enabling
time is selected for small UAS to initiate maneuvers to avoid potential collisions
with other nearby traffic in civil airspace.
Mitigation Solutions During mid-air encounters, two types of mitigation solutions
are proposed and designed for small UAS to provide DAA maneuvering guidance
in self-separation and emergency evasive maneuvers in collision avoidance [34].
With millions of simulated mid-air encounters in civil airspace on the fast-time
simulation platform, these two mitigation solutions are tested and qualified in
different encounter geometries with various uncertainties on sensor measurements,
wind effects and system delays from pilot decisions, command executions and
aircraft aerodynamic responses. The analysis results are used to direct the
development and improvement of mitigation solutions for future small UAS
onboard DAA systems.
Performance Ranking For aircraft safety, the airworthiness of UAS can be evaluated
and certified by existing standards and regulations for manned GA aircraft, but
for DAA systems, there are no standards and regulations issued by aviation
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authorities at present. Thus, a set of new analytical metrics are proposed and
introduced for DAA systems to establish a performance ranking system for the
integration of small UAS into civil airspace with manned GA aircraft [34]. This
performance ranking system will guide researchers and system developers toward
achieving the certification of newly-developed DAA systems, and help aviation
authorities evaluate the risk levels of integrating small UAS into civil airspace.
Implementation and Flight Tests The theoretical approaches are integrated into
an effort of implementing DAA systems to provide a safe operation environment
for small UAS in civil airspace. A ground portable radar system and an ADS-B
based ACAS [35] are developed and integrated (with the RAVEN team of which
the author is a member) to provide the capability of detecting both cooperative
and non-cooperative traffic in the surveillance volume. During system testing
and qualification of DAA systems, a HIL simulator is designed and constructed
for system ground tests and pilot training [36], and a four-dimensional (4D)
encounter synchronization control system [37,38] is also designed and developed
for improving the efficiency of flight tests in the field.
Publications The results of this thesis are presented at two conferences [35, 37],
and documented in four journal papers [32–34,39], as well as recorded in four
technical reports [36, 38, 40, 41]. The list of publications with respect to their
contributions is given in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: List of publications
Publications [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41]
Contributions
Situation Awareness X X
Mitigation Solutions X
Performance Ranking X
Implementation and Flight Tests X X X X X X X
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1.5 Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 contains a review of the
literature on currently available sensor technologies that can be employed for DAA
systems. It also includes related definitions and terminologies, as well as related
work on DAA systems that will be discussed in the thesis for system modelling,
assessment and evaluation. Chapter 3 explains the system modelling framework and
begins to implement modules for the Detect System on the fast-time simulation based
analysis platform. Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 focus on the design and
implementation of those modules for the Avoid System on the fast-time simulation
based analysis platform. Chapter 4 quantifies the encounter safety boundaries in
winds and completes the implementation of the hazard identification module. Chapter
5 develops a set of real-time computable collision risk assessment metrics and finishes
the implementation of the risk assessment module. Chapter 6 proposes two types
of mitigation solutions for small UAS in self-separation and collision avoidance to
help implement the mitigation strategy module. It also introduces a set of risk-ratio
metrics to implement the performance evaluation module. Chapter 7 discusses the
effort on the experimental work carried out for system testing and verification. Finally,
Chapter 8 summarizes the contributions to DAA research, and suggests directions for
future work.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This thesis is concerned with the implementation and evaluation of DAA systems for
small UAS. As such, the background material contained in this chapter is of a diverse
nature, encompassing elements of detection sensor technologies, aircraft encounter
definitions, and DAA decision timeline and parameters. It also features related work
on the high fidelity mid-air encounter model for civil airspace that will be used in
the DAA analysis and evaluation throughout the modules on the fast-time simulation
platform. This chapter is a brief overview of terminologies to support the design and
analysis of DAA systems, and more detailed literature reviews will be given in their
corresponding chapters later in the thesis.
2.1 Detection Sensor Technologies
Currently, multiple detection sensors have been used to detect mid-air hazards like
nearby traffic or objects with a risk of collision on large UAS and manned aircraft.
Based on the technologies employed, they can be summarized into two categories:
cooperative and non-cooperative [42]. Cooperative sensors usually receive radio signals
from equipment on other surrounding aircraft, such as ATC transponders, TCAS, and
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ADS-B. On the other hand, non-cooperative sensors are used to detect non-cooperative
traffic that have not been equipped with cooperative sensors, i.e., radar, Electro-Optic
(EO) or Infrared Radiation (IR) cameras, acoustic sensors, as well as laser/light
detection and ranging (lidar) systems.
2.1.1 Cooperative Sensors
2.1.1.1 ATC Transponder
A Mode A/C transponder is an avionic system that provides information about the
aircraft identification (Mode A) and barometric altitude (Mode C) to the ATC Radar
Beacon System (ATCRBS) on the ground and to TCAS on other aircraft, by the
interrogation from the ATC Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) on the ground or
TCAS on the other nearby aircraft [43]. Based on the travel time of the reply from
the transponder and the SSR antenna pointing angle, the position of the aircraft is
calculated by the SSR on the ground. Synchronized with the targets detected on the
ATC Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR), air traffic controllers have a more complete
picture of the surveillance area. Moreover, the identification information from a Mode
A/C transponder can be used to correlate the aircraft track to its flight plan.
Figure 2.1: Antennas of a typical ground surveillance radar system for ATC [4].
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Fig. 2.1 shows antennas of a typical ground radar system for ATC. The ladderlike
top section is the SSR directional antenna, whereas the lower part of the assembly is
the PSR antenna [44].
2.1.1.2 TCAS
TCAS provides a solution to the problem of reducing the risk of mid-air collisions
between aircraft and has achieved extraordinary success in commercial aviation since
1990s [45,46]. TCAS basically is a mini version of SSR on the aircraft, which detects and
tracks the surrounding transponder-equiped traffic by sending air-to-air interrogations
and decoding replies from transponders on nearby traffic aircraft [47]. As a SSR, a
TCAS measures the distance to an intruder by assessing the signal round-trip travel
time and estimating the bearing of the intruder with a static, electronically steered
four-element phased array directional antenna on the aircraft [46, 47]. Two types
of transponders are currently in use: Mode S and Mode A/C transponders. The
main difference between them is the support of selective interrogation on Mode S
transponders, which greatly reduces the likelihood of garbled or overlapping replies and
frequency congestion in high density airspaces [46]. In addition, Mode S transponders
have an additional data-link to coordinate collision avoidance maneuvers during mid-air
encounters [46].
Figure 2.2: TCAS direction antenna [5].
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TCAS is an advisory system for the pilot using three types of alerts: traffic advisory
(TA), resolution advisory (RA) and clear of conflict (CC) [6]. When a TA is issued,
the flight crews need to be alerted and start to search the intruder visually according
to the bearing indicated on the TCAS display. If the intruder keeps approaching, a
RA will be issued and the pilot will make a final decision to command the aircraft to
climb or descend, and return back the previous assigned course after a CC is issued
on TCAS [47]. Fig. 2.3 shows a TCAS protection volume with a RA region, a TA
region, and a surveillance region around a TCAS-equipped aircraft in both horizontal
and vertical directions.
Not to Scale
COLLSION
AREAWARNING
AREA
CAUTION
AREA RA
15-35 SECONDS
TA
20-40 SECONDS
TA
RA
Figure 2.3: TCAS protection volume (modified from [6]).
2.1.1.3 ADS-B
As a solution for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) in civil
airspace, ADS-B combines the precise aircraft location and velocity derived from
Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite signals with other data like the aircraft
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identification and possibly its intent, and broadcasts this flight information to ATC
and other surrounding ADS-B equipped aircraft [48]. It is designed to improve the
operational capacity, safety and efficiency in civil airspace, and support ATC to
gradually migrate their conventional ground-based SSR system to a satellite-based
cooperative surveillance system to have more accurate and frequent surveillance
services and less system maintenance cost [49].
Figure 2.4: ADS-B surveillance configuration diagram [7].
For ADS-B communication, a data-link 1090 Extended Squitter (ES) at 1090MHz
has been assigned internationally, which is also used by existing Mode A/C/S transpon-
ders for TCAS and SSR interrogations. Due to this potential frequency congestion
on 1090 MHz, another data-link Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) at 978MHz is
adopted in the US by the FAA as the second data-link for the GA aircraft operating
below Flight Level (FL) 180 (18,000 ft). At the same time, this UAT data-link in the
US is also used for transmitting the Ground Uplink Message from ground to air to
provide weather information about aircraft operating areas [49].
As described in Fig. 2.4, all ADS-B equipped aircraft are able to detect and
track other surrounding ADS-B equipped traffic automatically without interventions
from pilots or air traffic controllers [50]. Although ADS-B was designed to improve
the situational awareness for ATC and manned aircraft, it also becomes a feasible
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cooperative DAA solution for the integration of small UAS into civil airspace because
nowadays airborne ADS-B avionics have been made in small size, light weight and
low power consumption [51].
2.1.2 Non-cooperative Sensors
In addition to the capacity of detecting and tracking mid-air traffic by cooperative
sensors, it is necessary for UAS to have an ability to sense other non-cooperative
traffic in civil airspace for safe operations with other GA aircraft, which indeed is an
essential requirement to obtain the regulator approval of integrating UAS into civil
airspace. Currently available technologies include passive sensors like EO/IR cameras
and acoustic sensors, or active sensors such as radar and lidar.
2.1.2.1 Passive Sensors: EO/IR Cameras and Acoustic Sensors
With the general need for eyes in the sky, EO/IR cameras are the most popular
payloads carried on a UA during airborne missions in both military and civilian
applications. Technically, EO cameras record images by capturing the reflected light
from objects during the day and IR cameras provide night visions by detecting the
object’s heat during the night [42]. As discussed in the survey conducted in Karhoff
et al. [52], in terms of small size, light weight and low power consumption, the
vision-based DAA solution using EO/IR cameras is the most cost-effective DAA
solution for small UAS to achieve an equivalent level of safety as human pilots on
manned aircraft. Following this conclusion, tremendous efforts have been put into
the research and development of implementing a vision-based DAA system for small
UAS [53–58], where field programmable gate array (FPGA) and graphics processing
unit (GPU) based hardware systems are employed for image processing in real-
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time detection of other nearby mid-air traffic. Up to date, due to shortcomings of
optical technologies, vision-based DAA systems have not achieved the full level of
success as human pilots on manned aircraft with solid and robust traffic detections in
visual meteorological conditions (VMC). For example, environmental or background
disturbances on captured images, such as sun and clouds in the sky, or trees and
moving targets on the ground, often increase the false alarm rate (FAR) for surrounding
traffic [59]. Thus, generally, to reach an acceptable FAR, thresholds in detection
algorithms have to be set to different values on a case-by-case basis. In addition, to
achieve the same required field of view (FOV) as human pilots, i.e., ±110◦ in the
front of the UA, multiple cameras have to be arrayed together on the UA so the
increasing requirements of space, weight and real-time image processing capabilities
will eventually limit this solution applied on small UAS [52,58].
Acoustic sensors have been applied on small UAS to detect the bearing angle of
approaching intruder by the sound of engines, propellers, or rotors on the aircraft [60,61].
They consist of a number of microphones mounted on the aircraft to provide bearing
information for sound at different frequencies. The microphone array measures phase
differences to determine the bearing angle to the intruder aircraft in both azimuth
and elevation [60]. At present, the detected bearing accuracy of acoustic sensors is
low, so they cannot be used for accurate measurements; however, they can be used to
cue other higher resolution sensors like EO/IR cameras to detect a nearby intruder
aircraft [60].
2.1.2.2 Active Sensors: Radar and Lidar
In general, an active radar system consists of a transmitter, an antenna for emitting
electromagnetic radiation and receiving the echo, a receiver and a processor. The
distance to objects is determined by measuring the time taken for signal to travel
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to the target and back, and the bearing of the target is determined by the angle
of arrival of the echo [62]. As a proven technology, radar has been widely used to
detect and track targets in many military and civilian applications, such as airborne
radar, marine radar, traffic radar, and weather radar. PSR is a good example of using
radar to monitor the air traffic in the surrounding area as a complementary system to
SSR for ATC on the ground, regardless of whether or not those traffic aircraft have
installed onboard cooperative sensors like transponders, TCAS, and ADS-B.
With the basic principle of radar, longer detection range and higher bearing
resolution usually require higher power and a larger antenna. As a result, small
airborne radar currently is not able to meet DAA requirements for small UAS unless
improvements are made to radar with digital technologies for miniaturizing radar
implementation [63,64]. Alternatively, a ground-based radar system like PSR for ATC
is attractive for small UAS to ensure safe operations in civil airspace; however, because
of aviation security, it is prohibited for commercial UAS operators to access local
real-time air traffic data from ATC facilities by a communication link electronically [65].
Moreover, in many cases, small UAS are often operated in areas without ATC PSR
coverage, so it will be worthwhile to deploy a portable ground-based radar system at
the area nearby small UAS operations to provide DAA abilities for implementing the
second near-term solution of integrating small UAS into civil airspace, as proposed in
Chapter 1.
Similar to radar, lidar emits laser lights and receives returns to measure the distance
to the target. With recent achievements on mechanical beam-steering components, lidar
is a suitable sensor on small UAS for target detection with outstanding measurement
accuracies on both range and bearing [66]; however, because its detection range is
relatively short and the FOV is narrow, at present, lidar is mainly used for low-altitude
obstacle avoidance and terrain mapping on small UAS [66,67], rather than for mid-air
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traffic detection and tracking like airborne radar on large UAS and manned aircraft.
2.1.3 Summary of Sensor Performance
The sensing technologies discussed in this section have various advantages and draw-
backs, which are briefly listed in Table 2.1. The cooperative sensors (transponders,
TCAS, and ADS-B) can be used under all-weather conditions; in particular, ADS-B
can meet the SWaP limitations on small UAS and their cost is low. The advantages
of passive non-cooperative technologies (EO/IR or acoustic) are the low cost and the
ability to detect mid-air non-cooperative traffic; however, they cannot provide range
information for detected targets. In addition, the bearing resolution from the acoustic
sensors is low, and EO/IR cameras do not work well in poor weather conditions. By
contrast, an airborne radar has the ability to work well under all-weather conditions,
but at present it cannot overcome the SWaP limitations on small UAS. Moreover, a
lidar can be installed on small UAS, but it is used for short-range obstacle avoidance
and low-altitude terrain mapping. Thus, at the current stage and in the near future,
ground portable radar is the only option to help small UAS detect and track mid-air
non-cooperative traffic nearby UAS operating areas.
Table 2.1: Summary of sensor performance
Sensors
Non
cooperative
Passive
sensing
All-weather SWaP Range
2D
Bearing
Cost
Transponder 5 5 X 5 X X X
TCAS 5 5 X 5 X X 5
ADS-B 5 5 X X X X X
EO X X 5 X 5 X X
IR X X 5 X 5 X X
Acoustic X X X X 5 X X
Airborne Radar X 5 X 5 X X 5
Ground
Portable Radar
X 5 X 5 X X 5
Lidar X 5 X 5 X X 5
Note: X: favourable/applicable; and 5 : not favourable/applicable.
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2.2 DAA Terminologies
To introduce the details, it is necessary to consider terminologies for the encounter
environment, the DAA timeline, and the parameters that will be studied in the later
chapters.
2.2.1 Encounter Environment
A key challenge of integrating UAS into civil airspace is the ability to detect and
avoid other mid-air traffic in civil airspace as human pilots on manned aircraft [68].
As shown in Fig. 2.5, two layers of critical UAS safety boundaries are adopted by the
RTCA SC-228 to quantitatively predict and resolve a potential conflict in a mid-air
encounter, i.e., the Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) boundary and the Well Clear
(WC) boundary [2]. The inner NMAC boundary is also called the Collision Volume
(CV) in [19].
Well Clear
NMAC 
Intruder
Encounter Cylinder
UA
Figure 2.5: Encounter cylinder diagram.
As labelled in Fig. 2.6, the NMAC boundary is a standard cylinder: 500 ft in
radius horizontally, and ±100 ft in height vertically.
The WC boundary is not defined as simply as the NAMC boundary. The WC
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100 ft in Height500 ft in Radius
NMAC Cylinder
UA
Figure 2.6: NMAC cylinder diagram.
boundary is not only a spatial separation in range, but also a temporal separation
in time [69–71]. For example, during a head-on encounter in Fig. 2.7, the radius of
the WC cylinder in the front of the UA is a 35-second travel distance between the
intruder and the UA, and the radius of the WC cylinder in the back of the UA is 4000
ft. In addition, the height of the WC cylinder is ±450 ft from the UA.
450UftUVertical
35-secUModifiedURangeUTau
DMODU=U4000Uft
WellUClearUCylinder
Intruder UA
Figure 2.7: WC cylinder diagram.
2.2.2 DAA Timeline
Fig. 2.8 depicts a proposed timeline for DAA systems [8]. It shows that to avoid a
potential collision, the sensors should detect mid-air traffic at a sufficient range so that
there is enough time remaining for target tracking, decision making, and maneuver
executing. The required detection range is not only determined by relative velocities
between UA and traffic, but also by time delays from measurement uncertainties,
tracker confirmations, PIC decisions, and aircraft aerodynamic responses [42]. As a
result, these delays have to be counted into the warning alert time in the design of
DAA systems.
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Figure 2.8: DAA timeline diagram [8].
2.2.3 DAA Parameters
For convenience in the analysis and implementation, air traffic positions in mid-air
encounters are defined on the local three-dimensional Cartesian coordinates (x, y, h)
with respect to the UA. As shown in Fig. 2.9, the x axis is pointing to the north for
the latitude position, and the y axis is pointing to the east for the longitude position,
and the h axis is pointing up for the altitude position. In addition, ψ is the traffic
heading relative to the north, and v is the horizontal velocity of the traffic in the
three-dimensional space.
In Fig. 2.9, (∆x, ∆y, ∆h) are local positions for the traffic relative to the UA.
Assume that
dx = ∆x = xtraffic − xua (2.1)
dy = ∆y = ytraffic − yua (2.2)
dh = ∆h = htraffic − hua (2.3)
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Figure 2.9: Aircraft positions in the three-dimensional space [9].
The slant range ρ is
ρ =
√
dx
2 + dy
2 + dh
2 (2.4)
The slant range rate ρ˙ is
ρ˙ =
dρ
dt
=
dxvrx + dyvry + dhvrh
ρ
(2.5)
where vrx, vry, and vrh are traffic velocities relative to the UA in the three-
dimensional space.
vrx = vtrafficcos(ψtraffic)− vuacos(ψua) (2.6)
vry = vtrafficsin(ψtraffic)− vuasin(ψua) (2.7)
vrh = h˙traffic − h˙ua (2.8)
Similarly, the horizontal range r is
r =
√
dx
2 + dy
2 (2.9)
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The horizontal range rate r˙ is
r˙ =
dr
dt
=
dxvrx + dyvry
r
(2.10)
It is noted that the safe horizontal range to separate UA from other traffic often
changes in mid-air encounters, in terms of various relative velocities between UA and
traffic. Thus, to unify a safe separation threshold in risk assessment, a time-based
range tau is introduced to evaluate the risk severity of potential collisions as [72]
τ = −r
r˙
( if r˙ 6= 0) (2.11)
Usually, a larger τ indicates lower collision risks and a smaller τ means higher
collision risks. However, in the case of two tail-chase aircraft operated at similar
velocities (i.e., range rate r˙ → 0), the calculated range tau from Eq. 2.11 will stay high
even when the intruder is in the NMAC cylinder (i.e., r < 500 ft). In addition, this
range tau will not be able to provide sufficient alerting time to avoid a Loss of Well
Clear (LoWC) or even a NMAC when a traffic suddenly accelerates. Thus, another
modified range tau is used to provide a minimum range, Distance MODification
(DMOD), 1 at which to alert regardless of the range tau. This modified range tau
(τmod) is defined as [72,73]
τmod = −r − (DMOD
2/r)
r˙
= −r
2 −DMOD2
rr˙
( if rr˙ 6= 0) (2.12)
where: DMOD = 4000 ft for the minimum of WC boundaries, and (DMOD2/r) is
a range buffer depending on the ratio of the DMOD and the horizontal range, i.e.,
1DMOD: an absolute distance threshold to alert the collision risk in mid-air encounters, e.g.,
DMOD = 4000 ft to alert the LoWC.
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(DMOD2/r) = DMOD× (DMOD
r
).
Another important encounter parameter is the Horizontal Miss Distance (HMD)
between the UA and other traffic in an encounter, which refers to the horizontal
distance at the horizontal Closest Point of Approach (CPA) between two aircraft
throughout the entire encounter [2,74]. In general, the horizontal range of two aircraft
is defined as the following time domain function.
r(t) =
√
(x0 + vrxt)
2 + (y0 + vryt)
2 (2.13)
where x0 and y0 are the initial positions of the other traffic relative to the UA.
The minimal distance occurs when d(r(t)
2)
dt
= 0, so the time to CPA can be obtained
by
tcpa = max(0,−x0vrx + y0vry
vrx2 + vry2
) (2.14)
where positive tcpa for closing geometries and zero for others.
According to Eq. 2.13 and Eq. 2.14, the HMD of two aircraft in an encounter can
be predicted from its current positions as [2]
HMD =
√
(dx + vrxtcpa)2 + (dy + vrytcpa)2 (2.15)
Similarly, the Vertical Miss Distance (VMD) between the UA and other traffic at
the horizontal CPA can be predicted by
VMD = dh + vrhtcpa (2.16)
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2.3 Related Work
The MIT Lincoln Laboratory has developed a series of statistical aircraft encounter
models to generate high fidelity aircraft encounters in US civil airspace (National
Airspace System (NAS)) using Markov predictions on dynamic Bayesian networks,
based on the ground radar data from more than 200 radar systems across the US
[10,75,76]. One of these models, an uncorrelated encounter model, is designed for non-
cooperative air traffic (without ATC guidance); another model, a correlated encounter
model, is developed for cooperative air traffic (with ATC guidance). This thesis uses
an uncorrelated encounter model to simulate the initial conditions and transitions of
millions of non-cooperative aircraft in mid-air encounters on the fast-time simulation
platform (as shown in the green box in Fig. 2.10). When required, a correlated
encounter model is also used to simulate ATC-guided cooperative encounters.
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Figure 2.10: Block diagram for the fast-time simulation based analysis platform.
2.3.1 Bounded initial conditions and transitions for
non-cooperative encounters in low altitude airspace
In general, most non-cooperative air traffic and small UAS are operated at similar
altitude layers, usually, below 5000 ft. Their feature histograms, based on recorded
radar data [10], are shown in Fig. 2.11,
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Figure 2.11: Feature histograms of recorded radar data based on 193 million samples [10].
where traffic horizontal airspeed v ∈ [ 0, 300 ] kt, horizontal acceleration v˙ ∈ [−1, 1 ]
kt/sec, vertical rate h˙ ∈ [−1250, 1250 ] ft/min, turn rate ψ˙ ∈ [−6, 6 ] deg/sec, and
traffic operating altitude h ∈ [ 500, 5000 ] ft.
2.3.2 Size of encounter cylinder
In the uncorrelated encounter model, an encounter cylinder is chosen for starting
positions to initiate mid-air traffic nearby the UA, which can be either a fixed-size
cylinder (e.g. 5 nmi in radius, ±1000 ft in height), or a dynamic-size one based on
the relative velocity and the tracking time required for a mid-air encounter. For better
simulation efficiency (in terms of the simulation time required for each encounter),
a dynamic-size encounter cylinder is chosen to initiate mid-air encounters on the
fast-time simulation platform, so that encounter trajectories can be simulated just
enough for UA to detect and track nearby air traffic in a fixed period of time (i.e.,
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a required DAA tracking time). As shown in Fig. 2.12, the dynamic-size encounter
cylinder is not a regular cylinder and its size depends on the relative velocity, the
tracking time required, and the traffic bearing relative to the UA at the encounter.
Traffic
Encounter Cylinder
Well Clear Cylinder
NMAC 
UA 
Figure 2.12: A dynamic-size encounter cylinder in the three-dimensional space.
Two types of dynamic-size encounter cylinders are established on the fast-time
simulation platform for UAS DAA analysis in self-separation and collision avoidance:
one dynamic-size encounter cylinder, with 120 seconds tracking time, is used for UAS
self-separation; the other one, with 60 seconds tracking time, is used for UAS collision
avoidance. In addition, similar to the DMOD defined in Subsection 2.2.3, a minimum
distance boundary is also implemented on the dynamic-size encounter cylinder for
tail-chase encounters with low relative velocities (e.g., vtraffic - vuas = 85 kt - 75 kt =
10 kt = 16.88 ft/sec ). As a result, a self-separation encounter cylinder is set at a
minimum of 2 nmi in radius and ± 800 ft in height, and a collision avoidance encounter
cylinder is set at a minimum of 1 nmi in radius and ± 450 ft in height.
2.3.3 Aircraft model for encounter generation
UAS DAA performance analysis is performed based on aircraft trajectories rather than
detailed aircraft aerodynamics, so a set of particle motion equations in Eq. 2.17 - Eq.
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2.21 [77] are employed in the encounter generation module to update the aircraft’s flight
states and construct the encounter trajectories on the fast-time simulation platform.
Following the definitions in Subsection 2.2.3, the aircraft’s initial conditions are given
as InitialAC = [x, y, h, ψ, v, v˙, h˙, ψ˙] in a three-dimensional space for latitude (north),
longitude (east), altitude (up), heading, horizontal velocity, horizontal acceleration,
vertical rate, and turn rate, respectively. Similarly, the aircraft transitions are given as
TransitionAC = [t, v˙, h˙, ψ˙] for encounter time elapsed, horizontal acceleration, vertical
rate, turn rate, respectively. Thus, detailed equations for updating aircraft’s flight
states and constructing trajectories can be described as follows [77]:
ht+1 = ht + h˙t∆t (2.17)
xt+1 = xt + vtcos(ψt)∆t+
1
2
v˙tcos(ψt)∆t
2 (2.18)
yt+1 = yt + vtsin(ψt)∆t+
1
2
v˙tsin(ψt)∆t
2 (2.19)
vt+1 = vt + v˙t∆t (2.20)
ψt+1 = ψt + ψ˙t∆t (2.21)
where t is the non-negative integer, and ∆t depends on the sampling rate, e.g., ∆t =
1 sec at 1 Hz or ∆t = 0.1 sec at 10 Hz. Fig. 2.13 shows a pair of sample encounter
trajectories for a converging geometry of the UA with traffic from the front right
(relative bearing at around 87 degrees), where encounter trajectories are updated at 1
Hz (∆t = 1 sec).
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Figure 2.13: A pair of sample encounter trajectories generated by the uncorrelated encounter
model (legend: blue for UA and green for traffic).
2.3.4 Implementation of encounter generation
In the implementation of encounter generation, a rejection sampling process [10,76]
is used to reject outbound traffic at the surface of an encounter cylinder and only
construct inbound traffic trajectories for DAA analysis and evaluation on the fast-time
simulation platform in Fig. 2.10. In addition, for a repeatable encounter analysis on the
fast-time simulation platform, all the selected initial conditions and transitions of the
UA and the inbound traffic are saved into Matlab workspace MAT-files. This enables
both interaction explorations and DAA performance comparisons among various
mitigation solutions, wind conditions, system delays on the fast-time simulation
platform (by a workspace reloading process prior to the simulation on Matlab).
A sample of the encounter generation process is described as follows [10]:
1. Set a required tracking time for the encounter cylinder (e.g., 60 or 120 seconds);
then use the MIT Lincoln Laboratory uncorrelated encounter model to generate
five million sets of initial aircraft conditions InitialAC = [x, y, h, ψ, v, v˙, h˙, ψ˙]
and aircraft transitions TransitionAC = [t, v˙, h˙, ψ˙], and save them into matrices
in the Matlab workspace MAT-files.
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2. Determine a set of initial encounter generation parameters (e.g., the UA airspeed
and the UA operating altitude layer), and then select a set of matched initial
conditions for the UA from the saved five million sets of initial conditions and
aircraft transitions in Matlab workspace MAT-files.
3. Select a random set of initial conditions for the traffic from the saved five million
sets of initial conditions and aircraft transitions in Matlab workspace MAT-files.
4. Set the size of the dynamic encounter cylinder depending on initial conditions
selected for two encounter aircraft.
5. Set the UA at the center of the encounter cylinder with a north heading (0◦).
6. Set the traffic aircraft on a random position at a surface (i.e., top, bottom or
side) of the encounter cylinder and select a heading randomly from [0◦, 360◦]
over a uniform distribution.
7. Perform a rejection sampling process to remove outbound traffic at the surface of
encounter cylinder; then only construct trajectories for the UA and the inbound
traffic; finally, save them into matrices in the Matlab workspace MAT-files as
accepted encounter data for the future repeatable encounter analysis.
8. Repeat Step 2 through 7 to generate millions of mid-air encounters as needed.
For example, followed with the instructions listed above, a set of five million sample
encounters are generated according to the predefined encounter parameters; e.g., the
UA cruise airspeed v = 76 kt, the UA operating altitude layer L = 2 (a transition
zone from 1200 ft to 3000 ft above ground level), and the required traffic tracking
time t = 60 sec. The feature histograms of these five million sample encounters are
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drawn in Fig. 2.14, and they are in accord with the ones based on recorded radar
data in Fig. 2.11 in Subsection 2.3.1.
(a) Airspeed (kt) (b) Acceleration (kt/sec)
(c) Vertical rate (ft/min) (d) Turn rate (deg/sec)
Figure 2.14: Feature histograms of five million sample encounters simulated on the fast-time
simulation platform.
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2.4 Summary
In this chapter we examine detection sensor technologies for DAA systems that have
been reported as currently available in the literature, and two sensor technologies
are chosen for the research of DAA systems for small UAS: ADS-B and ground
portable radar. Meanwhile, we also begin to introduce DAA terminologies on various
aircraft encounter definitions and parameters, such as: NMAC, WC, CPA, slant
range, horizontal range, range tau, modified range tau, time to CPA, HMD, and
VMD. In the last section, we discuss the uncorrelated encounter model from the MIT
Lincoln Laboratory and have it implemented into the encounter generation module
on the fast-time simulation platform to provide high fidelity non-cooperative aircraft
encounters in civil airspace for DAA analysis and evaluation.
In the following chapters, two major systems in Fig. 2.10, Detect System and
Avoid System, will be developed in further detail followed by sensor measurement and
target tracking in Chapter 3, hazard identification in Chapter 4, risk assessment in
Chapter 5, as well as mitigation strategy and performance evaluation in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 3
Detection and Tracking
As briefly discussed in Chapter 1, aviation authorities will not grant the integration
of small UAS into non-segregated airspace with other manned aircraft, unless DAA
systems for small UAS have reached an equivalent level of safety as human pilots
on manned aircraft in civil airspace. As a result, further testing is required to prove
that this equivalence of safety has been achieved on small UAS. First, to save time
and cost, a large amount of data should be collected on a fast-time simulation based
analysis platform to comprehensively explore the interactions among engaging elements
of UAS operations in civil airspace with other manned aircraft, e.g., encounters at
various initial conditions and aircraft transitions, encounters in different atmospheric
conditions, failures on sensors, hidden limitations in algorithms, and delays across
DAA systems. Later, flight tests on the HIL simulator and in the field should be used
to validate the simulation results and ensure the performance of DAA systems. These
two methods have been used together with great success for the development and
verification of TCAS in the 1990s [42]. To follow this successful strategy, a fast-time
simulation based analysis platform is thus designed and developed to facilitate the
development of DAA systems for the future integration of small UAS into civil airspace.
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3.1 Introduction
From this chapter we begin to introduce the design and development of the fast-time
simulation platform, which consists of two major systems: the Detect System and
the Avoid System, as drawn in Fig. 3.1. This chapter emphasizes the Detect System
in the green box, including the sensor selection module, the sensor measurement
module and the target tracking module. The Detect System is developed to simulate
traffic detection and tracking functions for DAA systems on the fast-time simulation
platform.
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Figure 3.1: Block diagram for the fast-time simulation based analysis platform.
In this chapter, we first summarize the required inputs/outputs and internal func-
tions for the modules in the Detect System and integrate them into the corresponding
mathematical models to develop these modules (as shown in the green box in Fig.
3.1). Later, we introduce the implementation of these modules in further detail with
the discussions for sensor errors and missing data during traffic detection and target
tracking on the fast-time simulation platform.
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3.2 Mathematical Models for Sensor
Measurement
Two promising sensor technologies, ADS-B and ground portable radar, are selected
in the research for small UAS to detect cooperative and non-cooperative mid-air
traffic during UAS operations. For the integration of these two sensors on the fast-
time simulation platform, we develop two sensor measurement models to convert
the detected aircraft positions from their built-in measurement coordinates into the
three-dimensional Cartesian coordinates (x, y, h) in accord with the coordinates used
on the fast-time simulation platform, as discussed in Subsection 2.2.3.
3.2.1 Aircraft positions from ADS-B
In default, ADS-B equipped cooperative traffic aircraft broadcast their precise GPS
positions and velocities during flight operations. These GPS positions are based on
a WGS84 reference coordinate system in latitude, longitude, and altitude, in which
latitude and longitude are in degrees, and altitude is in feet or meters. As discussed
in Subsection 2.2.3, a local three-dimentional Cartesian coordinate system is used
for DAA evaluation and analysis on the fast-time simulation platform. Thus, in the
ADS-B measurement model, we need to convert the latitude and longitude from their
global coordinates in degrees to the local Cartesian coordinates in nautical miles with
respect to the UA, and convert the absolute altitude to the relative altitude in feet
with respect to the UA. The conversion equations are given as follows [78–80]:
ϕ = Latitudeaverage = 0.5× (Latitudetraffic + Latitudeua) (3.1)
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CoefLat = 111132.92− 559.82cos(2ϕ) + 1.175cos(4ϕ) + 0.0023cos(6ϕ) (3.2)
CoefLon = 111412.84cos(ϕ)− 93.5cos(3ϕ) + 0.118cos(5ϕ) (3.3)
∆x = CoefLat(Latitudetraffic − Latitudeua)/1852.0 (3.4)
∆y = CoefLon(Longitudetraffic − Longitudeua)/1852.0 (3.5)
∆h = (Altitudetraffic − Altitudeua) (3.6)
Note that Eq. 3.2 is used to calculate the latitude cooefficient (the length in meters of
a degree of latitude at a latitude on the the WGS84 spheroid). Similarily, Eq. 3.3
is used to calculate the longitude cooefficient (the length in meters of a degree of
longitude on the the WGS84 spheroid) [78–80]. Eq. 3.4 and Eq. 3.5 show that the
global GPS coordinates are almost linear to the local three-dimensional Cartesian
coordinates because the coefficients CoefLat and CoefLon do not change when the UA
and traffic aircraft are in the nearby area during a mid-air encounter.
3.2.2 Aircraft positions from ground portable radar
A ground radar usually measures a mid-air moving target by slant range ρ, azimuth
angle β, and elevation angle ε in the spherical polar coordinates as drawn in Fig. 3.2.
Thus, in the ground radar measurement model, we need to convert these radar mea-
surements from the spherical polar coordinates into the three-dimensional Cartesian
coordinates (x, y, h) for further evaluation and analysis on the fast-time simulation
platform. The conversions are listed as follows [81]:
xtraffic = ρcos(ε)cos(β) (3.7)
ytraffic = ρcos(ε)sin(β) (3.8)
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Figure 3.2: Radar polar and Cartesian coordinates diagram [11].
htraffic = ρsin(ε) (3.9)
where xtraffic, ytraffic, htraffic are detected traffic positions relative to radar positions.
Finally, for the traffic relative positions (∆x, ∆y, ∆h) with respect to the UA, we
calculate them through Eq. 2.1, Eq. 2.2 and Eq. 2.3 with the current UA positions
(xua, yua, hua) decoded from the UA telemetry data received by a GCS, or the ADS-B
messages received by a ground ADS-B receiver.
In addition, Eq. 3.10, Eq. 3.11, and Eq. 3.12 are used to convert the three-
dimensional Cartesian coordinates back to the spherical polar ones, and they will be
used to calculate the radar measurement estimates in Eq. 3.24 in Section 3.3.
ρ =
√
x2 + y2 + h2 (3.10)
β = arctan(
y
x
) (3.11)
ε = arcsin(
h√
x2 + y2 + h2
) (3.12)
where x, y, h are current traffic positions relative to radar positions.
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3.3 Mathematical Models for Target Tracking
Owing to the nature of noisy and/or possibly missing measurements on detection
sensors during target tracking [82], Kalman filtering is adopted to provide more accurate
position estimates of both the UA and the traffic during mid-air encounters [83]. In
this section, two aircraft tracking models are developed to carry out traffic estimates
for two sensor measurements: ADS-B and ground portable radar, respectively.
Similar to the trajectory generation equations in Subsection 2.3.3, the aircraft
trajectory in a Kalman filter can be expressed in a discrete-time matrix notation as
follows [84]:

xn+1
yn+1
hn+1
vx,n+1
vy,n+1
vh,n+1

=

1 0 0 ∆t 0 0
0 1 0 0 ∆t 0
0 0 1 0 0 ∆t
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


xn
yn
hn
vx,n
vy,n
vh,n

+

∆t2
2
0 0
0 ∆t
2
2
0
0 0 ∆t
2
2
∆t 0 0
0 ∆t 0
0 0 ∆t


v˙x,n
v˙y,n
v˙h,n
 (3.13)
where Xn = [xn, yn, hn, vx,n, vy,n, vh,n]
T is the state vector of the detected target aircraft
on the three-dimensional Cartesian coordinates at the time step n, ∆t is the sensor
measurement interval, (xn, yn, hn) are the target positions, ( vx,n, vy,n, vh,n) are the
target velocities, and (v˙x,n, v˙y,n, v˙h,n) are the target accelerations at the time step n.
During flight operations, aircraft usually operates at a constant velocity on a
straight-line trajectory; thus aircraft maneuvers and accelerations are modelled as
perturbations on the aircraft trajectory. By this assumption, we can rewrite Eq. 3.13
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into a simplified matrix notation [84]:
Xn+1 = FnXn +GnVn (3.14)
where Vn is the Gaussian distributed random process noise [v˙x,n, v˙y,n, v˙h,n]
T with zero
mean and covariance matrix Qn, Fn is the transition matrix, and Gn is the noise gain
matrix. Similarly, we can simplify sensor measurements into a matrix notation [84]:
Zn = HnXn +Wn (3.15)
where Zn is the sensor measurement output vector, Hn is the measurement coordinate
transformation matrix that converts the state vector Xn from the Cartesian coordinates
to the coordinates used on measurement sensors, and Wn is the sensor measurement
error vector that is assumed to be zero-mean white Gaussian noise with covariance
matrix Rn.
In Eq. 3.15, for non-linear transformation between aircraft trajectory estimates and
position measurements, a first-order Taylor series approximation is used to linearize
the transformation function and form the transformation matrix Hn. Then, the target
aircraft positions can be estimated recursively by the following Prediction and Update
processes in the extended Kalman filter (EKF) algorithm [83,84].
Prediction
Xˆn|n−1 = Fn−1Xˆn−1|n−1 (3.16)
Pn|n−1 = Fn−1Pn−1|n−1F Tn−1 +Gn−1Qn−1G
T
n−1 (3.17)
Update
Xˆn|n = Xˆn|n−1 +Kn(Zn −HnXˆn|n−1) (3.18)
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Pn|n = Pn|n−1 −KnHnPn|n−1 (3.19)
where Pn is the estimation error covariance matrix, and Kn is the Kalman gain
Kn = Pn|n−1HTn [HnPn|n−1H
T
n +Rn]
−1 (3.20)
The process noise covariance matrix Qn is
Qn =

σ2v˙rx 0 0
0 σ2v˙ry 0
0 0 σ2v˙rh
 (3.21)
where σ2v˙rx , σ
2
v˙ry , σ
2
v˙rh
are acceleration covariances in the three-dimensional space.
For target tracking by the ADS-B, as the equations listed in Eq. 3.4, Eq. 3.5, and
Eq. 3.6, the measurement coordinate transformation matrix Hn can be approximated
linearly as
Hn =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
 (3.22)
The ADS-B measurement error covariance matrix Rn is
Rn =

σ2x 0 0
0 σ2y 0
0 0 σ2h
 (3.23)
where σ2x, σ
2
y , σ
2
h are the ADS-B measurement error covariances for x, y, and h on the
local three-dimensional coordinates.
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On the other hand, for target tracking by the ground portable radar, the first-order
Taylor series approximation is applied on the non-linear transformation equations (Eq.
3.10, Eq. 3.11, and Eq. 3.12) to obtain the coordinate transformation Jacobian matrix
Hn as
Hn =

x√
x2 + y2 + h2
y√
x2 + y2 + h2
h√
x2 + y2 + h2
0 0 0
−y
x2 + y2
x
x2 + y2
0 0 0 0
− hx√
x2 + y2(x2 + y2 + h2)
− hy√
x2 + y2(x2 + y2 + h2)
√
x2 + y2
x2 + y2 + h2
0 0 0

(3.24)
where (x, y, h) are predicted aircraft positions relative to radar positions at the time
step (n− 1).
The radar measurement error covariance matrix Rn is
Rn =

σ2ρ 0 0
0 σ2β 0
0 0 σ2ε
 (3.25)
where σ2ρ, σ
2
β, σ
2
ε are the radar measurement error covariances on slant range, azimuth,
and elevation.
3.4 Implementation for Sensor Measurement and
Target Tracking
As shown in Fig. 3.3, sensor measurement errors and missing data are considered
and simulated in the sensor measurement and target tracking modules on the fast-
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time simulation platform because they are normal situations for UAS operations in
civil airspace. Thus, based on the true trajectory data outputted from the encounter
generation module, the EKF algorithm in this section is used “reversely” (in the design
of the target tracking module) to introduce randomized sensor measurement errors,
for generating representative trajectories fed to the Avoid System on the fast-time
simulation platform.
Simulated
EncounterPTrajectoriesP
(TruePData)
Sensor
Measurement
(ADS-BP/PRadar)
TargetPTracking
(EKF)P
Errors Missing
data
PredictedP
EncounterPTrajectoriesP
(EKFPOutputPData)
Figure 3.3: Implementation diagram for sensor measurement and target tracking modules.
For the implementation in this section, the difficulties are to determine sensor
measurement errors as well as a number of matrices for EKF prediction and update
processes, i.e., the estimation error covariance matrix Pn, the process noise covariance
matrix Qn, and the sensor measurement error covariance matrix Rn.
3.4.1 Sensor measurement errors
With regard to ADS-B and ground portable radar, measurement errors are composed
by a large number of small and independent random factors such as the GPS position
bias, the GPS position noise, the radar range error, the radar azimuth angle error, and
the radar elevation angle error. Based on the central limit theorem, these measurement
errors are in normal distribution [85–87]. Hence, in Fig. 3.4, aircraft positions of both
the UA and traffic are drawn as a series of cylinders in the three-dimensional space,
where their radii relate to the mean and standard deviation of horizontal measurement
errors, and their heights are determined by the mean and standard deviation of altitude
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measurement errors.
Traffic
UA
Traffic position
with uncertainties
UA position
with uncertainties
Horizontal
range
Figure 3.4: Aircraft measured positions with uncertainties during mid-air encounters.
ADS-B measurement errors
Usually, the ADS-B acquires horizontal positions from GPS and altitude through a
barometric altimeter. For horizontal positions, ADS-B measurement errors come from
GPS horizontal position errors, as well as from ADS-B uncompensated latency on
receiving and transmitting GPS positions (e.g., 100 to 600 milliseconds) [2]. Thus,
ADS-B horizontal position errors are simulated as the following equations [2, 88].
xmeasured = xsimulated + (biasxy + noisexy)cos(θxy) (3.26)
ymeasured = ysimulated + (biasxy + noisexy)sin(θxy) (3.27)
where: biasxy ∼ N (0, σ2xy-epu) in normal distribution, θxy ∈ U(0, 2pi) is the angle of the
horizontal position bias on the horizontal x/y plane in uniform distribution, and
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noisexy =

−0.05σxy-epu if p ≤ 0.5,
0.05σxy-epu Otherwise.
(3.28)
Note that p ∈ U(0, 1) is a uniform distributed random number and σxy-epu is the standard
deviation of the GPS Estimated Position Uncertainty (EPU)1 on the horizontalx/y
plane and σxy-epu ≈ 100
3
m = 33.33 m = 0.018 nmi because nearly all (99.7%) of
measurement readings in normal distribution are within three standard deviations
from the mean [89].
For altitude measurements, as stated in the regulation [91], certified barometric
altimeters provide vertical accuracy within ±75 ft, so
hmeasured = hsimulated + herr (3.29)
where: herr ∼ N (0, σ2h-epu) in normal distribution, and σh-epu is the standard deviation
of the barometric altimeter EPU and σh-epu ≈ 75
3
= 25 ft.
Ground portable radar measurement errors
As discussed in Subsection 3.2.2, the ground radar usually measures mid-air moving
targets by slant range ρ, azimuth angle β, and elevation angle ε in spherical polar
coordinates; thus radar measurement errors comprise these three components: the
range error, the azimuth angle error and the elevation angle error. In addition, these
radar measurement errors often vary from radar systems and manufacturers. For
simplicity in the implementation, we adopt a minimum requirement of radar track
accuracy [1] in Table 3.1 to implement the radar measurement model for Detect
System on the fast-time simulation platform.
1 The GPS standard positioning service (SPS) provides 100 meters horizontal accuracy [90].
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Table 3.1: Minimum requirement of radar track accuracy for high-priority traffic [1]
Measurement errors Mean Standard deviation Unit
Range error µρ−err = 50 σρ−err = 70 ft
Azimuth angle error µβ−err = 0.5 σβ−err = 1 deg
Elevation angle error µε−err = 0.5 σε−err = 1 deg
where µρ−err, µβ−err, µε−err are radar measurement error means on slant range, azimuth,
and elevation, and σ2ρ−err, σ
2
β−err, σ
2
ε−err are radar measurement error covariances on
slant range, azimuth, and elevation.
Then,
ρmeasured = ρsimulated + ρerr (3.30)
βmeasured = βsimulated + βerr (3.31)
εmeasured = εsimulated + εerr (3.32)
where ρerr ∼ N (µρ−err, σ2ρ−err) in normal distribution, βerr ∼ N (µβ−err, σ2β−err) in
normal distribution, and εerr ∼ N (µε−err, σ2ε−err) in normal distribution as well.
3.4.2 Matrices initialization for EKF implementation
As in the EKF algorithm described in equations (Eq. 3.16 - Eq. 3.21), we need to
initialize a number of matrices to enable recursive prediction and update processes,
such as: the estimation error covariance matrix P0, the process noise covariance matrix
Q0, the measurement coordinate transformation matrix H0, the sensor measurement
error covariance matrix R0.
For the estimation error covariance matrix P0, we can use 10% estimation errors
for traffic state variables Xn = [xn, yn, hn, vx,n, vy,n, vh,n]
T at the beginning of EKF
processes, thus
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P0 =

0.1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.1

(3.33)
Later, the more accurate estimation error covariance matrix Pn is calculated and
updated by Eq. 3.17 and Eq. 3.19 during EKF recursive prediction and update
processes.
For most aircraft operated in civil airspace, the maximum load factor is less than
four during the takeoff and turns [92], i.e., the maximum accelerations in lateral and
vertical are less than 4g (39.2 m/s2 with gravitational acceleration g = 9.8m/s2).
Thus, σv˙rx = σv˙ry = σv˙rh =
4g
3
=
39.2
3
m/s2 = 13.07m/s2 = 0.007nmi/s2 = 42.87ft/s2.
With Eq. 3.21, the process noise covariance matrix Q0 can be obtained in terms of
traffic positions x, y in nmi and h in ft.
Q0 =

0.00005 0 0
0 0.00005 0
0 0 1837.81
 (3.34)
The measurement coordinate transformation matrixH0 and the sensor measurement
error covariance matrix R0 depend on the measurement method selected, either the
ADS-B by Eq. 3.22 and Eq. 3.23 with measurement error covariances (σ2xy-epu, σ
2
xy-epu,
σ2h-epu) calculated in Subsection 3.4.1, or the ground portable radar by Eq. 3.24 and
Eq. 3.25 with measurement error covariances (σ2ρ, σ
2
β, σ
2
ε) obtained from Table 3.1 in
Subsection 3.4.1.
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3.4.3 Results for EKF target tracking with measurement
errors
During EKF recursive prediction and update processes, predicted measurements can
be used to replace missing measurements from sensors. Thus, missing measurement
data in a short period of time (e.g., 1 to 5 seconds) will not be a major problem
for target tracking with the EKF during UAS operations. In addition, for better
performance in the EKF implementation, the sensor measurement interval ∆t in Eq.
3.13 is set to 0.1 sec (10 Hz), so measurement interpolations are required for low
update rate sensor measurements (e.g., ADS-B measurement at 1 Hz) in the EKF
measurement update process in Eq. 3.18.
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Figure 3.5: Comparisons for trajectories estimated by EKF on the horizontal and vertical
planes.
As seen in Fig. 3.5, the EKF estimated traffic trajectories are much smoother
than the ones directly from sensor measurements, and more closer to simulated traffic
true trajectories. Furthermore, EKF estimated sample trajectories of the UA and
traffic are drawn in Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.7 for measurements through the ADS-B or the
ground portable radar, respectively.
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Figure 3.6: A pair of sample encounter trajectories estimated by EKF through ADS-B
measurement. (Legend: blue for simulated UA trajectory, green for simulated traffic true
trajectory, and magenta for estimated traffic trajectory.)
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Figure 3.7: A pair of sample encounter trajectories estimated by EKF through ground
portable radar measurement. (Legend: blue for simulated UA trajectory, green for simulated
traffic true trajectory, and magenta for estimated traffic trajectory.)
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3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we develop mathematical models for sensor measurement and target
tracking modules on the fast-time simulation platform with regard to two promising
sensor technologies: the ADS-B and the ground portable radar, which are selected
for small UAS to detect cooperative and non-cooperative mid-air traffic during UAS
operations in civil airspace. Later in this chapter, we discuss the implementation of
sensor measurement and target tracking modules, where sensor measurement errors
and a number of matrices initialized for EKF prediction and update processes are
addressed.
By sensor measurement and target tracking modules, simulated UAS trajectories
and EKF estimated traffic trajectories are obtained, and ready to feed to the Avoid
System on the fast-time simulation platform for hazard identification, risk assessment
and mitigation analysis. In Chapter 4, we determine the alerting boundaries necessary
to identify mid-air encounter hazards. In Chapter 5, we develop a real-time computable
collision risk level evaluation method for collision risk assessment. In Chapter 6, we
construct a novel learning-based decision tree method to provide mitigation solutions
for UAS mitigation strategy. The topics introduced in these three chapters are major
contributions to this thesis.
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Chapter 4
Hazard Identification
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, we developed and discussed modules for the Detect System on the fast-
time simulation platform to detect and track simulated nearby traffic during mid-air
encounters. In this chapter and the next two chapters, we will develop modules for
the Avoid System [93] on the fast-time simulation platform, as shown in the green
box in Fig. 4.1. These modules are designed to identify traffic hazards and assess risk
levels of potential collisions in mid-air encounters, as well as determine appropriate
avoidance maneuvers when required [94].
EncounterH
Generation
Detect Avoid
Sensor
Measurement
Sensor
Selection
Mitigation
Strategy
Performance
Evaluation
Target
TrackingH
RiskH
Assessment
CivilHAirspace
Errors Missing
data
Modifications
AirspeedUA
AltitudeHlayer
Traffic
TrackingHtime
HazardH
Identification
Figure 4.1: Block diagram for the fast-time simulation based analysis platform.
In this chapter, we focus on the development and implementation of the hazard
identification module of the Avoid System on the fast-time simulation platform. We
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first introduce mathematical definitions used for UAS to identify hazards with other
approaching traffic during mid-air encounters. Later, in the implementation, because
these mathematical definitions cannot be computed in real-time, we develop two
algorithms to use Monte Carlo simulations to form lookup tables for UAS real-time
hazard identification during mid-air encounters.
4.2 Mathematical Definitions for Mid-Air
Encounters
A layered encounter environment in Fig. 4.2 is initially introduced in Subsection
2.2.1, where NMAC and WC cylinders are defined as two layers of critical UAS
safety boundaries to help UAS predict and resolve a potential conflict in an encounter
quantitatively.
NMACIntruder
Well Clear
Encounter Cylinder
UA WCAT CAAT
Figure 4.2: Layered encounter model of the airspace nearby the UA.
In this section, the formal definitions for NMAC and WC cylinders are given as
follows:
Definition 1 (NMAC) The NMAC boundary is a standard cylinder around the UA.
RNMAC = 500 feet in radius horizontally, and hNMAC = ± 100 feet in height vertically [2].
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100 ft in Height500 ft in Radius
NMAC Cylinder
UA
Figure 4.3: NMAC cylinder diagram.
Definition 2 (WC) For given: Modified Range Tau Threshold τ∗modwc = 35 sec,
Horizontal Miss Distance Threshold HMD∗wc = DMODwc = 4000 ft, and Vertical
Separation Threshold VMD∗wc = 450 ft, an intruder is within WC [2] when
[0 ≤ τmod ≤ τ∗modwc ] and [HMD ≤ HMD∗wc] and [Vs ≤ VMD∗wc] (4.1)
where: τmod is the modified range tau defined in Eq. 2.12, HMD is the horizontal miss
distance at CPA defined in Eq. 2.15, and Vs is the vertical separation that can be
calculated by Vs = abs(dh) with Eq. 2.3.
450UftUVertical
35-secUModifiedURangeUTau
DMODU=U4000Uft
WellUClearUCylinder
Intruder UA
Figure 4.4: WC cylinder diagram.
By comparing to Fig. 2.5 in Subsection 2.2.1, we note that two dash line cylinders
in Fig. 4.2 are added in this section, which are two new alerting threshold boundaries
to avoid LoWCs or NMACs:
• A Well Clear Alerting Threshold (WCAT) boundary is located at the outer layer
of the WC cylinder, which is the closest range boundary for the UA to still be
able to remain WC with the traffic by a horizontal maneuver within the Flight
Performance Envelope (FPE).
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• A Collision Avoidance Alerting Threshold (CAAT) boundary is located at the
outer layer of the NMAC cylinder, which is the closest range boundary for the
UA to still be able to avoid NMACs with the traffic by a horizontal maneuver
within the FPE.
Their formal mathematical definitions are given as follows:
Assume that x = [x, y, h, ψ, v] are aircraft states for latitude, longitude, altitude,
heading, and horizontal velocity, respectively. m = [ψ˙, tm] are horizontal maneuvers
for turn rate and time duration for maneuvering 1. Xlpt is the set of all possible
aircraft states for linear projected traffic (LPT) 2. Xlpu is the set of all possible aircraft
states for linear projected UA (LPU) 3. MWCfpe is the set of all allowed UA horizontal
maneuvers within the FPE that can be used for remaining WC, and MNMACfpe is the
same for UA to avoid NMACs.
Definition 3 (WCAT) For given: xtraffic ∈ Xlpt and xua ∈ Xlpu, a traffic aircraft
is outside of WCAT when
∃ mua ∈ Mwcfpe such that WC (4.2)
Definition 4 (CAAT) For given: xtraffic ∈ Xlpt and xua ∈ Xlpu, a traffic aircraft is
outside of CAAT when
∃ mua ∈ Mnmacfpe such that NMAC (4.3)
1m refers to single-move horizontal maneuvers, e.g., a horizontal maneuver at 6◦/sec for 5 seconds.
2 LPT refers to the traffic aircraft that are flying at constant velocities on straight line flights.
3 LPU refers to the UA that are flying at constant velocities on straight line flights.
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4.3 Methodology for Hazard Identification
For hazard identification to prevent mid-air traffic from violating the safety boundaries,
three control zones around the UA are proposed and defined in Fig. 4.5: the hazard
zone, the alert zone, and the safe zone. In the design, 1) when traffic aircraft break
into the hazard zone, the UA should take immediate maneuvers to avoid potential
mid-air collisions; 2) when traffic aircraft break into the alert zone the UA may or
may not respond to alerts from DAA systems upon collision risk levels; and 3) when
traffic aircraft are outside of the alert zone, the UA are in the safe zone and can
remain on the original flight course.
Intruder
Safe Zone
Alert Zone
Hazard Zone
UAWC
Encounter Cylinder
Figure 4.5: Layered encounter zones of the UA.
As depicted in Fig. 4.5, the safe zone in green refers to the areas outside the alert
zone of the UA. The alert zone in yellow is a larger cylinder outside the hazard zone,
which is defined as follows [2]:
Definition 5 (Alert Zone) For given: Modified Range Tau Threshold τ∗modaz = 110
sec, Horizontal Miss Distance Threshold HMD∗az = DMODaz = 2 nmi, and Vertical
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Separation Threshold VMD∗az = 800 ft, an intruder is within the alert zone when
[0 ≤ τmod ≤ τ∗modaz ] and [HMD ≤ HMD∗az] and [Vs ≤ VMD∗az] (4.4)
The hazard zone refers to a region outside the WC boundary and within the alert
zone of the UA, which is determined by the WCAT boundary (i.e., the threshold
boundary for the UA to initiate maneuvers to avoid LoWCs).
As mentioned in Chapter 1, two types of UAS mitigation solutions are developed for
DAA systems to avoid LoWCs or NMACs during mid-air encounters: self-separation
and collision avoidance, which can be clearly described using above five definitions
given in this chapter.
• Self-separation refers to efforts carried out by the PIC with the guidance from
DAA systems to avoid LoWCs (the breach of the hazard zone) when traffic
aircraft are penetrating the alert zone of the UA with LoWCs projected.
• Collision avoidance refers to maneuvers triggered by DAA systems to avoid
NMACs when traffic aircraft have entered the hazard zone and are close to
breaching the CAAT boundary of the UA with NMACs projected.
4.4 Implementation for Hazard Identification
To identify hazards for the UA during mid-air encounters, we should first locate
boundaries for the alert zone and the hazard zone of the UA. As given in Definition
5 (Alert Zone) and Definition 3 (WCAT), the alert zone of the UA can be easily
calculated in real-time through Eq. 4.4; however, the hazard zone (i.e., the WCAT
boundary) of the UA cannot be simply obtained through the statement in Definition
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3 (WCAT) in real-time, because it usually requires a time-consuming Monte Carlo
(MC) simulation to estimate the WCAT boundary for the UA in that encounter.
Moreover, in the case of the breach of the hazard zone, we should locate the CAAT
boundary for DAA systems to determine if collision avoidance maneuvers are required
as a last resort for the UA to avoid potential NMACs. Similar to the WCAT, the
CAAT boundary cannot be calculated through the statement in Definition 4 (CAAT)
in real-time, which also requires a time-consuming MC simulation to carry out the
estimation.
As a result, we develop two algorithms in this section based on MC simulations to
locate WCAT and CAAT boundaries, and then establish WCAT and CAAT lookup
tables for real-time hazard identification on the fast-time simulation platform. It is
noted that small UA are usually light-weight (e.g., less than 25 kg) and operate at a
slow cruise airspeed (e.g., 75 kt), so their turning trajectories and the time needed to
complete turns vary in different wind conditions (i.e., different wind speed and wind
directions). As small UA turning trajectories look very different under various wind
conditions in Fig. 4.6, wind effects have to be quantified in MC simulations to locate
WCAT and CAAT boundaries for small UA.
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Figure 4.6: Sample turning trajectories for 75 kt UA under 20 kt winds in various wind
directions from 0◦ to 360◦ every 45◦ by 20-second 2g left level turns (6◦/sec).
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4.4.1 Aircraft trajectory generation in the wind
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Figure 4.7: Aircraft trajectory generation in the wind.
During mid-air encounters, DAA maneuvers are usually triggered in long-range,
thus as suggested in [95–97], small UA trajectory during level flights and horizontal
maneuvers in the wind can be propagated based on a kinematics model discussed
in [98]. For general cases in UAS operations, we can assume that the wind has only a
horizontal component with wind speed vws and wind direction ψwind, and the UA is on
the level with airspeed vas, ground speed vgs, and turn rate ψ˙, thus UA trajectories
during level flights and horizontal maneuvers in the wind can be generated by the
following equations, as depicted in Fig. 4.7.
α(0) = ψwind − ψtrack(0) (4.5)
θ(0) = arcsin(
vwssin(α(0))
vas
) (4.6)
ψnose(0) = ψtrack(0)− θ(0) (4.7)
ψnose(n) = ψnose(n− 1) + ψ˙(n) (4.8)
vgsx(n) = vascos(ψnose(n)) + vwscos(ψwind) (4.9)
vgsy(n) = vassin(ψnose(n)) + vwssin(ψwind) (4.10)
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xn = xn−1 + vgsx(n) (4.11)
yn = yn−1 + vgsy(n) (4.12)
hn = hn−1 (4.13)
where: n ∈ N+. θ is the angle between the UA nose heading ψnose and the UA ground
track heading ψtrack. α is the angle between the wind direction ψwind and the UA
ground track heading ψtrack.
4.4.2 Algorithms to determine WCAT and CAAT
boundaries
For simplicity, vertical boundaries of CAAT and WCAT are pre-defined at fixed
heights; namely, the vertical boundary of CAAT is defined as VMD∗wc = 450 ft, and
the vertical boundary of WCAT is defined as VMD∗az = 800 ft. Thus, only horizontal
boundaries of WCAT and CAAT are required to be determined via MC simulations
by a series of co-altitude mid-air encounters.
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Figure 4.8: A web structure for Monte Carlo simulations to determine WCAT and CAAT
boundaries (bearing in deg and range in nmi).
Fang 2018 62
To implement these MC simulations, as shown in Fig. 4.8, we introduce a web
structure in the algorithm design based on the principle of dynamic programming
[99,100], where traffic aircraft are initiated from inner circles to outer circles at bearing
angles [0◦, 360◦) with heading angles in [0◦, 360◦); UA are initiated at the web center
with the 0◦ heading angle (to the north). At each bearing angle, we locate the shortest
horizontal range between UA and traffic at which UA can avoid LoWCs or NMACs
with traffic in all possible headings by one of the appropriate horizontal maneuvers.
Algorithm 1 Determine WCAT
1: function DetermineWCAT(vua, ψ˙ua)
2: for < ψtraffic ∈ [0◦, 360◦) with 1◦ increment > do
3: for < vtraffic ∈ [50, 300] kt with 50 kt increment > do
4: for < ψwind ∈ [0◦, 360◦) with 45◦ increment > do
5: for < βtraffic ∈ [0◦, 360◦) with 1◦ increment > do
6: for < rtraffic ∈ [0.6,10] with 0.01 nmi increment > do
7: while LoWC or LoWC-projected (according to Eq. 4.1) do
8: for < ψua ∈ [-180◦,180◦] with ψ˙ua increment > do
9: Generate trajectories for traffic in the wind
10: Generate maneuvering trajectories for UA in the wind
11: by a single-move maneuver to the new heading
12: if the UA regains WC then 4
13: Update and record the shortest traffic range rtraffic
14: Update and record the least maneuvering method
15: either left turn or right turn initiated on UA
16: with the heading change in For Loop (ψua)
17: end if
18: end for
19: end while
20: end for
21: end for
22: end for
23: end for
24: end for
25: end function
In the implementation, two algorithms are developed for UA to determine WCAT
4Based on a Detect and Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems (DAIDALUS) in [101]
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and CAAT boundaries via MC simulations, i.e., Algorithm 1 (Determine WCAT)
and Algorithm 2 (Determine CAAT). For obtaining bounded WCAT and CAAT
boundaries, as Definition 3 (WCAT) and Definition 4 (CAAT), two algorithms are
designed with two assumptions: 1) traffic are on level flights with constant horizontal
velocities throughout mid-air encounters; and 2) UA are on level flights or level
maneuvers to avoid LoWCs or NMACs. Hence, the states of UA and traffic can be
reduced to [x, y, ψ, v, ψ˙] for latitude, longitude, heading, horizontal velocity, and turn
rate, respectively.
The parameters and settings used in MC simulations to implement Algorithm 1
(Determine WCAT) and Algorithm 2 (Determine CAAT) are listed as follows:
• Based on the airspace in the low altitude below 5000 ft at which small UA are
most likely operated and the feature histograms in Fig. 2.11, assume that small
UA are operated at airspeed vua = 75 kt and turn rate ψ˙ua = 6
◦/sec.
• Traffic are simulated at an airspeed range of [50, 300] kt with an airspeed
increment every 50 kt.
• For WCAT, traffic are initiated at 0.6 nmi (within DMODwc = 0.66 nmi = 4000
ft) at a bearing angle βtraffic in [0
◦, 360◦) (e.g. at 30◦ in Fig. 4.8) and move
outer bound every 0.01 nmi for each simulation run.
• For CAAT, traffic are initiated at 490 ft (0.08 nmi within RNMAC = 500 ft) at
a bearing angle βtraffic in [0
◦, 360◦) and move outer bound every 10 ft (0.0016
nmi) for each simulation run.
• The detected traffic bearing βtraffic and the traffic heading ψtraffic are selected
every 1◦ in [ 0◦, 360◦).
• Winds are introduced at 20 kt in eight directions every 45◦ in [ 0◦, 360◦).
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In addition, during MC simulations, for each simulated encounter, the closest
traffic range and the least maneuvering method (left turn or right turn with the least
heading change on the UA), as well as other related encounter parameters such as
vua, ψua, vtraffic, ψtraffic, βtraffic, vwind, ψwind, HMD, VMD, and τmod, are saved in a
SQLite local database [102] for further analysis. In this chapter, they are first used
to construct WCAT and CAAT lookup tables for real-time hazard identification on
the fast-time simulation platform. Later in Chapter 6, these encounter results will be
used again as the encounter maneuvering guidance knowledge base to guide decision
making in the mitigation strategy module.
Algorithm 2 Determine CAAT
1: function DetermineCAAT(vua, ψ˙ua)
2: for < ψtraffic ∈ [0◦, 360◦) with 1◦ increment > do
3: for < vtraffic ∈ [50, 300] kt with 50 kt increment > do
4: for < ψwind ∈ [0◦, 360◦) with 45◦ increment > do
5: for < βtraffic ∈ [0◦, 360◦) with 1◦ increment > do
6: for <rtraffic ∈ [490,10000] with 10 ft increment > do
7: while NMAC or NMAC-projected (upon Definition 1) do
8: for < ψua ∈ [-180◦,180◦] with ψ˙ua increment > do
9: Generate trajectories for traffic in the wind
10: Generate maneuvering trajectories for UA in the wind
11: by a single-move maneuver to the new heading
12: if the UA avoids NMAC then
13: Update and record the shortest traffic range rtraffic
14: Update and record the least maneuvering method
15: either left turn or right turn initiated on UA
16: with the heading change in For Loop (ψua)
17: end if
18: end for
19: end while
20: end for
21: end for
22: end for
23: end for
24: end for
25: end function
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4.4.3 Impact of WCAT and CAAT boundaries on wind
uncertainties
To analyze the impact of WCAT and CAAT boundaries on wind uncertainties (i.e.,
various wind speeds and wind directions), a 20 kt gusty wind with a pattern [12] in Fig.
4.9 is introduced in MC simulations while locating WCAT and CAAT boundaries.
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Figure 4.9: An example of 20-second gusty wind pattern with wind velocity jumps [12].
Followed by Algorithm 1 (Determine WCAT) and Algorithm 2 (Determine CAAT)
with the gusty winds introduced in eight wind directions from 0◦ to 360◦ every 45◦,
two MC simulations are performed in this section and encounter results are saved in
the database as designated in Subsection 4.4.2. Once these two MC simulations are
completed, a data retrieving process is then performed to find the shortest horizontal
range for UA to avoid LoWCs or NMACs at each bearing angle in [0◦, 360◦) under
one of the gusty wind conditions for nearby traffic operating in the heading angles
from 0◦ to 360◦ every 1 ◦ and the airspeeds from 50 kt to 300 kt every 50 kt.
For example, at the bearing angle 30◦ for a 100 kt operated traffic aircraft under a
20 kt gusty wind in 45◦ (southwest wind), 360 matched records are retrieved from the
database for traffic in all heading angles from 0◦ to 360◦ every 1◦, and then the alert
threshold for this bearing angle 30◦ is obtained by the shortest range among these
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Figure 4.10: Range-based WCAT diagrams with 20 kt gusty winds in eight directions
(bearing in deg, range in nmi, UA at 75 kt vs. traffic at various airspeeds).
360 retrieved records. Similar to this example, data retrieving processes for all 360
bearing angles, six traffic airspeeds, and eight gusty wind directions are performed
throughout the whole database and finally a number of WCAT and CAAT boundaries
are obtained and plotted in this section.
WCAT
In Fig. 4.10, eight subfigures show small UA WCAT boundaries under 20 kt gusty
winds in eight wind directions, where WCAT boundaries are rotated in various wind
directions. For instance, WCAT boundaries are left rotated when the winds come from
the left side of the UA (e.g., southwest wind in 45◦ and northwest wind in 135◦), and
vice versa. Moreover, in each subfigure in Fig. 4.10, the size of WCAT boundaries are
proportional to traffic velocities; namely, the faster the traffic velocities the bigger the
WCAT boundaries. In addition, the UA front ±120◦ WCAT boundaries are generally
larger than the UA rear ones due to faster relative velocities between UA and traffic.
During UAS operations, wind conditions around the UA usually vary over time
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Figure 4.11: Summarized range-based WCAT diagrams (bearing in deg, range in nmi, UA
at 75 kt vs. traffic at various airspeeds).
and location, and no accurate wind velocity measurements are available for DAA
systems (only estimates based on the airspeed and groundspeed of the UA). Thus,
to overcome wind uncertainties on WCAT boundaries, we reorganize eight sets of
WCAT boundaries in Fig. 4.10 into a set of wind-summarized WCAT boundaries in
Fig. 4.11b to cover encounters in various wind conditions. In general, the UA front
WCAT boundaries in Fig. 4.11b are enlarged in comparison with the ones without
wind in Fig. 4.11a. In particular, the UA WCAT boundaries at the bearing angles
[95◦, 110◦] and [250◦, 265◦] are enlarged dramatically due to the WCAT boundary
rotations in various wind directions. For quantitative comparison between Fig. 4.11a
and Fig. 4.11b, we define a new variable, the threshold changing ratio (TCR).
TCRwcat =
WCATwind-summarized
WCATno-wind
× 100% (4.14)
Two TCR diagrams of WCAT boundaries on Cartesian coordinates and on polar
coordinates are plotted in Fig. 4.12. The TCRs of WCAT boundaries are increased
by almost 25% between the wind-summarized WCAT and the no-wind WCAT at the
bearing angles [95◦, 110◦] and [250◦, 265◦]. In other words, these two traffic bearing
regions are the most vulnerable regions for the PIC to identify hazards and initiate
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Figure 4.12: Threshold changing ratio diagrams for the impact of WCAT boundaries on
wind uncertainties (UA at 75 kt vs. traffic at various airspeeds).
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Figure 4.13: Range-based CAAT diagrams with 20 kt gusty winds in eight directions (bearing
in deg, range in nmi, UA at 75 kt vs. traffic at various airspeeds).
maneuvers to avoid LoWCs in various wind conditions during UAS operations.
CAAT
Eight subfigures in Fig. 4.13 show small UA CAAT boundaries under 20 kt gusty wind
in eight wind directions, where CAAT boundaries are rotated into wind directions as
those rotations occurred on WCAT boundaries. Moreover, in each subfigure in Fig.
4.13, the size of CAAT boundaries are proportional to traffic velocities; namely, the
faster the traffic velocities the bigger the CAAT boundaries.
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Figure 4.14: Summarized range-based CAAT diagrams (bearing in deg, range in nmi, UA at
75 kt vs. traffic at various airspeeds).
Similar to the wind-summarized WCAT, we reorganize eight sets of CAAT bound-
aries in Fig. 4.13 into a set of wind-summarized CAAT boundaries in Fig. 4.14b
to cover encounters in various wind conditions. In general, the UA front CAAT
boundaries in Fig. 4.14b are enlarged in comparison with the ones without wind in
Fig. 4.14a. For quantitative comparison between Fig. 4.14a and Fig. 4.14b, we define
TCRcaat =
CAATwind-summarized
CAATno-wind
× 100% (4.15)
Two TCR diagrams of CAAT boundaries on Cartesian coordinates and on polar
coordinates are plotted in Fig. 4.15. The TCRs of CAAT boundaries are about 10%
to 35% increased between the wind-summarized CAAT and the no-wind CAAT in
most bearing angles. Furthermore, Fig. 4.14a and Fig. 4.14b show that UA require
longer horizontal ranges to avoid NMACs for traffic from the side regions of UA, such
as: [60◦, 120◦] and [240◦, 300◦], because during UAS operations they are the most
vulnerable bearing regions on CAAT boundaries in various wind conditions.
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Figure 4.15: Threshold changing ratio diagrams for the impact of CAAT boundaries on
wind uncertainties (UA at 75 kt vs. traffic at various airspeeds).
Real-time lookup tables
Two lookup tables are constructed for real-time use on the fast-time simulation
platform based on wind-summarized WCAT and CAAT boundaries in Fig. 4.11b and
Fig. 4.14b. In MC simulations, traffic at six airspeeds from 50 kt to 300 kt every 50 kt
are simulated in the analysis so only six traffic airspeeds are available in lookup tables.
Moreover, as shown in Fig. 4.11b and Fig. 4.14b, faster traffic corresponds with larger
WCAT or CAAT boundaries of small UA. As a result, a worst-case scenario method
is designed to estimate WCAT or CAAT boundaries for small UA at each encounter
carried out on the fast-time simulation platform. This worst-case scenario lookup
table method is summarized as follows:
1. Locate the airspeed range for traffic, and choose the upper bound as the airspeed
for traffic in the lookup table search.
2. Use the rounded traffic detected bearing angle as the index to locate the WCAT
or CAAT for small UA in lookup tables.
For example, during a mid-air encounter, the UA is heading to the north (0◦) at
75 kt in 20 kt wind, and a traffic aircraft is detected at a bearing angle 32.25◦ with
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a detected horizontal speed at 109.76 kt. Using the worst-case scenario method, we
can search the WCAT or CAAT boundary based on the airspeed band 150 kt and the
detected bearing angle at 32◦ in the lookup table. Then, the corresponding WCAT
for this encounter is at 2.35 nmi, and the CAAT is at 0.56 nmi.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we introduce a series of layered encounter boundaries for small UA
to identify hazards with approaching traffic in mid-air encounters, i.e., NMAC, WC,
WCAT, CAAT, hazard zone, alert zone, and safe zone. During the implementation
of hazard identification, for WCAT and CAAT boundaries that cannot be directly
calculated through computable formulas, we design and develop two algorithms to
locate them via MC simulations by exhaustively checking the maneuverabilties of
small UA with traffic at six airspeeds in various wind conditions. The encounter
results in MC simulations have also been saved in the database and summarized into
lookup tables for real-time hazard identification on the fast-time simulation platform.
The hazard identification module is implemented for the Avoid System on the
fast-time simulation platform in this chapter. The next two chapters will introduce
collision risk assessment methods, discuss mitigation strategies in self-separation and
collision avoidance, as well as carry out performance evaluations in further detail.
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Chapter 5
Risk Assessment
In Chapter 4, we completed the development and implementation of the hazard
identification module, the first module of the Avoid System on the fast-time simulation
platform. In this chapter, we begin to implement the risk assessment module, the
second module of the Avoid System, as the yellow block drawn in the green box in
Fig. 5.1. Similar to previous chapters, we first design a set of metrics (mathematical
formulas) for small UA to assess collision risk levels from the outer encounter boundary
(the encounter surveillance cylinder) to the inner encounter boundary (the NMAC
cylinder) as previously depicted in Fig. 4.2. Later, we introduce a statistical risk-
ranking method in the implementation to provide robust risk assessment results to
overcome uncertainties from sensor measurement errors.
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Figure 5.1: Block diagram for the fast-time simulation based analysis platform.
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5.1 Introduction
In collision risk analysis, for post-analysis, calculations of probability of potential
collisions are straightforward when processing recorded encounter data; however, for
prediction, calculations usually rely on probabilistic methods, such as an analytical
approximation method [87], a numerical approximation method [103,104], or an MC
simulation method [105,106]. These methods typically require intensive computation
over a long period of time, thus they are not suitable for real-time analysis. To
overcome this drawback, we adopt a geometric method to develop a computable
collision risk level evaluation method based on linear projections to carry out collision
risk assessment for small UAS in real-time [107,108].
 
Figure 5.2: Benign momentary nick at the LoWC boundary and prolonged, severe LoWC [2].
As discussed in previous chapters, LoWCs are categorical failures to maintain
the separation standard in civil airspace; however, only a few LoWCs will result in
NMACs, with determining factor normally being the severities of LoWCs [109]. Thus,
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as shown in Fig. 5.2, severity metrics should be alternative solutions to evaluate
the collision risks from benign LoWCs to NMACs in mid-air encounters. In [110],
the Separation Severity Index (SSI) in Eq. 5.1 has been developed to measure the
separation between aircraft at the CPA on predicted trajectories of the UA and traffic.
SSI = mint
{
max
[
r(ti)
DMODwc
,
Vs(ti)
VMD∗wc
]}
(5.1)
where t = t0, t1, t2, t3, ... , tcpa, and tcpa ∈ [0, 110] sec, DMODwc = 4000 ft, and
VMD∗wc = 450 ft. For SSI ≥ 1, no LoWC will occur in the next tcpa seconds. For
SSI ∈ [0, 1), LoWC will occur or has occurred and the Severity of Loss of Well Clear
(SLoWC) is from 0 (the most severe, i.e., NMAC) to 1 (the least severe, i.e., WC).
As shown in Eq. 5.1, the calculated SSI at t0 may be equal to the other calculated
SSI at tcpa because the time penetration component τmod is not included in the
calculations. However, the SLoWCs at these two timestamps should not be the
same as indicated by SSI calculations. For this reason, in Eq. 5.2, the Well Clear
Penetration Integral (WCPI) is therefore introduced to calculate the SLoWC based
on all three penetration components: the horizontal penetration (HMD), the vertical
penetration (Vs), and the time penetration (τmod) [2].
WCPI =
n∑
i=1
min
(
(DMODwc −HMDi)
DMODwc
,
(VMD∗wc − Vsi)
VMD∗wc
)
(τmodwc − τmodi)
τmodwc
∆t
(5.2)
where i is the local instance of LoWC, n is the total number of local instances of
LoWC, τmodwc = 35 sec is the modified range tau threshold for LoWC, and ∆t is the
sensor measurement interval. Through this equation, the calculated WCPI should
provide penetration severities for LoWC encounters. Usually, LoWC encounters with
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(WCPI < 2) are benign LoWCs, while encounters with (WCPI > 10) are considered
significant LoWCs [2]. Thus, penetration severities can be used to represent collision
risks for small UA during mid-air encounters.
However, as the sum total is listed in Eq. 5.2, the WCPI is unbounded so that it
cannot be normalized into a ratio in [0, 1] to identify the collision risks by a set of
consistent risk levels. Moreover, the WCPI is designed to measure the collision risks in
LoWCs (i.e., the SLoWC), so it cannot be used for small UA to estimate the collision
risks with traffic approaching during the transition period from the beginning of the
violation of the alert zone to the LoWC. To overcome these drawbacks, we design a set
of new severity metrics in this chapter to assess collision risks in the entire alert zone
by extending the penetration control boundary from the WC boundary outbound to
the alert zone boundary for the severity of penetrating the alert zone (SPenAZ).
5.2 Severity Metrics for Risk Assessment
According to SLoWC severity metrics discussed in Section 5.1 and WC and alert zone
definitions given in Chapter 4, we extend severity calculations from the SLoWC to
the SPenAZ for quantifying collision risk levels throughout the period when traffic are
penetrating the UA alert zone, which comprise all three local penetration components:
the time penetration (τmod), the horizontal penetration (HMD) and the vertical
penetration (Vs), as well as normalize collision risk levels into a bounded range [0, 1]
to standardize decision-making for UAS mitigation analysis. Moreover, new severity
metrics predict collision risk levels based on the current aircraft states and projections,
rather than requiring calculations over the entire projected trajectories of the UA and
traffic throughout mid-air encounters, thus they greatly reduce the computation time
for the real-time collision risk assessment during mid-air encounters.
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In the following subsections, new severity metrics are introduced and designed
based upon two independent predictions of collision risk levels: the penetration risk
level and the range risk level.
5.2.1 Penetration risk level
Similar to the three local penetration components of τmod, HMD and Vs used in
Definition 2 (WC) and Definition 5 (Alert Zone) in Chapter 4, we design a set of
real-time computable equations to quantitatively assess the penetration risk level,
Prisk(Penetration), for small UA with traffic approaching during mid-air encounters,
as follows:
Prisk(Penetration) = 1− ( P risk(τmod)⊕ P risk(HMD)⊕ P risk(Vs) ) (5.3)
P risk(τmod) =

min(
τmod − τ∗modwc
τ∗modaz
, 1) if τmod > τ
∗
modwc
,
1 if τmod < 0,
0 Otherwise.
(5.4)
P risk(HMD) =

min(
HMD −RNMAC
DMODaz
, 1) if HMD > RNMAC,
0 Otherwise.
(5.5)
P risk(Vs) =

min(
Vs − hNMAC
VMD∗wc + VMD∗az
, 1) if Vs > hNMAC,
0 Otherwise.
(5.6)
where: Prisk(Penetration) ∈ [0, 1], P risk(τmod) ∈ [0, 1], P risk(HMD) ∈ [0, 1],
P risk(Vs) ∈ [0, 1], and
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Prisk(τmod) = 1− P risk(τmod) (5.7)
Prisk(HMD) = 1− P risk(HMD) (5.8)
Prisk(Vs) = 1− P risk(Vs) (5.9)
Note that the Fernandez-Guasti (FG) squircle operators, ⊕, in Eq. 5.3 refer to
FG Norm operations used for risk synthesis to combine three normalized penetration
components of collision risk levels together. As shown in Eq. 5.10 and Fig. 5.3, the
FG Norm operation is better than the multiplication operation (a× b) which always
moves toward low values, and also is better than the maximum operation max(a, b)
which does not provide distinction from variation of the lesser component [111].
a⊕ b =
√
a2 + (1− a2)b2 (5.10)
Figure 5.3: A sample FG Norm operation diagram [2].
The FG Norm operation in Eq. 5.10 was originally designed to blend together
two normalized components that range from 1 (least severe) to 0 (most severe) [111].
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To combine together three normalized components in Eq. 5.3, FG Norm operations
should meet the following necessary properties [2, 111],
• a⊕ b = b⊕ a (commutative)
• a⊕ (b⊕ c) = (a⊕ b)⊕ c (associative)
• 1⊕ a = 1 for any a
• 0⊕ a = a for any a
• 0⊕ a = 0 if and only if a = 0
When FG Norm operations meet the above properties among three normalized
and inverted risk levels: P risk(τmod), P risk(HMD), and P risk(Vs), the penetration risk
level, Prisk(Penetration), can be calculated by Eq. 5.3 with a probability-inverting
operation. [Prisk(Penetration) → 0] refers to a low collision risk level while traffic
aircraft start penetrating the UA alert zone, whereas [Prisk(Penetration)→ 1] means
that the risk level to a potential NMAC is high. The detailed description for the
Prisk(Penetration) value range is listed as follows:
Table 5.1: Description for Prisk(Penetration) value range
Prisk(Penetration) Description for parameter value range
[0, 0.5) Penetrating the alert zone, but always remaining WC
0.5
Penetrating the alert zone, with potential LoWC
(on the critical boundary between WC and Benign LoWC)
(0.5,1]
Penetrating the alert zone, with potential LoWC / already LoWC
LoWC from the least severe to the most severe
(WC to NMAC)
Note that Prisk(Penetration) = 0.5 is designed and selected as a critical risk level
threshold, i.e., Prisk(Threshold), to distinguish the collision risks between WC and
LoWC. During UAS operations, the PIC can select a preferable risk level threshold
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depending on safety concerns and flight missions planned, e.g., Prisk(Threshold) ∈
[0.45, 0.55].
Based on Eq. 5.4, Eq. 5.5, and Eq. 5.6, three function curves of inverted risk
levels P risk(τmod), P risk(HMD), and P risk(Vs) are plotted in Fig. 5.4. In Fig. 5.4a,
P risk(τmod) = 1 when traffic are not on the closing geometry with small UA (τmod < 0
sec) or on the closing geometry but τmod > 145 sec. P risk(τmod) = 0 when traffic are
on the closing geometry and τmod < 35 sec. P risk(τmod) is on the linear transition
from 0 to 1 when τmod ∈ [35, 145] sec; namely, P risk(τmod) is decreasing while τmod
decreases (i.e., when traffic are approaching small UA).
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Figure 5.4: Diagrams of P risk(τmod), P risk(HMD), and P risk(Vs) function curves.
In Fig. 5.4b, P risk(HMD) = 1 when the projected HMD is larger than 2.08 nmi
(2 nmi + 500 ft = 2.08 nmi). P risk(HMD) = 0 when traffic are projected within the
range of 500 ft (0.08 nmi) with small UA on the horizontal plane. P risk(HMD) is on
the linear transition from 0 to 1 when HMD ∈ [0.08, 2.08] nmi; namely, P risk(HMD)
is lower for smaller HMD (i.e., small UA and traffic are projected closer at the CPA
on the horizontal plane).
In Fig. 5.4c, P risk(Vs) = 1 when the vertical separation Vs is larger than 1250 ft.
P risk(Vs) = 0 when traffic are within a 100-ft vertical separation with small UA in
altitude. P risk(Vs) is on the linear transition from 0 to 1 when Vs ∈ [100, 1250] ft;
namely, P risk(Vs) is lower for the smaller vertical separation Vs (i.e., small UA and
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traffic are closer on the vertical plane).
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Figure 5.5: Diagrams of Prisk(Penetration) for co-altitude encounters.
Moreover, for co-altitude encounters, i.e., P risk(Vs) = 0, Eq. 5.3 can be rewritten
into a simplified equation as follows:
Prisk(PenetrationcoAlt) = 1− (P risk(τmod)⊕ P risk(HMD)) (5.11)
The penetration risk levels for co-altitude encounters are plotted on the colormaps in
Fig. 5.5, so the change of Prisk(PenetrationcoAlt) can be explored through interactions
of the closing time τmod and the horizontal separation HMD between the UA and
traffic. For example, when the projected horizontal separation HMD > 1.1 nmi,
Prisk(PenetrationcoAlt) will be below 0.5 (50%) regardless of the closing time τmod;
when the closing time τmod > 91 sec, Prisk(PenetrationcoAlt) will be below 0.5 (50%)
regardless of the horizontal separation HMD.
In addition, to further research the impact of horizontal and vertical separation on
collision risks [112], assume that P risk(τmod) = 0, i.e., τmod ∈ [0, 35] sec, then Eq. 5.3
can be rewritten as follows:
Prisk(Penetrationseparation) = 1− (P risk(HMD)⊕ P risk(Vs)) (5.12)
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The penetration risk levels by the separation are plotted in the colormaps in Fig.
5.6, so the change of Prisk(Penetrationseparation) can be explored through interactions
of the horizontal separation HMD and the vertical separation Vs between the UA
and traffic. For example, when the projected horizontal separation HMD > 1.1 nmi,
Prisk(Penetrationseparation) will be lower than 0.50 (50%) regardless of the vertical
separation Vs; when the vertical separation Vs > 730 ft, Prisk(Penetrationseparation)
will be lower than 0.50 (50%) regardless of the horizontal separation HMD.
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Figure 5.6: Diagrams of Prisk(Penetration) without Prisk(τmod).
5.2.2 Range risk level
For most head-on encounters, the penetration risk level Prisk(Penetration) in Eq. 5.3
can be used to evaluate collision risk levels between the UA and traffic; however, for
tail-chase encounters with very small closing velocities, τmod may still be larger than
τ∗modaz (110 sec), even when traffic aircraft close to the UA DMODwc boundary (4000
ft), e.g., a tail-chase encounter with a UA at 75 kt and traffic at 76kt (i.e., a UA
overtaken encounter with a 1 kt closing velocity). Thus, the calculated penetration
risk level cannot be used to represent collision risk levels for encounters with small
closing velocities. To remedy this issue, we introduce a new severity metric, the range
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risk level, Prisk(Range), to evaluate collision risks based on the horizontal range r
regardless of the τmod calculated during mid-air encounters.
Prisk(Range) =

1−min(r − 2DMODwc
2DMODwc
, 1) if r > 2DMODwc and Vs ≤ VMD∗az,
1 if r ≤ 2DMODwc and Vs ≤ VMD∗az,
0 Otherwise.
(5.13)
where Prisk(Range) ∈ [0, 1], DMODwc = 4000 ft, VMD∗az = 800 ft, r is the current
horizontal range between the UA and traffic (obtained by Eq. 2.9), and Vs is the
current vertical separation between the UA and traffic (obtained by Eq. 2.3).
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Figure 5.7: Diagrams of Prisk(Range) function curves.
Fig. 5.7 shows the function curve of Prisk(Range) when the vertical separation
Vs ≤ 800 ft. Namely, Prisk(Range) = 0 when the horizontal range between the UA
and traffic is larger than 2.63 nmi (16000 ft); Prisk(Range) = 1 when the horizontal
range between the UA and traffic is within 1.32 nmi (8000 ft); Prisk(Range) is on
the linear transition from 1 to 0 when r ∈ [1.32, 2.63] nmi ([8000, 16000] ft); and
Prisk(Range) = 0.5 when the horizontal range between the UA and traffic is at 2
nmi (12000 ft), which is equal to the minimum horizontal range of the UA alert zone,
DMODaz.
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5.3 Implementation Methodology
As designed for the fast-time process, the penetration risk level Prisk(Penetration)
in Eq. 5.3 and the range risk level Prisk(Range) in Eq. 5.13 are calculated based on
current estimated aircraft states and projections; thus, as shown by the blue curve
drawn in Fig. 5.8b, the penetration risk level assessed for traffic on the EKF-estimated
trajectory in Fig. 5.8a varies a lot throughout a simulated mid-air encounter. This
shows that the penetration risk level Prisk(Penetration) is sensitive to projections
of the current τmod and HMD (i.e., relative heading angles estimated between the
UA and traffic which lead to projection errors). To solve this problem, a risk-ranking
method based on likelihood statistical analysis [113] is developed in this section to
provide robust risk assessment results for the next module, mitigation strategy, on the
fast-time simulation platform.
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Figure 5.8: Diagrams of Prisk calculations based on sensor measurements.
Penetration risk ranking
A collision risk-ranking table is designed in Table 5.2, where five rows refer to five risk
level categories: Insignificant, Minor, Moderate, Major, and Catastrophic; five columns
indicate five likelihood options of detected risk levels: Rare, Unlikely, Possible, Likely,
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and Certain; the probability range numbers (e.g., Moderate [0.45. 0.7), or Unlikely
[15%,45%)) are set for these risk level categories and likelihood options based on
previously successful risk-ranking analysis results obtained on the fast-time simulation
platform; 25 risk ranks are assigned in the table from 1 (bottom left) to 50 (top right)
based upon both the risk level and the likelihood; low collision risk ranks are displayed
in green; moderate collision risk ranks are displayed in brown; and high collision risk
ranks are displayed in red.
Table 5.2: Collision Risk Ranking Table
Likelihood
Risk Level
Rare
[0%, 15%)
Unlikely
[15%, 45%)
Possible
[45%, 55%)
Likely
[55%, 85%)
Certain
[85%, 100%]
Catastrophic
[0.9, 1.0]
22 38 46 48 50
Major
[0.7, 0.9)
18 26 36 42 45
Moderate
[0.45, 0.7)
15 22 27 32 35
Minor
[0.2, 0.45)
7 12 16 22 24
Insignificant
[0.0, 0.2)
1 4 6 8 10
As per the ranking process summarized in Eq. 5.14, the ranked penetration risk
level is determined by the likelihood analysis of the last ten penetration risk levels
calculated at time steps (n− 9, n− 8, ... , n− 2, n− 1, and n). Namely, the rank “1”
is assigned when only one measurement has the penetration risk level in [0.0, 0.2) in
the last ten measurements; the rank “27” is assigned when five measurements have
penetration risk levels in [0.45, 0.7) in the last ten measurements; and the rank “50”
is assigned when all ten measurements have risk levels in [0.9, 1.0].
Prisk(Penetrationranked) =
5∑
i=1
Rank(i)NumPrisk(i)
50× 10 (5.14)
where:
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• i is the index of five penetration risk level categories (i.e., 1 for Insignificant, 2
for Minor, 3 for Moderate, 4 for Major, and 5 for Catastrophic in Table 5.2).
• Rank(i) is the rank value assigned based on the risk level category and the
likelihood of Prisk(Penetration). For example, the Minor risk level, Rank(2), is
assigned to “16” when five calculated penetration risk levels Prisk(Penetration)
are in the risk level range [0.2, 0.45) in the last ten calculations (50% likelihood).
• NumPrisk(i) is the number of calculated penetration risk levels Prisk(Penetration)
found in each risk level category from the last ten Prisk(Penetration) calculations
at time steps (n− 9, n− 8, ... , n− 2, n− 1, and n), and ∑5i=1 NumPrisk(i) = 10.
Range risk ranking
Similar to calculations of ranked penetration risk levels, calculations of ranked range
risk levels are also based on the ranking table method. The ranks in the range
risk-ranking table in Table 5.3 are modified, because the value changes in calculated
range risk levels in Eq. 5.13 are usually small in comparison with the changes in
calculated penetration risk levels. Furthermore, for the fast response on range risk
ranking, only the last four range risk levels at time steps (n− 3, n− 2, n− 1, and n)
are used in calculations of ranked range risk levels.
Prisk(Rangeranked) =
5∑
i=1
Rank(i)NumPrisk(i)
50× 4 (5.15)
where:
• i is the index of five penetration risk level categories (i.e., 1 for Insignificant, 2
for Minor, 3 for Moderate, 4 for Major, and 5 for Catastrophic in Table 5.3).
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• Rank(i) is the rank value assigned based on the risk level category and the
likelihood of Prisk(Penetration).
• NumPrisk(i) is the number of calculated penetration risk levels Prisk(Penetration)
found in each risk level category from the last four Prisk(Penetration) calcula-
tions at time steps (n− 3, n− 2, n− 1, and n), and ∑5i=1 NumPrisk(i) = 4.
Table 5.3: Range Risk Ranking Table
Likelihood
Risk Level
Rare
[0%, 15%)
Unlikely
[15%, 45%)
Possible
[45%, 55%)
Likely
[55%, 85%)
Certain
[85%, 100%]
Catastrophic
[0.9, 1.0]
18 21 46 48 50
Major
[0.7, 0.9)
16 26 32 42 45
Moderate
[0.45, 0.7)
12 18 25 26 30
Minor
[0.2, 0.45)
6 10 16 22 24
Insignificant
[0.0, 0.2)
1 2 6 12 16
Collision risk ranking
The collision risk level, Prisk(Collision), can be defined as
Prisk(Collision) = max ( Prisk(Penetrationranked), Prisk(Rangeranked) ) (5.16)
In Eq. 5.16, the collision risk level is determined by the larger one between two
independent risk levels: the ranked penetration risk level Prisk(Penetrationranked) in
Eq. 5.14 and the ranked range risk level Prisk(Rangeranked) in Eq. 5.15. Finally, as
shown in Fig. 5.8b, the change of the ranked Prisk(Collision) (the red curve) is small
in comparison with the change of calculated Prisk(Penetration) (the blue curve), and
thus the ranked Prisk(Collision) can be used to provide robust collision risk assessment
on the fast-time simulation platform.
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5.4 Risk Assessment Performance Analysis
Table 5.4: Summary of encounter geometries [2]
Geometric Classification Icon Description
Head-On
UA Overtaken
UA Overtaking
Left Oblique
UA Overtaking
Right Oblique
UA Overtaking
Left-Converging
Traffic
Right-Converging
Traffic
Legend: UA in blue and traffic in red.
In this section, we start to analyze the risk assessment performance using the
developed severity metrics on listed encounter geometries in Table 5.4. As with the
design of metrics, the collision risk level Prisk(Collision) is normalized into [0, 1] to
assess collision risks from the least severe at 0 (WC) to the most severe at 1 (NMAC).
Based on this normalization, a risk level threshold Prisk(Threshold) is selected in the
analysis to control the sensitivity of the mitigation triggering process for the Avoid
System on the fast-time simulation platform.
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In default, Prisk(Threshold) = 0.5, i.e., the mitigation module is activated to
provide the maneuvering guidance when Prisk(Collision) > 0.5. For example, using
this threshold and the developed severity metrics, we can obtain UA mitigation
triggering conditions for two sample encounters, where the UA in encounter 2 initiates
a self-separation maneuver 10 seconds earlier than the UA in encounter 1 due to the
higher collision risk level.
1. Benign LoWC encounter: the mitigation process is triggered to avoid a potential
LoWC when τmod < 68 sec, HMDprojected = 0.65 nmi (3950 ft ≈ DMODwc),
and Vs = 475 ft (≈ VMD∗wc).
2. Severe LoWC encounter: the mitigation process is triggered to avoid the potential
LoWC when τmod < 78 sec, HMDprojected = 0.31 nmi (1900 ft), and Vs = 475 ft
(≈ VMD∗wc).
In the following subsections, we choose five typical left-side encounters from the
encounter geometries summarized in Table 5.4 to initiate 500 mid-air encounters on the
fast-time simulation platform, and perform further analysis on collision risk assessment
for the developed severity metrics. Note that for encounters on both the left encounter
geometries and the corresponding right encounter geometries, the developed severity
metrics will give the same triggering results because of encounter symmetries.
5.4.1 Head-On
As shown in Fig. 5.9a, in a head-on encounter, the UA in blue is heading to the north,
the traffic aircraft in red is heading the south, and their initial conditions are: the
detected traffic bearing at 0 deg (the north), the traffic heading at 179 deg (the south),
the south wind (0 deg) at 20 kt, the UA ground speed at 95 kt, and the traffic ground
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speed at 100 kt. A set of sample Prisk curves are drawn in Fig. 5.9b, where the red
curve depicts the collision risk level Prisk(Collision) over the evaluation time [0, 120]
sec. Upon the output performance, it is a much smoother control curve in comparison
with the blue curve of the penetration risk level Prisk(Penetration) in Fig. 5.9b.
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Figure 5.9: Prisk collision risk analysis for a head-on encounter.
As shown in the implementation block diagram in Fig. 3.3, measurement errors
are introduced in the sensor measurement module, and detected traffic trajectories
are tracked and smoothed by the EKF in the tracking module. With this simulated
detection process, 100 head-on encounters in Fig. 5.9a are generated on the fast-time
simulation platform, and at the same time the risk assessment performance of the
developed severity metrics is analyzed. Table 5.5 lists analysis results at the first
breach of Prisk(Collision) > 0.5 for these head-on encounters, where the two-sigma
rule (2 standard deviations) is used to calculate 95% containment for each statistical
result. Upon analysis of the results of these head-on encounters, the DAA mitigation
process is usually triggered to provide mitigation guidance to avoid the potential
LoWC when the horizontal range r < 4.63 nmi (or the closing time τmod < 83.52 sec),
which is outside of the WCAT boundary (2.38 nmi, as per the WCAT lookup table
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obtained in Chapter 4).
Table 5.5: Analysis results for encounters on the head-on geometry.
Statistic Unit N Mean
95%
Containment
Standard
Deviation
Min Max
range (r) nmi 100 4.63 ±0.38 0.19 3.20 4.86
range rate (r˙) kt 100 -195.90 ±18.90 9.44 -237.43 -177.65
time (τmod) sec 100 83.52 ±11.16 5.58 50.35 91.18
horizontal separation (HMD) nmi 100 0.18 ±0.30 0.15 0.00 0.71
vertical separation (Vs) ft 100 354.82 ±40.34 20.67 304.27 412.44
Prisk(Penetrationranked) 100 0.52 ±0.0032 0.0016 0.52 0.54
Prisk(Rangeranked) 100 0.32 ±0.0000 0.0000 0.32 0.32
Prisk(Collision) 100 0.52 ±0.0032 0.0016 0.52 0.54
5.4.2 UA Overtaken
As shown in Fig. 5.10a, in a UA overtaken encounter, the UA in blue is heading to
the north, the traffic aircraft in red is heading the northeast with a faster velocity, and
their initial conditions are: the detected traffic bearing at 228 deg (the southwest),
the traffic heading at 17 deg (the northeast), the south wind (0 deg) at 20 kt, the UA
ground speed at 95 kt, and the traffic ground speed at 122 kt. A set of sample Prisk
curves are drawn in Fig. 5.10b, where the red curve depicts the collision risk level
Prisk(Collision) over the evaluation time [0, 120] sec.
Similar to the performance analysis of previous head-on encounters, risk assessment
results for UA overtaken encounters at the first breach of Prisk(Collision) > 0.5
in 100 runs on the fast-time simulation platform are listed in Table 5.6. In this
encounter geometry, the DAA mitigation process is triggered to provide mitigation
guidance to avoid the potential LoWC by the breach of the ranked range risk level
Prisk(Rangeranked) (i.e., r < 2 nmi and Vs < 800 ft regardless of the time τmod). At
the triggering time, the ranked penetration risk level Prisk(Penetrationranked) indeed
stays small because the closing time τmod is larger than 110 sec. Moreover, the DAA
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triggering location is also outside of the WCAT boundary (1.43 nmi, based on the
WCAT lookup table obtained in Chapter 4).
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Figure 5.10: Prisk collision risk analysis for a UA overtaken encounter.
Table 5.6: Analysis results for encounters on the UA overtaken geometry.
Statistic Unit N Mean
95%
Containment
Standard
Deviation
Min Max
range (r) nmi 100 1.95 ±0.0068 0.0034 1.94 1.96
range rate (r˙) kt 100 -40.47 ±27.53 13.77 -76.00 2.15
time (τmod) sec 100 147.78 ±651.68 325.84 -2894.65 929.30
horizontal separation (HMD) nmi 100 0.52 ±0.81 0.41 0.01 1.95
vertical separation (Vs) ft 100 436.95 ±38.29 19.14 391.25 477.12
Prisk(Penetrationranked) 100 0.20 ±0.0019 0.01 0.17 0.22
Prisk(Rangeranked) 100 0.60 ±0.0000 0.00 0.60 0.60
Prisk(Collision) 100 0.60 ±0.0032 0.00 0.60 0.60
5.4.3 UA Overtaking
As shown in Fig. 5.11a, in a UA overtaking encounter, the UA in blue is heading
to the north, the traffic aircraft in red is heading the north with a slower velocity,
and their initial conditions are: the detected traffic bearing at 357 deg (the north),
the traffic heading at 359 deg (the north), the south wind (0 deg) at 20 kt, the UA
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ground speed at 95 kt, and the traffic ground speed at 70 kt. A set of sample Prisk
curves are drawn in Fig. 5.11b, where the red curve depicts the collision risk level
Prisk(Collision) over the evaluation time [0, 120] sec.
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Figure 5.11: Prisk collision risk analysis for a UA overtaking encounter.
Table 5.7: Analysis results for encounters on the UA overtaking geometry.
Statistic Unit N Mean
95%
Containment
Standard
Deviation
Min Max
range (r) nmi 100 1.98 ±0.008 0.004 1.96 1.99
range rate (r˙) kt 100 -23.55 ±20.73 10.37 -54.49 5.93
time (τmod) sec 100 164.12 ±2292.91 1146.45 -9355.26 2231.20
horizontal separation (HMD) nmi 100 0.64 ±1.09 0.55 0.00 1.98
vertical separation (Vs) ft 100 513.10 ±36.92 18.46 455.93 549.71
Prisk(Penetrationranked) 100 0.20 ±0.0133 0.007 0.17 0.22
Prisk(Rangeranked) 100 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.60
Prisk(Collision) 100 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.60
Similar to the performance analysis of the previous encounters, risk assessment
results for UA overtaking encounters at the first breach of Prisk(Collision) > 0.5
in 100 runs on the fast-time simulation platform are listed in Table 5.7. In this
encounter geometry, the DAA mitigation process is triggered to provide mitigation
guidance to avoid the potential LoWC by the breach of the ranked range risk level
Prisk(Rangeranked) (i.e., r < 2 nmi and Vs < 800 ft regardless of the time τmod). At
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the triggering time, the ranked penetration risk level Prisk(Penetrationranked) indeed
stays small because of the low closing velocity between the UA and traffic (-23.55 kt)
and the large τmod (τmod > 110 sec). Moreover, the DAA triggering location is also
outside of the WCAT boundary (1.51 nmi, based on the WCAT lookup table obtained
in Chapter 4).
5.4.4 Left Oblique UA Overtaking
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Figure 5.12: Prisk collision risk analysis for left oblique UA overtaking encounters.
As shown in Fig. 5.12a, in a left oblique UA overtaking encounter, the UA in
blue is heading to the north, the traffic aircraft in red is heading the northeast with
a slower velocity, and their initial conditions are: the detected traffic bearing at 327
deg (the northwest), the traffic heading at 61 deg (the northeast), the south wind (0
deg) at 20 kt, the UA ground speed at 95 kt, and the traffic ground speed at 76 kt. A
set of sample Prisk curves are drawn in Fig. 5.12b, where the red curve depicts the
collision risk level Prisk(Collision) over the evaluation time [0, 120] sec.
Similar to the performance analysis of previous UA overtaking encounters, risk
assessment results for left oblique UA overtaking encounters at the first breach of
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Prisk(Collision) > 0.5 in 100 runs on the fast-time simulation platform are listed
in Table 5.8. In this encounter geometry, the DAA mitigation process is triggered
to provide mitigation guidance to avoid the potential LoWC by the breach of the
ranked range risk levels Prisk(Rangeranked) (i.e., r < 2 nmi and Vs < 800 ft). At the
triggering time, the ranked penetration risk level is less than the threshold 0.5, but
it almost reaches 0.5 with Prisk(Penetrationranked) = 0.42, range rate r˙ = −80.59 kt
and closing time τmod = 80 sec. Moreover, the DAA triggering location is outside the
WCAT boundary (1.93 nmi, based on the WCAT lookup table obtained in Chapter
4).
Table 5.8: Analysis results for encounters on the left oblique UA overtaking geometry.
Statistic Unit N Mean
95%
Containment
Standard
Deviation
Min Max
range (r) nmi 100 1.96 ±0.0132 0.0066 1.95 1.99
range rate (r˙) kt 100 -80.59 ±23.77 11.89 -137.81 -49.43
time (τmod) sec 100 79.27 ±22.50 11.25 46.33 126.16
horizontal separation (HMD) nmi 100 0.76 ±0.44 0.22 0.03 1.40
vertical separation (Vs) ft 100 402.15 ±44.99 22.50 338.40 458.93
Prisk(Penetrationranked) 100 0.42 ±0.10 0.05 0.24 0.52
Prisk(Rangeranked) 100 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.60
Prisk(Collision) 100 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.60
5.4.5 Left-Converging Traffic
As shown in Fig. 5.13a, in a left-converging traffic encounter, the UA in blue is
heading to the north, the traffic aircraft in red is heading the southeast, and their
initial conditions are: the detected traffic bearing at 327 deg (the northwest), the
traffic heading at 125 deg (the southeast), the south wind (0 deg) at 20 kt, the UA
ground speed at 95 kt, and the traffic ground speed at 136 kt. A set of sample Prisk
curves are drawn in Fig. 5.13b, where the red curve depicts the collision risk level
Prisk(Collision) over the evaluation time [0, 120] sec.
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Figure 5.13: Prisk collision risk analysis for a left-converging traffic encounter.
Table 5.9: Analysis results for encounters with traffic on the left-converging geometry.
Statistic Unit N Mean
95%
Containment
Standard
Deviation
Min Max
range (r) nmi 100 3.97 ±0.35 0.17 3.37 4.23
range rate (r˙) kt 100 -197.30 ±18.68 9.34 -235.31 -172.00
time (τmod) sec 100 70.63 ±9.45 4.72 55.17 80.68
horizontal separation (HMD) nmi 100 0.13 ±0.22 0.11 0.00 0.46
vertical separation (Vs) ft 100 603.46 ±40.38 20.19 562.50 646.99
Prisk(Penetrationranked) 100 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.52
Prisk(Rangeranked) 100 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32
Prisk(Collision) 100 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.52
Similar to the performance analysis of previous head-on encounters, risk assessment
results for left-converging traffic encounters at the first breach of Prisk(Collision) > 0.5
in 100 runs on the fast-time simulation platform are listed in Table 5.9. In this
encounter geometry, the DAA mitigation process is triggered to provide mitigation
guidance to avoid the potential LoWC by the breach of the ranked penetration risk
level Prisk(Penetrationranked) when the horizontal range r < 3.97 nmi (or the closing
time τmod < 70.63 sec), which is outside of the WCAT boundary (1.90 nmi, based on
the WCAT lookup table obtained in Chapter 4).
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5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we develop a new set of severity metrics to assess collision risk levels for
small UA when traffic are penetrating from the outer encounter boundary (encounter
surveillance cylinder) to the inner encounter boundary (NMAC cylinder), which
are based on three penetration components: the closing time τmod, the horizontal
separation HMD, and the vertical separation Vs. To overcome uncertainties from
sensor measurements, a risk-ranking table method is also designed and introduced to
provide robust risk assessment results for mitigation analysis. For the performance
analysis, encounters on various geometries are performed on the fast-time simulation
platform, and the analysis results show that the developed risk assessment metrics can
be employed to evaluate potential collision risks and trigger the mitigation process
during mid-air encounters.
With hazards identified in Chapter 4 and collision risks assessed in this chapter,
the other two modules of the Avoid System, the mitigation strategy module and the
performance analysis module, will be developed in the next chapter. The development
will be focused on two types of mitigation strategies in UAS self-separation and
collision avoidance, as well as the mitigation performance analysis metrics used on the
fast-time simulation platform.
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Chapter 6
Mitigation Analysis
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we completed the development of the hazard identification
module and the risk assessment module, the first two modules of the Avoid System on
the fast-time simulation platform. In this chapter, we begin to implement the last two
modules of the Avoid System, the mitigation strategy module and the performance
evaluation module, as shown in the orange block and the pink block drawn in the
green box in Fig. 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Block diagram for the fast-time simulation based analysis platform.
Two categories of mitigation strategies are developed in this chapter for self-
separation and collision avoidance. In self-separation, a learning-based decision tree
method is proposed to provide DAA guidance for small UA to avoid LoWCs or NMACs
during mid-air encounters. In collision avoidance, a three-dimensional emergency
evasive maneuvering algorithm is designed for small UA to avoid coming NMACs
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when traffic are approaching the CAAT boundary in the hazard zone during mid-air
encounters. Later in this chapter, to evaluate the mitigation performance of DAA
systems, a set of risk ratio metrics are developed to perform statistical analysis over
millions of simulated mid-air encounters on the fast-time simulation platform.
6.1 Introduction
As with the near-term solutions proposed in Chapter 1, for safety concerns about UAS
operations in civil airspace, the PIC should make final decisions on whether maneuvers
are required during mid-air encounters to avoid potential LoWCs or NMACs; however,
it is not an easy task for the PIC, even an experienced pilot, to make such decisions
for safe operations in civil airspace due to the complexities of mid-air encounter
geometries, and uncertainties of sensor measurements on aircraft states such as traffic-
detected bearings, headings, velocities, and accelerations, as well as on encountered
environmental conditions, i.e., wind speed and wind direction. For example, when
traffic are converging from the left rear of UA at the bearing region [250◦, 265◦], as
shown in Fig. 4.11 and Fig. 4.12, the WCAT is increased almost 25% in various
wind conditions for UA operated at 75 kt, which often results in LoWCs because of
inappropriate maneuvers chosen by the PIC based on previously successful experience
from similar encounter geometries. As a result, a DAA guidance system is required to
help the PIC assess collision risks quantitatively and make appropriate maneuvers to
avoid potential LoWCs or NMACs in mid-air encounters.
For large UAS, the TCAS can be installed as a proven DAA guidance system
to help the PIC make appropriate maneuvers to avoid potential collisions during
mid-air encounters. For small UAS, the TCAS cannot be installed due to SWaP
limitations. A light-weight ADS-B-based airborne DAA system and a portable ground
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radar-based DAA system are therefore proposed in Chapter 1 to help small UAS choose
appropriate horizontal maneuvers 1 to avoid LoWCs in UAS self-separation, and achieve
the equivalent level of safety as manned aircraft in civil airspace. However, when
self-separation fails (i.e., traffic have breached the hazard zone and are approaching
the UA CAAT boundary), DAA guidance systems in collision avoidance are allowed to
maneuver UA in any way in the three-dimensional space that is safe to avoid NMACs.
As regards the guidance for helping the PIC steer UA in self-separation, three
core concerts must be considered in advance: when to maneuver, how to maneuver,
and the length of time that maneuvers should last. These concerns are all related to
maneuvering timing, turning direction, turn rate, and duration. A number of guidance
methods have been reviewed and summarized for solving such questions in [114,115].
For instance, a predefined guidance method is designed based on predefined rules to
determine escape trajectories. This is efficient in specific encounters, but in most cases,
it is less effective and less optimal than an optimized guidance method [116,117]. As for
the system response time, the predefined guidance method can provide an avoidance
maneuvering solution immediately [115]. The optimized guidance method, on the
other hand, usually requires extra computation time to search for the best solutions
from all possible maneuvering options in mid-air encounters [118–121]. To overcome
these drawbacks for real-time decision making, the TCAS selects the least-aggressive
vertical maneuver within a limited set of potential climb or descent maneuvers that
can provide adequate separation between aircraft in mid-air encounters [114, 122].
However, it cannot be directly adopted for DAA guidance systems because horizontal
maneuvers have many more maneuvering options (e.g., various turn rates and heading
changes) than vertical maneuvers.
1Note that the TCAS has been designed to avoid potential mid-air collisions by vertical maneuvers.
In case of miscommunication with existing TCAS-equipped aircraft, new DAA systems that are
capable of horizontal maneuvers must expect to adapt themselves when necessary [2].
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In this chapter, a novel learning-based decision tree method is proposed and
designed to provide real-time DAA guidance without demanding extra computation
time in searching for the best solutions from all possible maneuvering options. This
method is inspired by a Google artificial intelligence (AI) program, AlphaGo, which
has recently mastered the complex ancient Chinese board game, “Go”, defeating the
best human “Go” game players in the last two years [123,124]. AlphaGo is not directly
programmed to play “Go” games; instead, it is designed to learn how to play the game
by a general purpose algorithm through analyzing millions of human expert-played
“Go” games (supervised learning) and AlphaGo self-played “Go” games (reinforcement
learning) [123]. By training through supervised learning and reinforcement learning,
two knowledge-based statistical networks: the policy network (how to play the game
in the next run) and the value network (how to evaluate the probability of winning
the game with the current decision), are thus constructed to reduce the breadth and
the depth of the MC searching tree to locate the best solutions in “Go” games [124].
It is true that AlphaGo is designed based on the optimization method and requires
extra computation power over thousands of computers to play games. However, more
importantly, its design strategy (two knowledge-based statistical networks: the policy
network and the value network) as well as the strategy used by TCAS (a limited set
of potential maneuvers) can be adopted in this paper to establish the learning-based
decision tree method to provide real-time supervisory DAA guidance for small UAS.
6.2 Mitigation Strategy
In accordance with layered zones (i.e., the alert zone and hazard zone) defined for
hazard identification in Chapter 4, DAA mitigation strategies are designed and
developed in two categories for UA to avoid LoWCs or NMACs in mid-air encounters.
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• Self-separation refers to the least disruptive horizontal maneuvers (i.e., the
least impact on the planned flight mission) triggered by the PIC to avoid LoWCs
or NMACs when traffic aircraft are penetrating the alert zone of UA.
• Collision avoidance refers to three-dimensional emergency evasive maneuvers
triggered by DAA systems to avoid NMACs when traffic aircraft are approaching
the CAAT boundary in the hazard zone of UA and NMACs are projected.
As discussed in Chapter 5, the collision risk level, Prisk(Collision), is assessed
into a normalized ratio in [0, 1] when traffic aircraft are penetrating the alert zone of
UA, i.e., from the least severe at 0 (remaining WC) to the most severe at 1 (NMAC
projected in 35 seconds). By default, the self-separation mitigation process is activated
when the collision risk level Prisk(Collision) > 0.5.
6.2.1 Self-separation
In this section, we design and develop a learning-based decision tree method to help the
PIC determine appropriate horizontal maneuvers for UA to avoid LoWCs or NMACs
in self-separation. As discussed in Section 6.1, for effective or optimal maneuvering,
the optimized guidance method is preferred in self-separation; however, this method
typically cannot be used to provide real-time DAA guidance for mid-air encounters
since it often requires extra computation time to search for the best solutions from all
possible maneuvering options (i.e., various maneuvering timings, turning directions,
turn rates, and durations). To fix this issue, a learning-based decision tree method
is proposed in this subsection to use knowledge learned from previous successful
maneuvering decisions studied in mid-air encounters, to help small UAS DAA systems
select optimized mitigation solutions in real-time for UAS self-separation.
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As learned from the design strategies of TCAS and AlphaGo, we need to reduce
the breadth of the decision tree (i.e., decision options at each choice point on the
decision tree) for real-time decision making. In response to this request, we first design
seven horizontal maneuvering options in various turn rates as shown in Fig. 6.2 and
listed in Table 6.1 for UA to handle collision risks from low to high risk levels during
mid-air encounters.
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Figure 6.2: Diagram for risk-based horizontal maneuvering options.
Table 6.1: UA horizontal maneuvering options
Suggested heading
changes (deg)
Collision
risks
Maneuvering
options
Heading changes
(deg)
Turn rate
(deg/sec)
Duration
(sec)
[ −180, −60 ] High L3 -60 -6 10
( −60, −30 ] Medium L2 -30 -3 10
( −30, 0 ) Low L1 -15 -1.5 10
0 Negligible Level 0 0 10
( 0, 30 ) Low R1 15 1.5 10
[ 30, 60 ) Medium R2 30 3 10
[ 60, 180 ] High R3 60 6 10
Note: negative for left turn, and positive for right turn; assume that a maximum 6 deg/sec
level turn can be performed on the UA during operations.
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In this solution, for example, a three-level decision tree can be minimized to only
evaluate 73 (343) decisions for the self-separation guidance. However, when this
solution is applied to deal with uncertainties on sensor measurements (i.e., aircraft
headings, velocities, bearings, and wind conditions), it will not be scalable to provide
real-time DAA guidance because the size of the decision tree is exponentially expanded
with measurement uncertainties. Thus, we have to further improve our new method
with the design strategy from AlphaGo; namely, 1) maneuvering knowledge learned
from the previously studied mid-air encounters in MC simulations in Chapter 4 is used
to construct a policy network to further reduce the breadth of the decision tree for
real-time decision making; 2) the collision risk level, Prisk(Collision), assessed and
predicted throughout mid-air encounters is used to form a value network to reduce
the depth of the decision tree and choose the best maneuvering solutions to provide
online supervisory guidance for small UA to avoid potential LoWCs or NMACs in
self-separation.
6.2.1.1 Maneuvering knowledge learning
Table 6.2: Datasets in the UA maneuvering knowledge base
Dataset Parameters included
Traffic Velocity, Detected bearing, Heading
UA Velocity, Heading
Wind Wind speed, Wind direction
Maneuvering options Turning direction, Heading change
Encounter states Range minimum (WCAT), Range rate, HMD, τmod
As mentioned in Subsection 4.4.2, MC simulations are carried out to locate WCAT
boundaries for UA with traffic in various velocities and wind conditions, and simulation
results (based on the DAIDALUS algorithm [101]) are saved in the database as listed
in Table 6.2 (including five datasets: traffic states, UA states, wind conditions,
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maneuvering options, and encounter states at the time when maneuvers are triggered).
The shortest traffic range (range minimum in encounter states) data are retrieved
from the database to determine WCAT boundaries in Chapter 4; in this chapter,
the database is treated as a knowledge base for future mid-air encounters. To begin
with knowledge learning, we design a supervised learning (SL) method to extract
the maneuvering experience from the knowledge base, and then construct the policy
network to guide horizontal maneuvers in future mid-air encounters. For example,
when the encounter input conditions are determined (e.g., Traffic states: velocity
at 100 kt, detected bearing at 30◦, and heading to 225◦; UA states: velocity at 75
kt and heading to 0◦; wind conditions: speed at 20 kt and direction to 0◦), the
suggested maneuvering option (i.e., the turning direction and the heading change) can
be obtained from the knowledge base via a database querying operation (e.g., left turn
and 36◦ heading change), and this suggestion is also adopted in the policy network for
future similar mid-air encounters. However, in most cases, input conditions cannot be
determined in as much detail as this example due to measurement uncertainties. As
a result, database range querying operations are employed to retrieve all suggested
heading changes from the knowledge base, and then the most probable maneuvering
option (i.e., the highest likelihood from all suggested options) is selected for UA to
handle measurement uncertainties during mid-air encounters.
For instance, when the detected traffic bearing is at 30◦± 5◦ and the traffic relative
heading is at 225± 5◦, the range querying operation is performed with the detected
traffic bearing βtraffic ∈ [25◦, 35◦] and the traffic relative heading ψtraffic ∈ [220◦, 230◦]
in the database, and then 81 corresponding database records are obtained and listed
in Table 6.3.
Once a list of suggested heading changes is obtained, such as the list in Table
6.3, a likelihood analysis in Table 6.4 is introduced to summarize these suggested
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Table 6.3: A sample database range query result from the knowledge base.
No ID Range rate (kt) Heading change (deg) Range minimum (nmi)
1 477747 -166.56 -36 1.86
2 477748 -166.19 -36 1.85
3 477749 -165.76 -30 1.85
4 477750 -165.29 -30 1.85
5 477751 -164.76 -30 1.84
6 477752 -164.19 -24 1.84
...
...
...
...
...
76 495030 -163.65 -42 1.83
77 495031 -163.33 -42 1.83
78 495032 -162.96 -36 1.83
79 495033 -162.55 -36 1.82
80 495034 -162.08 -30 1.82
81 495035 -161.56 -30 1.82
heading changes in seven angle regions (i.e., in [-180◦, -60◦], (-60◦, -30◦], (-30◦, 0◦), 0◦,
(0◦, 30◦), [30◦, 60◦), and [60◦, 180◦]) with respect to seven predefined maneuvering
options in Table 6.1 (i.e., L3, L2, L1, Level, R1, R2, and R3). Finally, the suggested
maneuvering option is chosen based on the highest likelihood ratio among seven
maneuvering options (e.g., L2 suggested in Table 6.4) for UA to avoid LoWCs or
NMACs during mid-air encounters.
Table 6.4: Maneuvering options statistics
Suggested heading
changes (degree)
Probable maneuvers
likelihood
Maneuvering
options
Maneuvering
index
Most probable
maneuvers
[ −180, −60 ] NumL3/Numtotal L3 −3
( −60, −30 ] NumL2/Numtotal L2 −2 (e.g., X if
NumL2
Numtotal
is the
highest likelihood ratio.)
( −30, 0 ) NumL1/Numtotal L1 −1
0 NumLevel/Numtotal Level 0
( 0, 30 ) NumR1/Numtotal R1 1
[ 30, 60 ) NumR2/Numtotal R2 2
[ 60, 180 ] NumR3/Numtotal R3 3
In summary, this SL training process can be listed as follows:
1. Select a set of initial conditions for the UA and traffic in a mid-air encounter and
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perform a range querying operation in the database with sensor measurement
uncertainties, e.g., UA velocity ±10 kt, traffic velocity ±20 kt, detected traffic
relative bearing ±5◦, traffic relative heading ±5◦, wind speed ±10 kt, and wind
direction ±20◦, to acquire a list of suggested maneuvering options from the
knowledge base, as depicted in Table 6.3.
2. Perform the likelihood analysis of suggested maneuvering options on the list;
namely, they are counted by heading changes in seven angle regions, e.g., if
one of the suggested maneuvering options on the list has a heading change
at -36◦ in (−60◦,−30◦], then the likelihood counter NumL2 is increased by 1
(i.e., NumL2 = NumL2 + 1). Similarly, NumL3, NumL1, NumLevel, NumR1,
NumR2, and NumR3 are counted; and Numtotal = NumL3 + NumL2 + NumL1
+ NumLevel + NumR1 + NumR2 + NumR3.
3. The most probable maneuver on the list (with the highest likelihood ratio) is
selected as the suggested maneuvering option to construct the policy network for
the mid-air encounter defined in Step 1 (e.g., in Table 6.4, L2 is selected when
NumL2
Numtotal
is the highest likelihood ratio among seven maneuvering options).
To construct the entire policy network in accord with all previously studied mid-air
encounters in Chapter 4, we design and carry out an MC tree search (using the above
SL training process) throughout the entire knowledge base at a predefined resolution
(i.e., every 1◦ for relative bearings and relative headings from 0◦ to 360◦, every 50
kt for velocities from 50 kt to 300 kt, 20 kt wind in every 45◦ from 0◦ to 360◦). It
is true that the MC tree search requires a large amount of processing time for the
millions of range querying operations in the database; however, once the SL training
process is completed, the trained policy network can be loaded into the computer
memory (RAM) to provide real-time supervisory guidance for the decision making
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at each choice point on the decision tree. A sample policy network is visualized for
a north heading 75 kt UA in a 2D colormap in Fig. 6.3a, where the vertical axis is
traffic headings [0◦, 360◦); the horizontal axis is traffic-detected bearings [0◦, 360◦);
and maneuvering options are colored as their indexes given in Table 6.4 (i.e., -2 for L2
left turn in blue, 0 for Level no turn in green, 2 for R2 right turn in red; or, in short,
negative indexes for left turns in cool colors and positive indexes for right turns in
warm colors). With the traffic detected bearing and heading, this 2D colormap can be
used as a lookup table to provide turning guidance. For example, a UA in Fig. 6.3b
is operated in north heading (0◦) at 75 kt under 20 kt south wind (0◦), and a 50 kt
traffic is detected at 20◦ bearing in 300◦ heading. The policy network in Fig. 6.3a
suggests the UA taking a L3 left turn to avoid a potential LoWC.
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Figure 6.3: Example for using a policy network to provide turning guidance in a mid-air
encounter.
More trained policy network diagrams are displayed in Fig. 6.4 for UA maneuvering
options in various velocities and wind conditions. Figs. 6.4a, 6.4c, 6.4e, and 6.4g are
policy network diagrams for traffic at various velocities in 20 kt gusty south wind
(direction at 0◦), where most suggested maneuvering options are symmetric. Figs.
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(a) 50 kt traffic in 20 kt gusty wind
at 0◦
0 100 200 300
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Traffic detected bearing − degree
Tr
af
fic
 h
ea
di
ng
 − 
de
gr
ee
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
(b) 50 kt traffic in 20 kt gusty wind
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(c) 100 kt traffic in 20 kt gusty
wind at 0◦
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(d) 100 kt traffic in 20 kt gusty
wind at 45◦
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(e) 150 kt traffic in 20 kt gusty
wind at 0◦
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(f) 150 kt traffic in 20 kt gusty
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(g) 200 kt traffic in 20 kt gusty
wind at 0◦
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(h) 200kt traffic in 20 kt gusty
wind at 45◦
Figure 6.4: Sample policy network diagrams for UA maneuvering options in various velocities
and wind conditions (UA: velocity at 75 kt and heading to the north; Legend: negative
indexes for left turns in cool colors and positive indexes for right turns in warm colors).
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6.4b, 6.4d, 6.4f, and 6.4h are policy network diagrams for traffic at various velocities
in 20 kt gusty southwest wind (direction at 45◦), where most suggested maneuvering
options are not symmetric (with left shifts), in comparison with the ones in 20 kt
gusty south wind (direction at 0◦).
6.2.1.2 Smart decision tree method
In this subsection, we begin to develop a smart decision tree method (SDTM) to
provide real-time DAA guidance for small UA to avoid LoWCs or NMACs in self-
separation. In the SDTM, the maneuvering policy network is employed at each choice
point (CP) to guide the decision making, reduce the breadth of the decision tree,
and save time on the evaluation of decisions. Moreover, metrics designed in Chapter
5 for assessing collision risks in mid-air encounters, e.g., collision risk levels, are
used to establish a value network to evaluate mitigation performance of suggested
maneuvering options, to reduce the depth of the decision tree, as well as to choose the
best maneuvers on the decision tree for real-time supervisory guidance.
As shown in Fig. 6.5, a binary decision tree is constructed based on the trained
policy network and the value network, where choice points on the decision tree are
set at every time interval (i.e., ∆t = 10 sec) because UA typically need extra time to
settle down with state changes in case of a loss of controllability or stabilizability. At
each choice point, the UA has two options: either taking a maneuver suggested by the
policy network (1), or remaining on/returning to the level flight (0). In addition, the
decision tree is constructed in three to six hierarchies upon mitigation performance
evaluation results from the value network, which is in accord with the self-separation
alerting time from the risk assessment module by the default entry condition when
Prisk(Collision) > 0.5 (i.e., 30 to 60 seconds before LoWCs or NMACs).
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Figure 6.5: An execution of a decision tree with choice points at time interval ∆t.
The learning-based SDTM is designed as follows:
System Inputs
Traffic states Xtrafficn = [xtrafficn , ytrafficn , htrafficn , vtrafficx,n , vtrafficy,n , vtraffich,n ]
T ,
UA states Xuan = [xuan , yuan , huan , vuax,n , vuay,n , vuah,n ]
T ,
UA horizontal airspeed vua,asn ,
estimated wind speed vwsn , estimated wind direction ψwindn ,
detected traffic bearing with respect to the UA βtrafficn,
horizontal range rn, vertical separation Vsn , τmodn , HMDpredictedn , VMDpredictedn ,
and collision risk level Prisk(Collision)n at the time step n.
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Control Variables
Generally, maneuvering states are m = [v˙, h˙, ψ˙, tm] for horizontal acceleration, vertical
rate, turn rate, and time duration for maneuvering, respectively. In self-separation,
horizontal maneuvers are selected, so maneuvering states can be simplified as m =
[ψ˙, tm] with allowed horizontal maneuvering options listed in Table 6.1.
Specifications
In the construction of the smart decision tree, the first specification is to provide
consistent maneuvers for DAA guidance in self-separation. For example, a left turn
L1 maneuver is initiated at the first choice point, and then no right turn maneuvers
will be selected at other choice points on the decision tree. The allowed maneuvering
options are limited to left turns L1, L2, L3, and the level flight Level.
The second specification is to determine emergency shutdown conditions for self-
separation mitigation. When traffic aircraft are approaching the CAAT boundary
in the hazard zone and NMACs are projected, UA should exit from self-separation
mitigation and enter collision avoidance mitigation to avoid coming NMACs.
Decision Tree Constructions
When self-separation mitigation is enabled, decision trees are constructed to predict
encounter states from the present to the lookahead horizon (e.g., 3∆t = 30 sec)
during mid-air encounters [125]. As shown in Fig. 6.5, the policy network is used to
determine maneuvering options at choice points on the decision tree; however, if the
suggested maneuvering option is not consistent with the ones made at other choice
points previously, an L1 or R1 maneuver will be selected to construct the decision
tree upon maneuveing options selected at other choice points.
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During the decision evaluation, predicted trajectories of both the UA and traffic
for all suggested maneuvering options on the decision tree are generated according to
trajectory generation equations in Eq. 4.5 - Eq. 4.13 under given wind conditions.
Moreover, decision trees are constructed dynamically (i.e., in various hierarchies)
upon evaluation results by the value network. Thus, decision trees are first con-
structed at three hierarchies with eight suggested maneuvering options, and later
they are expanded up to six hierarchies with 64 suggested maneuvering options when
Prisk(Collision)Predicted < 0.5 has not been achieved on three-level decision trees.
System Outputs
Deviation distance
t10 t20 t30 t40 t50 t60 t70
t
Unmitigated trajectory
Mitigated trajectory
t0
Deviation angle
Figure 6.6: Trajectory deviation diagram (modified from [2]).
The learning-based decision tree method outputs the predicted collision risk level
Prisk(Collision)Predicted and the predicted deviation (i.e., deviation distance and devi-
ation angle) from the original flight course at the lookahead horizon (e.g., 30-second
prediction in Fig. 6.6). In Table 6.5, sample analysis results of a three-level decision
tree are listed for a head-on encounter in Fig. 6.7. To choose the best maneuvering
options in Table 6.5 for UA to avoid potential LoWCs or NMACs, the DAA supervisory
guidance should meet with the following conditions:
1. The predicted collision risk level Prisk(Collision)predicted < Prisk(Threshold)
(0.5, the default collision risk level threshold).
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2. The predicted HMDpredicted > DMODwc (0.66 nmi).
3. The predicted horizontal range rpredicted > DMODaz (2 nmi).
Thus, without considering system delays, four maneuvering options: 4, 6, 7, and 8
in Table 6.5 (i.e., [0, L2, L1], [L2, 0, L1], [L2, L1, 0], and [L2, L1, L1]) can be selected
for UA to avoid LoWC in the head-on encounter in Fig. 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: Sample mitigation analysis in a head-on encounter.
Table 6.5: List of sample analysis results from eight suggested maneuvering options on a
three-level decision tree in a head-on encounter.
Option
index
t0 t0 + 10 t0 + 20
Predicted
Prisk(Collision) with delays
Deviation
distance
(nmi)
Deviation
angle
(deg)
Least
disruptive
maneuver
0 sec 5 sec 10 sec 15 sec
1 0 0 0 0.73 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.00 0.00
2 0 0 L2 0.59 0.63 0.66 0.69 0.05 21.60
3 0 L2 0 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.14 21.60
4 0 L2 L1 0.43 0.48 0.52 0.56 0.16 32.69
5 L2 0 0 0.51 0.55 0.58 0.61 0.23 21.60
6 L2 0 L1 0.39 0.43 0.47 0.52 0.26 32.69
7 L2 L1 0 0.37 0.41 0.45 0.49 0.29 32.69 X
8 L2 L1 L1 0.24 0.29 0.35 0.40 0.31 44.10
Note that the maneuvering option [0, L2, L1] suggests that the PIC should command
the UA to maintain level flight in [t0, t0 + 10), take an L2 turn horizontal maneuver
in [t0 + 10, t0 + 20), and perform an L1 turn horizontal maneuver in [t0 + 20, t0 + 30).
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Decision Making
1. For suitable DAA guidance in UAS operations, system delays (i.e., delays from
sensor measurements, data communications, pilot decisions, command executions
and aerodynamic responses) have to be considered in the decision making. Thus,
suggested maneuvering options should be able to handle system delays of 5 to 15
seconds [28]; namely, maneuvering options 4 and 6 in Table 6.5 are not suitable
maneuvering options when system delays of 10 to 15 seconds are introduced in
the prediction.
2. For better mitigation performance, the least disruptive maneuver should be
chosen when more than one suitable maneuvering option is available on the
decision tree. In this case, maneuvering option 7 (i.e., [L2, L1, 0]) in Table 6.5 is
selected as the suggested DAA guidance for the PIC, because of less deviation
from the original flight course (in both deviation distance and deviation angle)
at the lookahead horizon t0 + 30 seconds between maneuvering options 7 and 8
in Table 6.5.
3. For the cases when no maneuvering option can meet Prisk(Collision)predicted <
0.5 on the six-level decision tree, the maneuvering option with the maximum
HMDpredicted should be selected as the suggested DAA guidance.
It is noted that the learning-based SDTM is designed to provide the best available
DAA supervisory guidance to help the PIC avoid potential LoWCs or NMACs during
mid-air encounters in real-time, rather than to determine the best solutions from all
possible maneuvering options through MC simulations over a long period of time.
Moreover, with the further improvement on the policy network constructed for real-
time supervisory guidance, the learning-based SDTM will be able to provide better
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maneuvering options that are converging to the optimal maneuvering options for small
UA in self-separation.
6.2.2 Collision avoidance
When UA self-separation fails (i.e., when traffic aircraft are approaching the CAAT
boundary in the hazard zone and NMACs are projected), the UA should exit from
self-separation mitigation and enter collision avoidance mitigation to avoid coming
NMACs. To help UA handle such emergencies in collision avoidance, we develop a
three-dimensional evasive maneuvering algorithm which consists of two components:
horizontal maneuvering strategy and vertical maneuvering strategy.
6.2.2.1 Horizontal maneuvering strategy in the three-dimensional
evasive maneuvering algorithm
UAS
Traffic
I 
II III
IV
Traffic
Traffic
Traffic
0
90
180
270
CAAT
Figure 6.8: Horizontal maneuvering strategies in the three-dimensional evasive maneuvering
algorithm.
In Fig. 6.8, once NMACs are projected and the break-ins are predicted on the
CAAT boundary in the next five seconds, the evasive maneuvering algorithm evaluates
collision risks and triggers horizontal maneuvers based on the traffic-detected relative
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bearing and the traffic relative heading with respect to the UA in four quadrants from
0◦ to 360◦. In each quadrant in Fig. 6.8, when traffic are heading to the red regions
(displayed as the red arc areas), the algorithm starts to initiate evasive maneuvers
to steer the UA to the safe regions which are far away from traffic potential heading
areas and stay there until the horizontal range rate r˙ > 0 and the horizontal range
r > DMODaz (2 nmi) between the UA and traffic. Assume that maximum 2g turns
(turn rate at 6◦/sec) can be achieved on the UA. The UA horizontal maneuvering
options at four quadrants in Fig. 6.8 are designed differently and their details are
described as follows:
Evasive maneuvers in quadrant I
As shown in Fig. 6.9, the maneuvering strategy in quadrant I is to let the UA fly
to safe waypoints in quadrant II, which are located at a position 90◦ off the traffic
break-in bearings on the CAAT boundary in quadrant II. Upon the traffic break-in
bearings, the UA make left turns or right turns to fly to the predefined safe waypoints.
The UA make right turns when the break-in bearing is less than 45◦; and the UA
make left turns when the break-in bearing is greater than 45◦.
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II III
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45
(a) Break-in bearing < 45◦
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(b) Break-in bearing > 45◦
Figure 6.9: Evasive maneuvering strategy in quadrant I.
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Evasive maneuvers in quadrant II and III
In Fig. 6.10, two maneuvering strategies are described for the cases when traffic are
coming from the rear of the UA. In Fig. 6.10a, the UA make left turns to fly to
the predefined safe waypoints in quadrant III when the traffic break-in bearing is in
quadrant II (rear right of the UA). In Fig. 6.10b, the UA make right turns to fly to
the predefined safe waypoints in quadrant II when the traffic break-in bearing is in
quadrant III (rear left of the UA).
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Figure 6.10: Evasive maneuvering strategies in quadrant II and quadrant III
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Figure 6.11: Evasive maneuvering strategy in quadrant IV
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Evasive maneuvers in quadrant IV.
In Fig. 6.11, the UA make left turns to fly to the predefined safe waypoints in quadrant
III when the break-in bearing is greater than 315◦; and the UA make right turns to
fly to the predefined safe waypoints in quadrant III when the break-in bearing is less
than 315◦.
6.2.2.2 Vertical maneuvering strategy in the three-dimensional evasive
maneuvering algorithm
In collision avoidance, horizontal and vertical maneuvers are performed at the same
time so small UA can escape from emergencies as soon as possible. The vertical
maneuvering strategy is designed based on the vertical separation dh and the traffic
vertical rate h˙traffic; namely, it is to increase the vertical separation between the UA
and traffic, so that the vertical separation at the horizontal CPA can be greater
than 100 ft (hnmac = ±100 ft). This strategy is described in further detail with the
corresponding diagrams for different encounter geometries in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Vertical maneuvering strategy
Geometric Classification Action Diagram
Traffic above UA
dh > 0
UA descending
h˙ua < 0
Traffic
UA
dh > 0
Traffic below UA
dh < 0
UA climbing
h˙ua > 0
Traffic
UA
dh < 0
Co-altitude and traffic climbing
dh = 0 and h˙traffic > 0
UA descending
h˙ua < 0
Traffic UA
dh = 0
Co-altitude and traffic levelling
dh = 0 and h˙traffic = 0
UA descending
h˙ua < 0
Traffic UA
dh = 0
Co-altitude and traffic descending
dh = 0 and h˙traffic < 0
UA climbing
h˙ua > 0
Traffic UA
dh = 0
Fang 2018 119
6.3 Performance Evaluation
As drawn in Fig. 6.1, the performance evaluation module is the last module of the
Avoid System on the fast-time simulation platform, which is designed to evaluate
the mitigation performance of DAA systems through millions of simulated mid-air
encounters in civil airspace. With this evaluation module, analytical results are used
to guide modifications and improvements for newly-developed mitigation solutions,
and later, after a number of evaluation iterations, mitigation solutions can be fine-
tuned and qualified on the fast-time simulation platform based on their mitigation
performance. Finally, the performance evaluation results should be documented and
further analyzed to help system developers work on continuous improvements [126],
and to convince aviation authorities to grant approvals for integrating small UA into
civil airspace in the near future.
6.3.1 Risk ratio definitions
In statistics, a risk ratio is an intuitive method to use to compare risk probabilities
between two selected study groups with relatively low probabilities [127], which is
similar to the case of violating encounters in all mid-air encounters. Hence, a risk
ratio method is adopted in this subsection to carry out a variety of statistical collision
risk analyses over mitigated encounters and unmitigated encounters among millions of
simulated mid-air encounters in civil airspace [2, 128].
As drawn in Fig. 6.12, the set and related subsets defined in Table 6.7 are used
to describe the risk ratios of mitigated and unmitigated encounters designed in this
subsection for statistical mitigation performance analysis. Three risk ratios in equations
Eq. 6.1, Eq. 6.2, and Eq. 6.3 are designed: RiskRatio (mitigated), the risk ratio of
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mitigated violating encounters is used to evaluate the overall performance of mitigation
solutions; RiskRatio (induced), the risk ratio of newly-induced violating encounters
is used to locate problems in mitigation solutions and guide future improvements;
and RiskRatio (unresolved), the risk ratio of unresolved violating encounters is used
to analyze incident reasons, such as late maneuvering timing or wrong maneuvering
options.
U
AB
B1 B2 A - B2
Figure 6.12: Mitigation risk ratio analysis diagram.
Table 6.7: Set and subset for the risk ratio analysis.
Name Description
Set U the total number of encounters in the risk ratio analysis,
Subset A the total number of violating encounters without mitigation,
Subset B the total number of violating encounters with mitigation,
Subset ( A - B2 ) the number of violating encounters avoided with mitigation,
Subset B1 the number of violating encounters newly induced with mitigation, and
Subset B2 the number of violating encounters unresolved with mitigation.
RiskRatio (mitigated) =
P (ViolatingEncmitigated)
P (ViolatingEncunmitigated)
=
B/U
A/U
=
B
A
(6.1)
RiskRatio (induced) =
P (ViolatingEncinduced)
P (ViolatingEncunmitigated)
=
B1/U
A/U
=
B1
A
(6.2)
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RiskRatio (unresolved) =
P (ViolatingEncunresolved)
P (ViolatingEncunmitigated)
=
B2/U
A/U
=
B2
A
(6.3)
Where:
RiskRatio (mitigated) the risk ratio of mitigated violating encounters;
RiskRatio (induced)) the risk ratio of newly-induced violating encounters;
RiskRatio (unresolved)) the risk ratio of unresolved encounters;
P (ViolatingEncmitigated) the probability of the violating encounters with mitigation;
P (ViolatingEncunmitigated) the probability of the violating encounters without mitigation;
P (ViolatingEncinduced) the probability of the newly-induced violating encounters with
mitigation; and
P (ViolatingEncunresolved) the probability of the unsolved violating encounters with mitigation.
In Section 6.2, DAA mitigation strategies are introduced in two categories, self-
separation and collision avoidance, so the statistical analysis for the performance
evaluation is also performed based on these two categories.
6.3.1.1 Self-separation performance
Similar to the equations in Eq. 6.1, Eq. 6.2, and Eq. 6.3, the risk ratios for the
mitigation performance analysis in self-separation are defined as follows:
RiskRatioss (mitigated) =
P (LoWCmitigated)
P (LoWCunmitigated)
=
B/U
A/U
=
B
A
(6.4)
RiskRatioss (induced) =
P (LoWCinduced)
P (LoWCunmitigated)
=
B1/U
A/U
=
B1
A
(6.5)
RiskRatioss (unresolved) =
P (LoWCunresolved)
P (LoWCunmitigated)
=
B2/U
A/U
=
B2
A
(6.6)
6.3.1.2 Collision avoidance performance
Similar to the equations in Eq. 6.4, Eq. 6.5, and Eq. 6.6, the risk ratios for the
mitigation performance analysis in collision avoidance are defined as follows:
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RiskRatioca (mitigated) =
P (NMACmitigated)
P (NMACunmitigated)
=
B/U
A/U
=
B
A
(6.7)
RiskRatioca (induced) =
P (NMACinduced)
P (NMACunmitigated)
=
B1/U
A/U
=
B1
A
(6.8)
RiskRatioca (unresolved) =
P (NMACunresolved)
P (NMACunmitigated)
=
B2/U
A/U
=
B2
A
(6.9)
6.3.2 Performance documentation
As listed in Table 6.8, not only the mitigation results but also the whole processes
for risk assessment and mitigation strategy are documented in the database for
further statistical analysis and incident investigations to ensure continuous safety
assurance [126]. For example, they can be used by system developers to keep improving
the performance of DAA systems, and by aviation authorities to grant approvals for
integrating small UAS into civil airspace in the near future.
Table 6.8: Datasets documented for further performance analysis
Dataset Parameters included
Traffic states Horizontal velocity, Vertical rate, Detected bearing, Heading
UAS states Horizontal velocity, Vertical rate, Heading
Wind conditions Wind speed, Wind direction
Maneuvering options
Maneuvering command list, Range at maneuver triggered,
Turning direction, Heading change, Vertical rate commanded
Encounter states
Range rate, HMD(unmitigated), Vs(unmitigated), τmod(unmitigated)
Prisk(Penetration)unmitigated, Prisk(Range)unmitigated
Mitigation performance
Trajectory deviation, HMD(mitigated), Vs(mitigated), τmod(mitigated),
Prisk(Penetration)mitigated, Prisk(Range)mitigated, LoWC, NMAC
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6.4 Encounter Mitigation Performance Analysis
As shown in the system block diagram in Fig. 6.1, with the completion of the
mitigation strategy module and the performance evaluation module in the last two
sections, we construct a closed-loop mitigation performance analysis platform (i.e., the
fast-time simulation based analysis platform). Through this platform, we begin to carry
out a variety of mitigation performance analyses on specified encounter geometries
as listed in Table 5.4 (e.g., a left-converging traffic encounter or a left oblique UA
overtaking encounter), as well as evaluate the overall mitigation performance for the
newly-developed DAA supervisory guidance on the fast-time simulation platform
over millions of simulated repeatable mitigated and unmitigated encounters among
a comprehensive set of encounter geometries [42]. These performance analyses are
summarized in a series of case studies as follows:
Case study 1: mitigation decisions made by a three-level decision tree
Fig. 6.13a shows a pair of horizontal trajectories with a north heading UA and
a left-converging traffic in a mid-air encounter, in which the initial conditions are:
the detected traffic bearing at 327◦ (the northwest), the traffic heading at 125◦ (the
southeast), the south wind (10◦) at 20 kt, the UA ground speed at 95 kt, and the
traffic ground speed at 136 kt. In this encounter, the mitigation enabling condition
Prisk(Collision) > 0.5 is reached at the horizontal range r = 4.02 nmi when the
predicted τmod = 72 sec, HMD = 0.08 nmi (486 ft) and Vs = 609 ft. As listed in
Table 6.9, the predicted collision risk levels at (t0 + 30) keep changing with various
system delays considered in the decision making. Hence, to handle non-removable
system delays of 5 to 15 seconds, maneuvering option 5 in Table 6.9 (i.e., [R3, 0, 0],
which indicates to take a 2g right turn at the first choice point for 10 seconds) is
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selected as the least disruptive maneuver (according to the deviation distance and
the deviation angle) for the UA to remain WC and achieve the new separation at
(t0 + 30) with the horizontal range r = 2.07 nmi, τmod = 51 sec, HMD = 0.86 nmi
(5225 ft) and Vs = 609 ft. Later, as shown in Fig. 6.13b, a simple left turn can be
used to return the UA back to the original flight course.
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Figure 6.13: Mitigation performance analysis for a left-converging traffic encounter.
Table 6.9: Maneuvering options for the encounter with left-converging traffic by a
three-level decision tree.
Option
index
t0 t0 + 10 t0 + 20
Predicted
Prisk(Collision) with delays
Deviation
distance
(nmi)
Deviation
angle
(deg)
Least
disruptive
maneuver
0 sec 5 sec 10 sec 15 sec
1 0 0 0 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.73 0.00 0.00
2 0 0 R3 0.44 0.48 0.51 0.68 0.09 43.02
3 0 R3 0 0.39 0.43 0.46 0.56 0.26 43.02
4 0 R3 R3 0.12 0.21 0.30 0.50 0.30 90.28
5 R3 0 0 0.22 0.37 0.41 0.45 0.44 43.02 X
6 R3 0 R3 0.05 0.14 0.22 0.37 0.47 90.28
7 R3 R3 0 0.00 0.09 0.18 0.27 0.51 90.28
8 R3 R3 R3 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.45 149.80
Fang 2018 125
Case study 2: mitigation decisions made by a six-level decision tree
Fig. 6.14a shows a pair of horizontal trajectories with a north heading UA and a
left oblique traffic in a UA overtaking encounter, in which the initial conditions are:
the detected traffic bearing at 327◦ (the northwest), the traffic heading at 61◦ (the
northeast), the south wind (10◦) at 20 kt, the UA ground speed at 95 kt, and the
traffic ground speed at 76 kt.
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(a) Left oblique UA overtaking
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(c) Mitigated trajectories via the six-
level decision tree (derived from
Option 6 on the top three-level
decision tree)
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(d) Mitigated trajectories via the six-
level decision tree (derived from
Option 8 on the top three-level
decision tree)
Figure 6.14: Mitigation performance analysis for a left oblique UA overtaking encounter.
In this encounter, the mitigation enabling condition Prisk(Collision) > 0.5 is
reached at the horizontal range r = 2 nmi when the predicted τmod = 79 sec, HMD
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= 0.72 nmi (4375 ft) and Vs = 401 ft. At the beginning, a three-level decision tree is
first constructed for the mitigation process with eight maneuvering options listed in
Table 6.10 and their probable maneuvering trajectories drawn in Fig. 6.14b. However,
as seen in Table 6.10, the predicted collision risk levels at (t0 + 30) are all greater
than 0.5 on this three-level decision tree, so it requires a further six-level decision tree
to make a final maneuvering decision for the UA to remain WC in this encounter
(e.g., eight new three-level decision trees are constructed under the eight outputted
maneuvering options of the top three-level decision tree).
Table 6.10: Maneuvering options for the left oblique UA overtaking encounter by the top
three-level decision tree.
Option
index
t0 t0 + 10 t0 + 20
Predicted
Prisk(Collision) with delays
Predicted
HMD
(nmi)
Predicted
range
(nmi)
0 sec 5 sec 10 sec 15 sec
1 0 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 1.03
2 0 0 R3 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.06
3 0 R3 0 0.87 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.36 1.16
4 0 R3 R3 0.82 0.90 0.98 1.00 1.24 1.24
5 R3 0 0 0.77 0.85 0.94 1.00 0.54 1.29
6 R3 0 R3 0.71 0.79 0.88 0.96 1.37 1.37
7 R3 R3 0 0.57 0.65 0.74 0.82 1.55 1.55
8 R3 R3 R3 0.54 0.62 0.70 0.78 1.60 1.60
According to the predictions in Table 6.11 and in consideration of various system
delays in decision making, maneuvering option 62 in Table 6.11 (derived from ma-
neuvering option 8 in Table 6.10; namely, [R3, R3, R3, R3, 0, R3]) is selected as the
least disruptive maneuvering option from all the qualified maneuvering options (e.g.,
options 57 - 62) in Table 6.11 with the predicted collision risk levels at t0 + 60. Note
that maneuvering option 60 in Table 6.11 is another qualified maneuvering option with
the deviation angle at 77.02◦ but it is not the least disruptive maneuver because of
the larger deviation distance (0.35 > 0.17 nmi). As with the maneuvering trajectories
predicted in Fig. 6.14d, the UA is almost back to the original flight course when
maneuvering option 62 is selected.
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Table 6.11: Maneuvering options for the left oblique UA overtaking encounter by the
expanded six-level decision tree (for Option 6 and 8 on the top three-level decision tree).
Option
index
t0 + 30 t0 + 40 t0 + 60
Predicted
Prisk(Collision) with delays
Deviation
distance
(nmi)
Deviation
angle
(deg)
Least
disruptive
maneuver
0 sec 5 sec 10 sec 15 sec
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
41 0 0 0 0.47 0.56 0.64 0.73 1.10 90.28
42 0 0 R3 0.44 0.53 0.61 0.70 1.04 149.80
43 0 R3 0 0.38 0.46 0.54 0.63 0.91 149.80
44 0 R3 R3 0.39 0.47 0.55 0.64 0.82 138.19
45 R3 0 0 0.31 0.39 0.46 0.55 0.79 149.80
46 R3 0 R3 0.32 0.39 0.47 0.55 0.69 138.19
47 R3 R3 0 0.36 0.43 0.50 0.58 0.50 138.19
48 R3 R3 R3 0.41 0.48 0.55 0.63 0.44 77.02
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
57 0 0 0 0.08 0.16 0.23 0.31 0.70 149.80
58 0 0 R3 0.09 0.16 0.23 0.32 0.60 138.19
59 0 R3 0 0.12 0.19 0.26 0.34 0.41 138.19
60 0 R3 R3 0.17 0.24 0.31 0.38 0.35 77.02
61 R3 0 0 0.15 0.21 0.27 0.35 0.22 138.19
62 R3 0 R3 0.19 0.26 0.32 0.39 0.17 77.02 X
63 R3 R3 0 0.32 0.38 0.43 0.51 0.07 77.02
64 R3 R3 R3 0.37 0.43 0.49 0.56 0.10 77.02
Case study 3: mitigation decisions made by various mitigation methods
In this case study, for performance comparisons, we carry out a series of mitigation
performance analyses over five typical encounter geometries as listed in Table 6.12
using two mitigation algorithms designed in Section 6.2: the mitigation algorithm
based on the SDTM in Subsection 6.2.1 and the mitigation algorithm based on the
Collision Avoidance Horizontal Maneuvering algorithm (CAHM) in Subsection 6.2.2.
Note that the CAHM was originally designed for collision avoidance but it can be used
for self-separation as well. In addition, the wind conditions for the encounters listed in
Table 6.12 are 20 kt south winds (10◦), and the mitigations are enabled with 15-second
delays (i.e., 15 seconds after the mitigation enabling condition Prisk(Collision) > 0.5
is reached during mid-air encounters).
The performance comparisons on the maneuvering options and the trajectory
deviations are described and listed in Table 6.12 with the corresponding diagrams.
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Table 6.12: Mitigation performance comparison diagrams
No Unmitigated Geometries CAHM Mitigated SDTM Mitigated
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Right turn [R3, 45 sec]
Deviation [83.00◦, 0.26 nmi]
at t0 + 45
Right turn [R3, R3, 0]
Deviation [90.28◦, 0.51 nmi]
at t0 + 30
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Left Oblique
UA Overtaking
Right turn [R3, 42 sec]
Deviation [102.06◦, 0.31 nmi]
at t0 + 42
Right turn [R3, R3, , R3, R3, 0, R3]
Deviation [77.02◦, 0.17 nmi]
at t0 + 60
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Left-converging Traffic
UA Overtaking
Right turn [R3, 40 sec]
Deviation [115.84◦, 0.35 nmi]
at t0 + 40
Right turn [R3, 0, 0]
Deviation [43.02◦, 0.44 nmi]
at t0 + 30
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Based on the comparisons in Table 6.12, we can conclude as follows:
• The SDTM provides less disruptive and more efficient maneuvers for the UA
to remain WC: either a lower turn rate during a similar turning time, or less
turning time with a similar turn rate. For instance, in the head-on encounter
in Table 6.12, the CAHM initiates a 15-second 2g right turn, and the SDTM
triggers two consecutive left turns: a 10-second 1g left turn followed by another
10-second 0.5g left turn; namely, the SDTM provides lower turn rates for the
UA to remain WC with smaller deviations from the original flight course (with
a smaller deviation angle and deviation distance on the simulated maneuvering
trajectories).
• The SDTM also intends to select a maneuvering option to help the UA return
back to the original flight course easier, e.g., in the left oblique UA overtaking
encounter in Table 6.12, the SDTM provides a maneuvering option with a longer
turning time but it guides the UA to almost fly back to the original flight course.
After the suggested maneuver is performed for 60 seconds, the traffic is outside
of the hazard zone of the UA, so the SDTM can return the UA back to the
previous flight immediately.
In addition, as shown in the maneuvering diagrams in Table 6.12, multiple suitable
maneuvering options are usually available for the PIC to select during UA self-
separation. The PIC can pick up them upon the preference of either the safest option
or the most efficient option. Therefore, a diagram table like Table 6.12 can be used as
a decision visualization method to guide the PIC to choose appropriate maneuvering
decisions in consideration of wind conditions and system delays to avoid LoWCs or
NMACs in mid-air encounters.
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Case study 4: Risk ratio analysis for mitigation performance evaluation
in UA self-separation
In this case study, for obtaining comprehensive risk ratio analytical results, 200 million
mid-air encounters in a variety of geometries are generated and analyzed on the
fast-time simulation platform, in which the wind conditions are set at 20 kt south
winds (10◦) and the SDTM is employed to provide mitigation solutions for UA self-
separation. In Fig. 6.15, three LoWC risk ratios are calculated based on the risk
ratio equations in Eq. 6.4, Eq. 6.5, and Eq. 6.6 defined in Subsection 6.3.1.1 (i.e.,
RiskRatioss (mitigated), RiskRatioss (induced), and RiskRatioss (unresolved)).
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Figure 6.15: Mitigation performance analysis of LoWC risk ratios in UA self-separation.
The impact of LoWC risk ratios on various system delays (e.g., 0, 5, 10, 15 seconds)
are also studied in the analytical statistics. For example, in Fig. 6.15, the mitigated
LoWC risk ratios stay at [0.03, 0.04] when system delays are within [0, 10] seconds,
whereas they are almost doubled when system delays are more than 15 seconds. As the
induced LoWC risk ratios are always close to constant in Fig. 6.15, the big increases of
mitigated LoWC risk ratios come from the large amount of unresolved LoWCs during
mid-air encounters. In other words, the more system delays in the mitigation process
the more unresolved LoWCs during mid-air encounters; or, the fewer system delays
the better mitigation performance in UA self-separation. As a result, a mitigation
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supervisory guidance system like the SDTM becomes essential for the PIC to reduce
the decision-making time involving in choosing suitable mitigation solutions to avoid
LoWCs or NMACs in UA self-separation.
In addition, as mentioned in Subsection 6.3.2, the newly-induced and unresolved
LoWC encounters are also saved in the database for further investigation and analysis
to improve the mitigation performance of DAA systems. For example, in the UA
overtaken encounter drawn in Fig. 6.16a, the UA and traffic fly to the north at 75 kt
and 175 kt, respectively. The self-separation mitigation is triggered when the collision
risk level Prisk(Collision) is greater than 0.5 (i.e., r = 2 nmi, HMD = 0.11 nmi, Vs =
335 ft, and τmod = 81 sec). As shown in the projection, the UA will be in LoWC in 46
sec; however, in consideration of system delays, the UA may not be able to fly to the
west far enough to prevent LoWC even with a steep left turn (e.g., HMDt0+46 = 0.62
nmi, which is still within the minimum LoWC boundary, DMODwc at 4000 ft or 0.66
nmi).
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(b) Front-converging Traffic
Figure 6.16: Sample diagrams for unresolved LoWC encounters in risk ratio analysis due to
system delays.
Fig. 6.16b shows another unresolved LoWC encounter, where the right-converging
traffic has a sudden left turn and heads to the UA. In this encounter, the collision risk
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level Prisk(Collision) is changed from 0 to 0.9 in 20 sec during the traffic’s sudden
left turn. Meanwhile, HMD is also changed from 2.02 nmi to 0.03 nmi and τmod is
changed from 78 sec to 40 sec. Thus, the UA bounds to LoWC in terms of the late
alerting time involving instinctive system delays.
Case study 5: Risk ratio analysis for mitigation performance evaluation
in UA collision avoidance
In this case study, for NMAC risk ratio analysis, five million mid-air encounters in a
variety of geometries are generated and analyzed on the fast-time simulation platform,
in which the wind conditions are set at 20 kt west winds (86◦) and the three-dimensional
evasive maneuvering algorithm is employed to avoid potential NMACs in UA collision
avoidance. In Fig. 6.17, three NMAC risk ratios are calculated based on the risk
ratio equations in Eq. 6.7, Eq. 6.8, and Eq. 6.9 defined in Subsection 6.3.1.2 (i.e.,
RiskRatioca (mitigated), RiskRatioca (induced), and RiskRatioca (unresolved)).
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Figure 6.17: Mitigation performance analysis of NMAC risk ratios in UA collision avoidance.
The impact of the NMAC risk ratios on various system delays (e.g., 0, 1, 2, 3,
4, 5 seconds) at the breach of the CAAT boundary are studied in the analytical
statistics. As shown in Fig. 6.17, the mitigated NMAC risk ratios are almost in
proportion to the system delays introduced in UA collision avoidance. For example,
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with five-second system delays, the mitigated NMAC risk ratios are increased to almost
0.2; thus, only 80% potential NMACs can be avoided in UA collision avoidance. In
other words, mitigation performance in UA collision avoidance cannot be maintained
with system delays. Therefore, as designed and suggested in Subsection 6.2.2, the
collision avoidance mitigation should be automatically triggered five seconds before
the breach of the CAAT boundary of UA to overcome non-removable system delays
from sensor measurements, data communications and aircraft aerodynamic responses.
For further investigation and analysis, all newly-induced and unresolved NMAC
encounters are saved in the database. For example, in the UA overtaken encounter
drawn in Fig. 6.18a, the UA (green) and traffic (red) fly to the north at 75 kt and
80 kt, respectively. The collision avoidance mitigation is triggered when the traffic
approaches to 800 ft behind the UA. A NMAC will occur when the system delay
is introduced for more than five seconds (because the UA cannot fly to the east far
enough).
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(b) Front-converging Traffic
Figure 6.18: Sample diagrams for unresolved NMAC encounters in risk ratio analysis due to
system delays.
Fig. 6.16b shows another unresolved NMAC encounter, where the traffic has a
sudden right turn and heads to the UA. In this encounter, the traffic is outside the
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CAAT boundary in most of the time of the encounter; however, when the traffic
engages a sudden turning maneuver, heads to the UA, and almost approaches the
CAAT boundary of the UA, in consideration of system delays, there will be not enough
alert time for the UA to prevent NMAC from such maneuvering traffic.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we complete the development of the mitigation strategy module
and the performance evaluation module for the fast-time simulation platform. Two
mitigation solutions are developed in the mitigation strategy module for small UA to
avoid LoWCs or NMACs in self-separation and collision avoidance. A learning-based
decision tree method is developed to help the PIC carry out the decision making on
choosing mitigation solutions for UA self-separation, and a three-dimensional evasive
maneuvering algorithm is developed to help UA escape from emergencies in UA collision
avoidance. Finally, three risk ratios are introduced in the performance evaluation
module to help system developers evaluate the mitigation performance, locate the
hidden limitations in mitigation algorithms, and work on continuous improvements on
DAA systems for the future approval of integrating small UAS into civil airspace.
Millions of simulated mid-air encounters are generated and analyzed on the fast-time
simulation based analysis platform to evaluate and qualify the mitigation performance
of the DAA supervisory guidance developed for small UA in self-separation and
collision avoidance. At the same time, all the mitigation solutions obtained during
the performance evaluation and qualification on the fast-time simulation platform are
logged into the database for future further analysis and investigation.
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Chapter 7
Experimental Work
With the development of DAA systems for small UAS in the RAVEN project, a variety
of flight tests have been planned, scheduled, and performed at the RAVEN test site
in Argentia, NL. During the flight tests, the theoretical approaches are tested and
validated; at the same time, the testing results and difficulties in the flight tests also
guide the direction of the theoretical approach in the next run, which is exactly the
case for the research work conducted and achieved in Chapter 4-6.
(a) UAS Operation (b) UAS GCS
Figure 7.1: UAS operation crew members and the GCS.
As the RAVEN project pictures show in Fig. 7.1, flight tests are team effort
missions which require UA, GCS, and ground control crew members, e.g., external
pilots (EPs), aerial vehicle operators (AVOs), ground supervisors, and ground spotters,
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as well as a test site to carry out UA testing flights with the permission from Transport
Canada under the SFOC.
7.1 RAVEN Unmanned Aircraft
7.1.1 Giant Big Stik Unmanned Aircraft
The Giant Big Stik (GBS) aircraft is originally an Almost-Ready-Fly (AFR) R/C
fixed wing model aircraft from Great Planes. The engine and servos were selected and
installed by the RAVEN project, and the detailed specifications are listed in Table
7.1. For UAS integration, the ArduPilot Mega (APM) 2.6 autopilot from 3D Robotics
is used as the flight controller for the GBS UA. This APM autopilot is designed to
use an external magnetometer to improve flight performance by allowing the compass
module (or combined GPS with the compass) to be placed further away from sources
of potential magnetic interference [129]. The GCS obtains the telemetry data and
sends commands to the UA over the command and control link at 900 MHz. The EP
uses a hand-held controller at 2.4 GHz for the manual override.
(a) GBS Take-off (b) GBS Flying
Figure 7.2: Giant Big Stik aircraft take-off and flying.
The GBS UA is an aerobatic aircraft flying at a wide airspeed range in [30, 100]
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kt. With a RAVEN custom-made 2-liter fuel tank, this UA can be airborne at a 50 kt
cruise speed for one hour without refuelling.
Table 7.1: Giant Big Stik aircraft specifications.
Aircraft Parameters Specifications
Airframe Wingspan 2045 mm
Wing area 97.93 dm2
Length 1385 mm
Empty weight 7 kg
Maximum take-off weight 10 kg
Engine Model DLE-30
Displacement 30.5 cc
Performance 3.7 hp at 8500 rpm
Fuel 87-93 Octane Gasoline with a 30:1
gas/2-stroke (2-cycle) oil mixture
Ignition Electronic 6V
Propellers Model XOAR Wood PJA Natural
Size 18x8, 18x10, 19x8, 20x8
7.1.2 Vector-P Unmanned Aircraft
The Vector-P aircraft is a professional composite UA with an endurance from 30
minutes to six hours depending on the payload and fuel configurations on the UA [130].
The detailed specifications are listed in Table 7.2. For UAS integration, the MicroPilot
2128g autopilot is used as the flight controller for the Vector-P UA. This autopilot is
designed to support long-range communication (LRC) between the UA and GCS [131].
The GCS obtains the telemetry data and sends commands to the UA over the command
and control link at 900 MHz. The EP uses a hand-held controller at 2.4 GHz for the
manual override.
The Vector-P UA is a pusher propeller aircraft which reduces the aerodynamic
disturbance at the front of the aircraft [132] and provides a relatively large payload
bay in the fuselage for various payload configurations. With a RAVEN custom-made
5-liter fuel tank, this UA can be airborne at a 75 kt cruise speed for one hour without
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(a) Vector-P Take-off (b) Vector-P Flying
Figure 7.3: Vector-P aircraft take-off and flying.
refuelling.
Table 7.2: Vector-P aircraft specifications.
Aircraft Parameters Specifications
Airframe Wingspan 2565 mm
Length 2300 mm
Empty weight 15 kg
Maximum take-off weight 25 kg
Engine Model 3W-75iUS
Displacement 75.22 cc
Performance 7.5 hp at 8500 rpm
Fuel 87-93 Octane Gasoline with a 50:1
gas/2-stroke (2-cycle) oil mixture
Ignition Electronic 6-8.5V
Propellers Model Biela Carbon Props
Size 22x12, 24x10
7.2 RAVEN Flight Test Site
Due to safety concerns, the flight tests are carried out under the SFOC at the RAVEN
flight test site, an abandoned former US naval base in Argentia, NL. As shown in Fig.
7.4, there is a large amount of flat open space on the runway areas for short range
visual-line-of-sight (VLOS) flight tests, as well as adjacent areas above the ocean for
long-range beyond-visual-line-of-sight (BVLOS) flight tests.
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It usually takes about one and a half hours on the highway from the RAVEN
project office in St. John’s, NL to the test site in Argentia, NL. A three thousand
square-foot hangar space is also rented by the RAVEN project at the Argentia test
site for the storage and local workshop to prepare flight missions and repair aircraft
parts during the flight tests.
(a) Argentia Runway (b) Argentia Map
Figure 7.4: The RAVEN project test site in Argentia, NL.
7.3 UA Synchronization for Mid-air Encounters
Achieving repeatable pre-defined air-to-air encounter flights is an essential task to
collect data for the development of DAA systems at the beginning of the research, as
well as to test and validate newly developed DAA systems later on for the completion
of the research work. To obtain the most effective and repeatable mid-air encounters,
two UA have to be synchronized to meet together at a predefined location and altitude
at the same time; namely, this requirement can be summarized as UA four-dimensional
(4D) synchronization during mid-air encounters [37,38].
At the early stage of the RAVEN project two UA 4D synchronization was attempted
by using two EPs and two AVOs on the ground. This effort failed due to too many
errors occurring in this manual process. For example, errors occurred when trying to
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use the human eye to estimate aircraft position and altitude, the wind effect blowing
the aircraft off-track could not be compensated for correctly, and errors occurred
due to the time delay experienced during communications between the EP and the
AVO. Furthermore, it was very difficult to achieve repeatable air-to-air synchronized
encounters using this manual 4D synchronization method. In a twenty-minute flight,
data from only one or two encounters were validated for data analysis. Most of
the flight time was wasted. To overcome these drawbacks, an automatic encounter
trajectory control algorithm is designed and developed to achieve two UA automatic
4D synchronization during mid-air encounters at different encounter angles and in
gusty wind conditions.
7.3.1 System Schematic for UA 4D Synchronization
UA
GCS1
UA 4D SYNC
Software
UA
GCS2
Telemetry 
   Data
UDP UDP
Control 
Commands
       Control 
Commands
Figure 7.5: UA 4D synchronization system schematic diagram
When two UA are switched to autopilot control after manual take-off, two GCSs
are used to monitor the status of the autopilot on the UA and to command the UA
to change waypoints, cruise speed, altitude, etc. As shown in Fig. 7.5, the UA 4D
synchronization algorithm communicates with the two aircraft GCSs over the UDP
network. After analyzing the telemetry data from the two UA, the synchronization
algorithm sends out synchronization commands to the two GCSs to control the two
UA for synchronized flight.
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7.3.2 System Design for UA 4D Synchronization
To synchronize two UA in the air, the UA 4D synchronization algorithm first needs to
acquire the current location, airspeed, altitude, heading, and next waypoint of each of
the two UA from telemetry data on the UDP network of two GCSs.
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(a) Waypoint3 Changed
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(b) Waypoint4 Changed
Figure 7.6: UA 4D synchronization system design diagram.
As shown in Fig. 7.6, UA2’s rectangular circuit (green color) can be rotated around
Waypoint 1 to achieve desired encounter angles from 0 to 360 degrees at Waypoint
1. The main control algorithm is used to minimize the distance error between the
two aircraft and their target waypoint (d1-d2). Namely, when the two aircraft head
to the same waypoint number and the error (d1-d2) closes to zero, the two aircraft
are 4D synchronized. Indeed, this control variable, i.e., distance error to the target
waypoint, also includes the implied wind effects in the control loop automatically so
the 4D synchronization algorithm does not need the AVO to manually update the
changing wind information during the synchronization.
If a large disturbance occurs, the algorithm not only changes the aircraft airspeed
but also automatically changes the location of the target waypoint to make up for the
limitation in the UA airspeed range. For example, in Fig. 7.6a, when UA1 reaches its
Waypoint 3, and UA2 is still too far away from its Waypoint 3, the algorithm will
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automatically shorten UA2’s distance to its Waypoint 3 by moving UA2’s Waypoint 3
to UA2’s current location and command UA2 to head to its Waypoint 4, as UA1 is
doing. On the other hand, when UA2 is flying too fast, the new algorithm will move
its target Waypoint 3 further away to wait for UA1 to catch up to its Waypoint 3.
In Fig. 7.6b, the same control theory is imposed on UA2’s Waypoint 4 as well. By
changing the locations of UA2’s Waypoint 3 and Waypoint 4, the control variable, i.e.,
the distance error to the target waypoint, will be small enough to be minimized when
the two aircraft head to their Waypoint 1 and a synchronized 4D encounter at the
location of Waypoint 1 is achieved.
7.3.3 Test Results for UA 4D Synchronization
Robust performance of UAV 4D synchronization has been achieved in flight tests at
the RAVEN project test site. As shown in Fig. 7.7a, the UA 4D synchronization
software moves UA2’s Waypoint 3 closer when UA1 has reached its Waypoint 3 (top
corner of the orange rectangular circuit). After the distance error is minimized after
Waypoint 3, UA2 is able to catch up to UA1 and have a synchronized 135-degree
encounter at Waypoint 1 as shown in Fig. 7.7b.
(a) Waypoint3 Changed (b) 4D Synchronized at Waypoint 1
Figure 7.7: UA 4D synchronization testing results.
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7.4 Development of ADS-B Based Cooperative
ACAS
Since 2011, the RAVEN project has partnered with R-Cubed Engineering for the use
of their All-Weather Sense and Avoid System (AWSAS) shown in Fig. 7.8. AWSAS is
an ADS-B technology-based system which transmits ADS-B positional information on
978 MHz and receives ADS-B radio transmissions on both 978 MHz ES and 1090 MHz.
The AWSAS unit also has an onboard Digital Signal Processor (DSP). During the
development of the RAVEN ADS-B based ACAS, the UA collision avoidance algorithm
designed in Subsection 6.2.2 is implemented on the AWSAS DSP processor which
analyzes the ADS-B traffic information and sends out collision avoidance guidance
commands to the autopilot on the host UA in order to initiate evasive avoidance
maneuvers whenever the traffic is approaching the CAAT boundary and potential
NMACs are predicted [35,36].
Figure 7.8: AWSAS Box Diagram.
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7.4.1 System Design for ACAS
As shown in Fig. 7.9, the host UA and the traffic UA are both equipped with AWSAS
boxes so that the air traffic information can be exchanged between two UA via 978
MHz RF communication. AWSAS is connected to the autopilot on the UA via either
PWM signals or RS232 serial communications.
Host
UA
AWSAS
Traffic
UA
AWSAS
ADS-B
MessagesRF RF
PWM       RS232 PWM       RS232
Figure 7.9: Cooperative ADS-B based ACAS schematic diagram.
On the AWSAS DSP processor, the UA collision avoidance algorithm has been
implemented in the C language and compiled into the runtime code for real-time
DSP running, where the decoded GPS positions are first converted into the local
Cartesian coordinates (x, y, h) by Eq. 3.1 - Eq. 3.6 in Chapter 3, and then fed to
the UA collision avoidance algorithm for analysis and decision making. Once collision
avoidance maneuvers are required and selected during mid-air encounters, the AWSAS
DSP processor sends out three control variables to the autopilot on the UA, i.e., the
turn rate, the heading change, and the vertical rate, to initiate evasive maneuvers for
collision avoidance.
7.4.2 Results for Initial ACAS Flight Tests
After the initial ADS-B based cooperative ACAS prototype is developed and tested on
the ground, a series of airborne ACAS flight tests have been scheduled and performed
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at the RAVEN test site in Argentia, NL to check the system performance of both
the hardware and the software, i.e., the ADS-B transmitter and receiver, the ADS-B
antenna positions on the UA, the communication protocol between the autopilot and
AWSAS, as well as the collision avoidance algorithm implemented on the AWSAS
DSP processor.
As shown in Fig. 7.10, two GBS UA sit on the runway before the ACAS flight
tests, where the AWSAS box is mounted on the upper nose of the GBS UA.
(a) Ready to Fly (b) Before Take-off
Figure 7.10: Initial flight tests for ACAS.
During the flight tests, two EPs first take off two UA manually and hand over to
two AVOs for autopilot flights, then the UA 4D synchronization software developed in
Section 7.3 is used to align two UA to enter the pre-defined encounter in a short period
of time (e.g., two minutes). Once two UA are aligned, the UA 4D synchronization
software releases the flight control to the ACAS for collision avoidance mitigation.
The maneuvering trajectories in Fig. 7.11a demonstrate a successful automatic
collision avoidance maneuver triggered by the ACAS on the runway areas in a head-on
encounter. Moreover, usually only a set of flight statuses from the UA can be displayed
on a computer screen on the GCS, either the host UA or the traffic UA, thus for
increasing the encounter situation awareness during flight tests, an ACAS monitoring
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(a) Head-on encounter trajectories from the
recorded autopilot flight logs
(b) ACAS GUI on the GCS for monitoring
Figure 7.11: Initial test results for ACAS.
graphic user interface (GUI) is developed for AVOs as shown in Fig. 7.11b, where the
red box is the host UA and the green triangle is the traffic UA. Before the maneuver
is engaged, the host UA is heading to the northwest (315◦) and the traffic UA is
heading to the south (180◦). At the time the turn is triggered, the traffic UA detected
bearing to the host UA is around 20◦; therefore, the right turn avoidance is triggered
and shown in Fig. 7.11b. In addition, Fig. 7.12 shows air-to-air pictures at mid-air
encounters during ACAS flight tests, where the traffic UA are detected in red eclipses.
(a) No maneuver required for traffic UA on the top(b) Left turn maneuver triggered for a co-altitude
traffic UA in the front
Figure 7.12: Encounter pictures in ACAS flight tests.
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7.4.3 Hardware-in-loop ACAS Testing Platform
More than a dozen automatic collision avoidance maneuvers have been successfully
achieved on the RAVEN UA at the RAVEN test site during short range Visual Line of
Sight (VLOS) flight tests; however, due to the high cost of UA and flight operations,
numerous all-direction encounter tests with aircraft in various airspeed ranges cannot
be performed as required; therefore, a hardware-in-loop (HIL) ACAS testing platform
is designed and constructed for intensive ACAS functional testing in the RAVEN
project lab.
Host
UA2HIL
AWSAS AWSAS
ADS-B
Message
Encoder
Traffic
UA2HIL
Telemetry2
222Data
UDP UDP
RS232 RS232PWM
RS232
PWM
RS232
Figure 7.13: The HIL ACAS testing platform schematic diagram.
As shown in Fig. 7.13, real-time aircraft telemetry data from two (i.e., host UA
and traffic UA) separate HIL simulators are fed into the ADS-B message encoder and
converted into real-time ADS-B messages. AWSAS boxes receive the ADS-B messages
from the RS232 serial communication link instead of the 978 MHz RF link. The PWM
signals or RS232 data are the outputs from the AWSAS boxes that command the
autopilot to control the host UA to make proper maneuvers if needed.
In Fig. 7.14, the two laptops on the left are HIL systems for the host UA and
the traffic UA, where the GCS software communicates with the autopilot and the
simulated UA in FlightGear [133], a visualized aircraft model and flight environment
simulator software. The ADS-B message encoder software is running on the laptop
on the right. At the same time, this laptop is also used to display received ADS-B
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(a) Front View (b) Side View
Figure 7.14: The HIL ACAS testing platform in the lab.
messages on the map where two UA are flying. When used in the HIL simulators
as described above, UA in various airspeed ranges can be simulated and flown in all
direction encounter geometries aligned by the UA 4D synchronization software as
required. The UA collision avoidance algorithm behaves exactly as it would when
installed on a UA during real flight tests. This means future actual test flights using
this avoidance algorithm should achieve the same results as observed during HIL
simulator testing.
7.4.4 ACAS HIL Test Results
Thousands of NMAC encounters in a variety of geometries have been performed on
the HIL ACAS testing platform with 90% successful collision avoidance results during
ACAS HIL tests. Most unsolved NMACs occur when traffic UA emerge from three
pairs of symmetric bearing regions on the UA CAAT boundary as the red arcs marked
in Fig. 7.15 (i.e., 30◦ ± 10◦ and 60◦ ± 10◦ in Quadrant I, 110◦ ± 10◦ in Quadrant II,
250◦ ± 10◦ in Quadrant III, as well as 330◦ ± 10◦ and 300◦ ± 10◦ in Quadrant IV).
Upon the UA trajectories depicted in Fig. 7.15, most unresolved NMACs (d <
RNMAC = 500 ft) are because of the late triggering on the required collision avoidance
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Figure 7.15: Diagrams for unresolved NMACs in Quadrant I in ACAS HIL tests.
maneuvers; in other words, the collision avoidance algorithm fails to estimate wind
effects on small UA in collision avoidance. The HIL testing results indeed have
guided research work on the CAAT boundary localization in winds for small UA (i.e.,
the research work to determine the CAAT boundaries in various wind conditions in
Chapter 4), as small UA are more affected in winds during horizontal maneuvers than
manned aircraft and large UA.
In addition, the HIL flight test is extremely time consuming in terms of the time to
set up the UA on the HIL simulator and the time to carry out the pre-defined mid-air
encounter. It takes about 20 minutes per encounter on the HIL simulator. As a result,
the HIL flight test is good for system development, e.g., the system functional test for
the newly-developed DAA systems; however, for system evaluation and qualification,
it is better to design a fast-time evaluation and qualification platform to perform
millions of simulated encounters in computer processor ticks (e.g., in one ten-millionth
of a second [134]), instead of actual clock ticks in seconds on the HIL testing platform.
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7.5 Ground Portable Radar for Non-Cooperative
Traffic
Since 2014, the RAVEN project has worked with Seamatica Aerospace (SMA) for
the use of their Zeus ground portable radar. As shown in Fig. 7.16, the Zeus radar
is based on OEM hardware originally designed for airborne weather detection. It
operates at X-band (permitting physically small and light-weight RF hardware to be
employed) and makes exclusive use of solid state technology. The Zeus radar also uses
long pulses with linear frequency modulation (LFM) pulse compression to increase
the energy on target while maintaining a tight range resolution [14].
(a) Zeus without radome (b) Zeus with radome
Figure 7.16: Zeus ground portable radar assembly [13].
Table 7.3 summarizes the key specifications of the Zeus hardware. It is noted that
the selected pulse duration (coupled with internal processing delays) results in a blind
range of approximately 0.5 nmi (an area within visual range). During target tracking,
the antenna scan rate results in an average target update interval of 2.5 seconds, which
is reasonable for a low-flying GA aircraft (altitude below 5000 feet).
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Table 7.3: Zeus ground portable radar specifications and settings.
Parameter Value
Centre Frequency 9375 MHz
Peak Transmit Power 40 W
Pulse Repetition Frequency (PRF) 3750 Hz
Pulse Duration 3.41 µs
Pulse Bandwidth 4688 kHz
Antenna Gain 25.8 dBi
Antenna Half Power Beamwidth (HPBW) 9◦
Antenna Scan Extents ±60◦
Antenna Scan Rate 48◦/sec
Antenna Tilt +3◦
Minimum Detectable Signal (PD = 0.7, PFA = 10−6) -127 dBm
7.5.1 Test Procedure
To check the radar detection performance, a field flight test is performed at Witless
Bay Line, NL as shown in Fig. 7.17. Seven flight plans are drawn in different colors
on the map in Fig. 7.17, including three approaching maneuvers, three crossing
maneuvers and a circular maneuver as listed in Table 7.4.
Figure 7.17: Witless Bay Line radar test flight plan on the map.
The traffic aircraft consists of a small, single engine float plane with a cruise
airspeed of 120 kt at 2000 ft and a typical radar cross section (RCS) on the order of 1
m2. The Zeus radar is installed at the Point 0 position on the map in Fig. 7.17 and
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aligned with the road (i.e., the heading angle at 80◦). In addition, a GPS recorder is
placed in the aircraft to obtain GPS positions and tracks for analysis.
Table 7.4: Summary of radar test flight plan.
Flight No Flight Plan Track Heading Track Color
1 Point 1 fly to Point 0 215◦ Red
2 Point 2 fly to Point 0 260◦ Green
3 Point 3 fly to Point 0 305◦ Cyan
4 Point 3 fly to Point 1 350◦ Orange
5 Point 4 fly to Point 5 170◦ Magenta
6 Point 7 fly to Point 6 170◦ Yellow
7 Circle (1.5 nmi radius) N/A Blue
7.5.2 Test Results
Figure 7.18: Results for the approaching maneuvers [14]. Distances are relative to the radar,
bearings are relative to the 80◦ radar pointing angle, the range rings interval is 1 nmi and
the scan spoke interval is 15◦.
Results for the three approaching maneuvers are shown in Fig. 7.18. All of the
results are plotted such that the range is taken to be relative to the radar location
and the bearings are relative to 80◦. In each approaching maneuver, three scans are
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required to establish track, and track is maintained for the complete maneuver. There
are only two instances of missed detections: one during Flight 2 (Point 2 fly to Point
0) at a range of approximately 4.2 nmi and another during Flight 3 (Point 3 fly to
Point 0) at a range of 3.3 nmi. This suggests that the detection reliability is very high
over these areas.
Figure 7.19: Results for the crossing maneuvers [14]. Distances are relative to the radar,
bearings are relative to the 80◦ radar pointing angle, the range rings interval is 1 nmi and
the scan spoke interval is 15◦.
Similar results are obtained for the crossing maneuvers, as shown in Fig. 7.19.
In particular, the two near paths exhibit perfect detection performance and strong
tracking performance with minimal false tracks. However, the furthest path (Point
3 fly to Point 1) is found to exhibit reduced detection performance when the target
range exceeds 4.5 nmi.
Finally, the results for the circular maneuver are shown in Fig.7.20. This data
exhibits strong performance with no missed detections. Furthermore, track is main-
tained throughout the maneuver despite occasionally significant deviations in the
detected target position relative to the GPS track.
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Figure 7.20: Results for the circular maneuver [14]. Distances are relative to the radar,
bearings are relative to the 80◦ radar pointing angle, the range rings interval is 1 nmi and
the scan spoke interval is 15◦.
The detection and tracking performance of the Zeus radar system is tested against a
representative GA target performing a variety of maneuvers over land clutter. Results
indicate excellent detection reliability when the target is within 4.5 nmi. Approaching
5 nmi is found to result in drop in detection probability, which can most likely be
attributed to multipath fading [14]. In summary, the test is successful and serves as a
key step on the path to developing a practical ground portal radar system.
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7.6 BVLOS Flight Tests
To fully research UAS operations in normal air traffic scenarios, the RAVEN UA have
to be able to fly in a large airspace to simulate real air traffic. However, such flights
are not allowed by the initial visual-range SFOC obtained from Transport Canada that
governs RAVEN flight operations in the VLOS range, because extra safety features
have to be installed on the UA to prevent the UA from flying away from the area
assigned by the SFOC when UA fly out of the visual range of the EP. For example, in
the RAVEN BVLOS SFOC application, extended communication links, a First-Person
View (FPV) video system, a flight termination system (FTS) [40], and Geo-fence and
Return-To-Launch (RTL) functions enabled in the autopilot are added to prove to
Transport Canada that the RAVEN project has the capability to prevent the UA from
flying-away during a BVLOS mission [41]. As a result, the RAVEN project is granted
an SFOC for BVLOS flights over the ocean at the RAVEN test site in the Argentia
area from Transport Canada as the red box region (3 nmi by 4 nmi) defined on the
map in Fig. 7.21.
Figure 7.21: Map for the BVLOS operating area in Argentia, NL.
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7.6.1 System Configuration for BVLOS UAS
As shown in Fig. 7.22, additional FTS and FPV systems are installed on the UA and
integrated with its built-in autopilot and R/C control systems. Three RF links are
used for BVLOS flights: a 900 MHz link is used for the communication between the
UA autopilot and the GCS by the AVO; a 2.4 GHz link is used for R/C manual control
by the EP; and a 5.8 GHz link is used for the real-time airborne video transmission by
the EP and the AVO. The FTS checks the healthy status of the 900 MHz and 2.4 GHz
links. If both links are lost for more than two minutes, the FTS will kill the engine to
prevent the unmanned aircraft from flying away. At ranges beyond the visual range of
the EP (approximately 0.25 nmi) and within the R/C link range (approximately 1
nmi), the FPV video system can help the EP control the aircraft to fly home (using
manual R/C control) if the autopilot system fails. At ranges beyond the R/C link
range, the FPV system allows the AVO to visually monitor the progress of the flight
and the status of the onboard systems.
FTS
Autopilot bManualb
Override
bbAutopilotb
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Figure 7.22: System configuration for BVLOS UAS.
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7.6.2 Link-loss Failure Action Plan for BVLOS Flights
During BVLOS flights, link-loss failures are the main factors that might lead a UA to
fly away. Table 7.5 describes how R/C, Autopilot (AP), and FPV link-loss failures
are handled during BVLOS flights.
Table 7.5: Link-loss failure cases in BVLOS flights.
Case
R/C
Link
AP
Link
FPV
Link
ACTION
Case 1 X X X
• Mission continues;
• Location of UA is known at all times via AP and FPV links.
Case 2 5 5 X
• Timeout counter starts;
• Location of UA is known at all times via FPV link;
• During the timeout period UA should head back towards the launch location; if either the R/C or AP link is not regained,
at end of the timeout period the engine is killed and the UA will impact the ground/water;
• If during the timeout period a reliable R/C or AP link is regained, then the timeout counter is disabled and subsequent
action is as per Case 5 or Case 7.
Case 3 5 5 5
• Timeout counter starts;
• During the timeout period UA should head back towards the launch location;
• If either the R/C or AP link is not regained, at end of the timeout period, the engine is killed and the UA will impact the
ground/water;
• If during the timeout period a reliable R/C or AP link is regained, then the timeout counter is disabled and subsequent
action is as per Case 6 or Case 8.
Case 4 X X 5
• Mission continues;
• Location of UA is known at all times via AP link.
Case 5 5 X X
• Mission continues;
• Location of UA is known at all times via AP and FPV links;
• At the end of the mission, UA is directed to landing point/safe area by uploading a new AP flight plan via AP link;
• If the R/C link has not been regained when UA arrives at landing point, the engine is killed and the UA will impact the
ground in a safe area;
• If the R/C link has been regained when UA arrives at the landing point, EP lands UA under R/C control.
Case 6 5 X 5
• Mission continues;
• Location of UA is known at all times via AP link;
• At the end of the mission, UA is directed to a landing point/safe area by uploading a new AP flight plan via AP link;
• If the R/C link has not been regained when UA arrives at the landing point, the engine is killed and the UA will impact the
ground in a safe area;
• If the R/C link has been regained when UA arrives at the landing point, EP lands UA under R/C control.
Case 7 X 5 X
• UA should head back towards the launch location;
• Location of UA is known at all times via FPV link;
• When UA arrives at the pre-programmed safe area, EP takes R/C control and lands;
• If UA is not heading in the correct direction, EP immediately takes R/C control and flies UA and lands.
Case 8 X 5 5
• If UA is within visual range of the EP, then the EP takes R/C control and lands the UA in a safe area;
• If EP is not successful or if UA is beyond visual range of the EP, the EP will shut off the R/C transmitter, thus inducing an
R/C link failure. Then, the situation becomes the same as Case 3.
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7.6.3 BVLOS Flights
As flight logs show in Fig. 7.23, BVLOS flights are conducted out and back from the
take-off point on the runway to Fox Island in Placentia Bay, a distance of approximately
2.5 nmi each way. The cruise altitude achieved is approximately 1200 ft above MSL.
During BVLOS flights, the UA can only be seen during the takeoff and landing at the
runway area. Once the UA climb to above 800 ft, the EPs and AVOs have to rely on
the AP and FPV links to monitor the attitude, position, and status of the UA at the
GCS and control the UA to carry out the flight missions for the research on BVLOS
flight operations, i.e., UA self-separation mitigation and collision avoidance mitigation
for small UAS.
Figure 7.23: BVLOS flights at the RAVEN project test site in Argentia, NL.
In BVLOS flight operations, the EP is the Pilot-in-Command (PIC) for the UA
during manual takeoff and landing, and the AVO is the PIC for the rest period of
time during the autopilot flight (e.g., 55 minutes in a 60-minute BVLOS flight). In
addition to continued monitoring of the attitude, position, and status of the UA at
the GCS, the PIC/AVO should check the ACAS GUI for potential LoWCs or NMACs
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during mid-air encounters. When LoWCs are predicted, the PIC/AVO needs to
make maneuvering decisions for self-separation mitigation to avoid potential LoWCs.
However, in consideration of wind effects on small UA level maneuvers, it is very
difficult for the PIC/AVO to determine an appropriate mitigation solution in a short
period of time (e.g., 30 seconds) to answer three fundamental questions “when to
maneuver”, “how to maneuver”, and “how long for the maneuver”, according to the
horizontal range, the detected relative bearing, the heading and the closing speed to
the UA on the ACAS GUI. As a result, it is necessary to have a DAA guidance system
to help the PIC/AVO reduce the workload and improve the mitigation performance
during BVLOS flight operations. This indeed guides the research work carried out in
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
7.7 Summary
Numerous VLOS and BVLOS UA flights are successfully carried out at the RAVEN
test site in Argentia, NL to test and validate the newly-developed ADS-B based
cooperative ACAS for small UAS. During flight tests, the UA 4D synchronization
control software and the ACAS HIL testing platform are also developed as required to
facilitate the system functional testing work in the development of the ADS-B based
cooperative ACAS. In addition, a ground portable radar test is performed at Witless
Bay Line, NL to check the radar performance on detecting non-cooperative mid-air
traffic nearby UAS operating areas.
The testing results and difficulties in the flight tests also direct the new theoret-
ical approaches discussed in Chapter 4 - 6, i.e., the impact of wind effects on the
WCAT/CAAT boundaries for small UAS in self-separation and collision avoidance, and
a set of real-time DAA supervisory guidance for small UAS during mid-air encounters.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
8.1 Contributions
This thesis develops a closed-loop simulation based evaluation and qualification
environment with all the elements involved in the development of DAA systems for
small UAS, and carries out the experimental work for DAA implementation and flight
tests. Later, credited with lessons learned from the experimental work and the efficiency
of the newly-developed fast-time simulation platform, three major contributions for
hazard identification, risk assessment, and mitigation solution are designed, developed,
modified and improved to provide real-time DAA mitigation guidance for small UAS
with other traffic during mid-air encounters in civil airspace. As described in Fig.
8.1, the research work in this thesis is a creative and coherent combination of the
incremental technological contributions based on theoretical foundations, such as
dynamic programming, small UAS aerodynamics, supervised learning, data mining,
discrete event system, and limited lookahead strategies. The core contribution “risk-
based supervisory guidance for DAA involving small UAS” became the title of this
thesis and can be summarized in the following sub-areas:
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Figure 8.1: Diagram for three major contributions in this thesis.
8.1.1 Modelling
A series of mathematical models are designed in the thesis through Chapter 2 to
Chapter 6 during the development of DAA modules for the fast-time simulation
platform, i.e., the encounter generation model, the sensor measurement model, the
target tracking model, the hazard identification model, the risk assessment model, the
mitigation strategy model, as well as the performance evaluation model. Through these
models, a closed-loop evaluation and qualification environment is constructed for DAA
systems of small UAS, where mid-air encounters are simulated, traffic are detected
and tracked, collision risks are assessed, mitigation maneuvers are suggested, and
mitigation performance is analyzed and recorded for further analysis and investigation.
8.1.2 Analysis Platform
From Chapter 2 through to Chapter 6, the fast-time simulation-based analysis platform
is developed to exercise encounter geometries, qualify the performance and reliability
of mitigation solutions, and perform statistical analysis over millions of simulated
mid-air encounters from a set of repeatable high-fidelity aircraft encounters in civil
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airspace in a short period of time. The completion of this simulation platform reduces
the turnaround time of the performance evaluation for DAA systems, facilitates the
modifications and improvements of the newly-developed DAA systems, and helps
them achieve the ultimate goal of an equivalent level of safety as human pilots on
manned GA aircraft.
8.1.3 Situation Awareness
Wind effects are introduced in the mathematical analysis for hazard identification
in Chapter 4 to determine the ever-changing outer and inner safety boundaries,
i.e., WCAT and CAAT boundaries, in various wind conditions for small UAS in
self-separation and collision avoidance. In addition, a set of time-based and range-
based metrics, i.e., Prisk(τmod), Prisk(HMD), and Prisk(Vs), are designed for risk
assessment in Chapter 5 to evaluate encounter collision risks in real-time and provide
normalized risk levels, i.e., Prisk(Penetration), Prisk(Range), and Prisk(Collision),
for oncoming air traffic during mid-air encounters. With a decision synthesis on both
safety boundaries and collision risks, appropriate DAA mitigation enabling times are
selected for small UAS to initiate maneuvers to avoid potential LoWCs or NMACs
with other nearby traffic in civil airspace.
8.1.4 Mitigation Solutions
In Chapter 6, two types of mitigation solutions are designed and developed for small
UAS to provide DAA maneuvering guidance during mid-air encounters; namely, self-
separation solutions suggested by the learning-based SDTM, and collision avoidance
solutions derived from the three-dimensional emergency evasive maneuvering algorithm.
With millions of simulated mid-air encounters in civil airspace on the fast-time
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simulation platform, these two mitigation solutions are tested, modified and qualified
in Chapter 6 in numerous encounter geometries with various uncertainties on sensor
measurements, wind effects and system delays.
8.1.5 Performance Ranking
For aircraft safety, the airworthiness of the UAS can be evaluated and certified by the
existing standards and regulations for the manned GA aircraft, but for DAA systems,
there are no standards and regulations provided by aviation authorities at present.
Thus, a set of new analytical metrics, i.e.,
RiskRatioss (mitigated), RiskRatioss (induced), RiskRatioss (unresolved),
RiskRatioca (mitigated), RiskRatioca (induced), and RiskRatioca (unresolved),
are introduced for DAA systems in Chapter 6 to establish a performance ranking
system for small UAS integration in civil airspace with manned GA aircraft. This
performance ranking system will guide the researchers and system developers toward
achieving the certification of newly developed DAA systems for small UAS, and help
aviation authorities evaluate the risk levels of integrating small UAS in civil airspace.
8.1.6 Implementation and Flight Tests
The theoretical approaches achieved in the thesis are integrated into an effort of
implementing DAA systems in Chapter 7 to provide a safe operation environment
for small UAS in civil airspace. A ground portal radar system and an ADS-B based
ACAS are developed and integrated (with the RAVEN team of which the author is
a member) to provide the ability to detect both cooperative and non-cooperative
traffic in the surveillance volume. During the system testing of the ACAS, a HIL
simulator was designed and constructed for system ground tests and pilot training,
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and a 4-dimensional (4D) encounter synchronization control system was also designed
and developed for improving the efficiency of flight tests in the field.
8.2 Future Work
Future work could begin with further improvement of the knowledge base for SDTM
decision making to cover more wind conditions, more traffic velocities, and more UA
velocities in civil airspace, which will be an essential prerequisite for obtaining future
approval for integrating small UAS into civil airspace. The current knowledge base
was obtained from the MC simulation work carried out in Chapter 4 only for the UA
operated at a 75 kt cruise speed in 20 kt gusty winds from eight wind directions, and
the traffic operated at six cruise speeds with 50 kt increments from 50 kt to 300 kt.
As a result, more MC simulations have to be carried out to improve the knowledge
base for more accurate supervisory guidance in mid-air encounters.
The second item for future work could be to migrate the MC simulation com-
putation platform from the centralized computing system (e.g., a single powerful
computer system with an Intel Core-i7 CPU, 32 GB RAM and 256 GB SSD [135]) to
the distributed computing system or cloud computing system (e.g., Amazon AWS,
Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud Platform [136]) to have the planned MC simula-
tions performed and completed in a short period of time, because current commercial
cloud computing systems can scale resources elastically with the demand from MC
simulations when needed, i.e., large amounts of data storage and compute time from an
almost infinite pool of resources [137]. On the contrary, as an example, the knowledge
base constructed in Chapter 4 took almost a month of computation time on the
centralized computing system to run through all possible maneuvers to locate the
least disruptive maneuvers for each of the simulated mid-air encounters. Moreover,
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the supervised learning in Chapter 6 also required a significant amount of time (i.e.,
days) to form the policy network for maneuvering options because of range-querying
operations from the database on the centralized computing system, which is another
unquestioned reason to use cloud computing, rather than the current centralized
computing, to carry out the future task of further improving the knowledge base for
small UAS DAA guidance in mid-air encounters.
The third item for future work could be to research reinforcement learning (RL)
methods to improve SDTM decision making through self-learning on successful mit-
igation solutions achieved by either the first choice of the SDTM or the preference
of the PIC over millions of simulated mid-air encounters in civil airspace on the
fast-time simulation platform. Similar to the SL knowledge base derived from the MC
simulations, the successful mitigation solutions on the fast-time simulation platform
will be sorted and saved in the RL knowledge base in the uniform distribution for each
encounter scenario; namely, only one successful mitigation solution is selected as the
maneuvering option based on the first choice of the SDTM or the preference of the
PIC for each encounter case in the RL knowledge base. Later, the RL policy network
could be generated and synthesized with the previously obtained SL policy network for
the new SDTM to provide more adaptive guidance solutions in DAA decision making.
After the first three future works are completed and qualified on the fast-time
simulation platform, as depicted in Fig. 8.2, the fourth item for future work could be
to employ this fast-time simulation platform to determine the sensor requirements,
i.e., minimal operational performance standards (MOPS) for detection sensors. Bruno
Miranda Artacho, a Master’s student in the RAVEN project, has employed the
initially-developed fast-time simulation platform from this thesis to determine the
radar detection range required for assisting small UAS in achieving an equivalent level
of safety as manned aircraft in civil airspace. In the future, more sensor performance
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Figure 8.2: Diagram for future recommendations.
requirements on different parameters could be determined by the advanced fast-time
simulation platform from this future work.
The fifth task for future work could be to implement the newly-developed SDTM
into DAA systems to provide online supervisory guidance for small UAS in mid-air
encounters. During the implementation of the RAVEN ACAS in Chapter 7, the UAS
collision avoidance algorithm was implemented on the onboard microcontroller (i.e., TI
TMS320C28343 microcontroller [138]). To implement both self-separation and collision
avoidance mitigation algorithms into the next generation of small UAS DAA systems,
a higher-performance processor platform should be chosen for the development, e.g.,
TI BeagleBone Black ARM Cortex-A8 platform with a TI real-time operating system
(RTOS), 1GHz ARM Cortex-A8 processor, 512 MB RAM, and 4 GB flash storage [139].
In this case, for the SL and RL policy networks up to 150 MB obtained from the second
and the third future work, they can be directly loaded into the system memory (RAM)
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to provide online supervisory guidance in real-time regardless of database querying
operations. In addition, the ACAS HIL testing platform developed in Chapter 7 can
also be used to test and verify the performance of the new DAA systems on both
software and hardware levels over a variety of encounter geometries.
The sixth task for future work could be to carry out the validation flight tests
for the newly-developed small UAS DAA systems in the field. The initial flight tests
can be performed at the RAVEN project test site in Argentia, NL; however, due
to the RAVEN SFOC restriction on BVLOS flights, the true BVLOS flight tests
could be held in a UAS test range (authorized by Transport Canada, e.g., the test
range in Alma, QC) to comprehensively test and verify the system performance of
the newly-developed small UAS DAA systems in a variety of encounter geometries as
required.
The ultimate goal of this thesis has been added on the top of the research tree
in Fig. 8.2. To implement the near-term solution of integrating small UAS into civil
airspace, the current thesis could be extended for small UAS operations from a single
GCS to a local ATC facility to help air traffic controllers manage small UAS air traffic
at the level above 2000 ft with manned air traffic in the region. In the future, with
more small UAS operational data obtained at low-altitude (e.g., below 400 ft [140]),
more accurate small UAS encounter models could be developed for the future fast-time
simulation platform, in turn, small UAS DAA systems could be further researched and
tested on the future fast-time simulation platform for the UAS Traffic Management
(UTM) environment proposed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) [141].
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